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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This was the only [election] race I ever lost in my life, but in the process I learned two 
extremely valuable lessons. During the campaign, my father had left me to my own 
devices, but when it was over, he pointed out that I had taken my own neighborhood for 
granted. He was right: I had received a tremendous vote in the other sections of the city, 
but I hadn’t worked hard enough in my own backyard. “Let me tell you something I 
learned years ago,” he said. “All politics is local.” 
Thomas ‘Tip’ O’Neill, former Speaker of the House of Representatives (Novak, 1987, p. 25) 
 
 
With this quote about his first of many election campaigns, Tip O’Neill (1912-1994) articulated 
what many politicians worldwide have come to realize during their careers: local roots are of 
the utmost importance in election campaigns and legislative activities. Neglecting local 
background, and failing to defend constituency interests can cost any incumbent his or her re-
election. Throughout his long and rich career in American politics, O’Neill got thoroughly 
convinced that legislators need to cater for their constituents if they want to build long and 
successful political careers. How to get elected, the pitfalls to avoid and how to stay in office 
are all directly related to dedicated constituent service. This also has important consequences 
for the candidate nomination and campaigning strategies of political parties. If locally rooted 
politicians are highly popular and electorally successful, then parties should be supportive of 
local party activity and recruitment in order to create a pool of locally rooted candidates, and 
be sensitive to the geography criterion in the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections. 
There are, however, various processes at work which might diminish the importance of local 
roots in parliamentary elections. According to Caramani (2004), politics in most European 
countries is becoming more and more nationalized and homogenized: this implies the formation 
of national electorates and party systems, party organizations and campaigns, as well as issues 
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and party manifestos. Geographical specificities disappear, and “local candidates are absorbed 
into nationwide structures and ideologies” (Caramani, 2004: 1). Other authors find evidence for 
an ongoing presidentialization of politics, where a number of national figureheads monopolize 
election campaigns and televised political debates, and strongly determine nationwide election 
results (Van Aelst et al., 2012; Rahat and Sheafer, 2007; Poguntke and Webb, 2005). This group 
of lucky few often present themselves as the ultimate defenders of national interests, and end 
up with the most important and powerful executive and parliamentary positions after the 
election. In fact, ‘the local’ seems to play a less important role in their rhetoric and campaigning 
style.  
If electoral convergence and nationalization indeed take place, where parliamentary election 
results become increasingly similar for every part of the country, and if these results can indeed 
be predicted by national-level determinants, then the common wisdom propagated by Tip 
O’Neill has become tremendously outdated. Who cares about ‘the local’ if all politics is 
determined by national election trends, televised debates and uniform campaign slogans and 
stunts, orchestrated by marketers from the central party headquarters located in the country’s 
capital? 
At first sight, however, political parties themselves still seem to care about local aspects in 
electoral politics. Looking at the nature of intraparty candidate recruitment, observing the 
electoral strategies of political parties, we can safely say that parties are still somewhat obsessed 
with the geographical and local dimensions of candidate selection processes and election 
results. Party organizations internally evaluate their election results from a geographical 
perspective: in which areas did the party make electoral gains compared to previous elections, 
and where did it suffer an electoral setback? Additionally, established parties traditionally 
invest a huge amount of effort into local elections, which involves designing locally customized 
election campaigns and recruiting a considerable group of local party candidates. Even new 
political parties often start their organizational expansion by forming local party branches all 
over the country. The recruitment, training and socialization of local activists and elites 
promotes party institutionalization (Randall and Svasand, 2002).1  
                                               
1
 Some parties (e.g. PVV in the Netherlands) follow a different organizational approach, and deliberately 
do not allow party membership or do not develop the party on the ground to avoid intraparty tensions 
(de Lange and Art, 2011). 
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Another intriguing observation in this regard is the obsession most parties have with the local 
background of candidates and incumbent MPs in their candidate selection processes. This was 
also noticed by Michael Gallagher in his co-authored book on intraparty candidate selection 
processes: “When it comes to objective personal characteristics, one almost invariably sought 
is the possession of local roots” (Gallagher, 1988: 251). Moreover, parties in list PR systems 
are typically worried about the territorial coverage of their party lists: did we nominate 
candidates from all areas of the electoral district? Did we cover every outskirt with locally 
rooted candidates? Indeed, there are various real-life examples from Belgium or other country 
cases where political party selectorates2 go out of their way to draft geographically balanced 
candidate lists and to select candidates with very specific local/geographical profiles. And when 
parties do not respect these geographical sensitivities, they often get publicly condemned by 
dissatisfied legislators or local grassroots organizations. In what follows, I present a number of 
striking examples of the above, starting with the Belgian case and proceeding with a Dutch, 
Austrian and Israeli example. 
 
Local candidate characteristics in candidate selection: Belgian examples 
In the run-up to the 2014 parliamentary elections, Flemish socialist and former member of 
federal government Bruno Tuybens, was assigned to the last position on the candidate list in 
his district (East-Flanders). As Tuybens was aiming for the third position on the list, a safe 
position according to the election polls at the time, he was utterly disappointed with the 
selectorate’s decision to move him to this less secure position instead (De Standaard, 
14.02.2014, p. 4). Contrary to what Tuybens hoped for, the selectorate decided to nominate 
Fatma Pehlivan for the third position: a female candidate with Turkish roots living in the 
electoral district capital of Ghent. Tuybens himself had been the mayor of Zwalm, a small rural 
municipality south of Ghent, and criticized the selectorate for the lack of geographical balancing 
on the party list: “Pehlivan might be a strong candidate of course, but by selecting another 
candidate from Ghent, the regional balance has been disrupted. Who is going to appeal to the 
rural voters?” Tuybens obviously referred to the potential electoral setback the party would 
                                               
2
 Throughout this dissertation, the term “party selectorate” is used to refer to the main body that selects 
the candidates. 
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suffer if its list of candidates ignored his local area. In the end, Tuybens decided not to accept 
the offer of the party selectorate, and retired from national politics. 
In this particular case, it seems that the party selectorate prioritized the gender and ethnic 
criterion over the geography criterion while selecting candidates for the party lists. Historically, 
the Flemish socialists have their electoral strongholds in the larger Flemish cities such as Ghent 
and Antwerp (Marissal et al.,2007). This often resulted in party lists dominated by candidates 
living in these metropolitan areas (Put et al., 2011). Even a former member of government with 
strong local roots in his municipality (i.e. a former mayor) was de-selected in favor of a 
candidate living in the capital city of the district. Self-evidently, the fact that Pehlivan is female 
and appeals to the large Turkish community in Ghent are additional reasons why she would be 
an attractive candidate to the party selectorate. The selection of Pehlivan pleases the grassroots 
supporters in Ghent, which has always been a key strategic area for the socialists, and satisfies 
the socialist voters by including minority group candidates on the party list.  
According to the disadvantaged candidate Tuybens, however, the party would lose votes caused 
by a lack of rural candidates among the realistic positions on the list. He explicitly criticized 
the geographical nomination strategy of his party, and proposed an alternative strategy where 
candidates from rural areas and small municipalities take on a much more prominent role on 
the party lists. Moreover, Tuybens also argued that his de-selection would cause turmoil among 
several local party branches even before the election results were known. In sum, Tuybens 
warned that the party would not only be electorally punished for the lack of geographical 
balance, but intraparty unity would suffer as well. 
A second anecdote takes us back to the Flemish regional elections of 2004. These were the first 
regional elections organized with provincial electoral districts, and required some special 
attention from the central party headquarters and subnational party branches. After all, it was 
the first time that party lists had to be drafted on the provincial level. In other words, the party 
selectorates were required to nominate a balanced set of candidates from within the broader 
boundaries of their province. In one of the electoral districts (Flemish-Brabant), two small 
previous districts were merged and the candidate selection process of the Flemish Christian-
democrats was organized at the new provincial district level. However, the two ‘subdistrict’ 
branches were allowed to check and reject the model list drafted by the provincial level (De 
Standaard, 05.03.2004, p. 3).  
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Leuven, which was one of the two involved subdistrict branches, decided to reject the model 
list even before it was finalized with specific candidate names. The Leuven branch feared that 
the proposed geographical distribution of realistic list positions would be too much in favor of 
the other subdistrict branch (Halle-Vilvoorde). The risk was that the Leuven candidates Trees 
Merckx and Jan Laureys (mayor of Diest), respectively in third and fourth position on the list, 
would be beaten on the basis of preferential votes by the more popular Halle-Vilvoorde 
candidates, Sonja Becq and Michel Doomst on the sixth and the final list position. Becq and 
Doomst were well-known candidates in their local area, and one could imagine that they would 
be able to overcome the party provided rank order based on an impressive number of 
preferential votes. Moreover, the demographic weight of their local area within the district 
eclipsed the demographic weight of the Leuven candidates. As a result, the provincial party 
selectorate had to renegotiate an adapted version of the party list, where the candidates from 
the Leuven subdistrict were assigned to better list positions than in the previous version of the 
model list. Afterwards, the party selectorate finally got to an agreement on a geographically 
more balanced party list to which both subdistrict branches could commit. 
Similar intraparty mechanisms were at work in the francophone Socialist party PS, during the 
candidate selection process in the Hainaut district before the 2003 federal elections. The chairs 
of the various subdistrict party branches (Hainaut occidental, Soignies, Mons-Borinage, 
Charleroi et Thuin) met with national party president Di Rupo at the national headquarters in 
Brussels (Saintghislain, 28.11.2002, p. 7). During this meeting, they extensively discussed the 
geographical distribution of candidates on the party list over the respective subdistrict areas. 
What strikes the eye in this particular example, is that the national party level had to intervene 
in order to come to a compromise on the candidate lists. So these examples from the Belgian 
case show that intraparty candidate selection strongly differs in terms of the involvement of 
local, district and national party organizations. It tickled my curiosity to examine which of these 
procedures actually resulted in geographically balanced candidate lists and which did not. And 
in the end, did the local and geographical profile of the list make any difference with regard to 
the electoral success of the list? 
 
Foreign examples 
This obsession with the geographical dimension of candidate selection is not limited to the 
Belgian case. Also in other list PR systems, political parties often make the assumption that 
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local roots of candidates and geographical balance will increase the success rate of party lists. 
For the Dutch provincial council elections, the head of the PvdA candidate nomination 
committee explained that the selectorate applied a variety of criteria while selecting candidates: 
“Above all we looked at candidate quality. Furthermore, we looked at a good balance between 
experienced and new candidates. We also kept in mind the geographical dispersion in the 
district, gender balance and a mix of young and older candidates. We are proud of our list and 
we are convinced that this balanced team of candidates will obtain a strong result for the PvdA 
in Drenthe” (Emmen.nu, 15.11.2014). Again, it is assumed that geographical dispersion has a 
clear association with the expected result of the party list. The committee head mentions a 
number of candidate selection criteria: candidate quality, experience, gender, age and of course 
geography or the local background of party candidates. The party expects the candidate list to 
score strong because of its balanced nature in terms of all these candidate characteristics. 
Similar assumptions were made by the minister-president of the Austrian region Vorarlberg, 
member of the Vorarlberger Volkspartei (ÖVP Vorarlberg), after the approval of their party list 
for the regional elections. He stated that “the major strength of this list is its strong geographical 
dispersion. The 68 selected candidates come from 39 different municipalities and guarantee the 
party’s commitment to local issues in all parts of the region Vorarlberg” (Volkspartei 
Vorarlberg, 01.04.2014). Again, it is argued that parties with geographically dispersed 
candidate lists will make a more convincing claim of being aware of local interests, which in 
turn will lead to electoral success. The Austrian quote thus reveals the underlying mechanism 
that explains the causality between geographical dispersion and success: as the party nominated 
candidates from all over the region Vorarlberg, there is not a single area whose interests will be 
neglected by the party. As a result, the party selectorate expects this particular list to be 
successful, or at least to beat the other party’s lists which is not geographically balanced. 
A final example shows that some parties even provide reserved list slots to ensure some level 
of geographical representation on their list. In Israel, several parties seem to work with this type 
of system to insure the inclusion of candidates from all areas of the country. In early January 
2015, the Likud list was drafted for the 2015 Israeli Knesset elections. The first spot on the list 
was reserved for incumbent prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The Likud leader was also 
authorized to bring in two newcomers on the 11th and 23rd slot, which proves the party’s 
concerns for getting a balanced list in terms of experience and age (Kornbluh, 01.01.2015). 
Furthermore, the 16th slot was reserved for a candidate of the Southern-Central region, the 18th 
for a candidate of the Northern region, followed by a candidate from the Dan region. While 
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Israel uses a nationwide constituency for its legislative elections, its parties seem to develop 
internal mechanisms to ensure sufficient levels of geographical representation on the party lists. 
 
Aim of the dissertation 
Both the Dutch and Austrian examples show that parties often make assumptions about the link 
between the geographical balance on the list and the electoral result. But is it really the case 
that balancing the ticket leads to better electoral results? What constitutes a ‘strong’ list, and 
what role is performed by the local characteristics of party candidates? And if geographical 
balance always leads to better results, one can expect that all parties achieve this balance on the 
lists they present to voters. But are geographical representation, geographical balance and local 
roots such straightforward and unidimensional concepts? And are there any parameters, for 
instance related to the electoral system or the internal organization of parties, that facilitate or 
inhibit the balancing of candidate lists? 
In sum, party selectorates seem to have this obsession with criteria such as geography, 
territoriality, locality when nominating candidates for parliamentary elections. This observation 
is clearly at odds with other important processes that currently take place in the political sphere, 
such as the nationalization and presidentialization of politics described earlier. What explains 
this apparent paradox? The existing political science research does not provide a satisfactory 
answer to this question, nor does it provide a clear framework to analyze geographical 
representation on party lists. And how should one operationalize all the concepts mentioned in 
this general introduction? A review of the relevant literature reveals a lack of empirical ground 
for the obsession of parties with local roots of candidates and geographical characteristics of 
candidate lists. Why are parties so involved with this aspect of candidate selection? Which 
intraparty mechanisms are at work to realize geographical representation on party lists? And 
are these efforts worthwhile: do local candidate characteristics affect election results, at both 
the individual and list level? What is the value of local roots and place of residence for 
individual parliamentary candidates? Along this introduction, we heard a number of interesting 
assumptions which need to be empirically tested in a systematic way. 
The present dissertation aims to answer all of the above questions. By looking at the case of 
Belgian political parties in the context of the Lower House elections (1987-2010), I want to 
tackle this intriguing puzzle and research problem. The next section will translate the research 
problem to more specific research questions. As became clear while presenting all real-life 
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examples from Belgian and foreign cases, this research problem is multifaceted and can be 
approached from several interesting perspectives. I will provide a clear structure which will be 
followed throughout the empirical part of this dissertation. By explaining how political parties 
deal with local candidate characteristics in candidate selection processes, and what effect these 
characteristics have on the election result, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of 
intraparty candidate selection processes, the effects of the electoral system on candidate 
selections, and the relationship between candidate selection and election results.  
 
Plan of the dissertation 
The dissertation starts with a theoretical chapter, where four crucial literature strands will be 
discussed: (1) descriptive representation and ticket-balancing, (2) candidate selection, (3) 
personal vote, and (4) the friends and neighbors effect. This literature is then used to build the 
theoretical framework for the dissertation: it defines the central theoretical concepts, provides 
the explanatory variables for the empirical analyses along with the hypotheses which will be 
tested later on throughout the empirical chapters. Three of the four cited literature strands are 
part of the political science field, the fourth is related to the adjacent field of political geography. 
For every literature strand, I will start by discussing its added value for this dissertation: I 
summarize which theoretical concepts are borrowed, and what independent variables are 
derived to answer the general research questions formulated later on in this introduction. The 
specific research hypotheses will be formulated and tested in the empirical chapters, which take 
the form of journal articles. The general overview in the theoretical chapter, however, 
summarizes to which literature this dissertation contributes, and from which theoretical 
frameworks the specific research hypotheses are derived.  
Besides building the theoretical framework, the first chapter will also discuss the selected case: 
the Belgian political parties in seven consecutive Lower House elections between 1987 and 
2010. I will elaborate why the Belgian case is interesting for studying the earlier described 
research problem. The main argument for selecting this case is the interesting variation taking 
place in the key independent variables identified in the literature (cf. infra). Finally, the first 
chapter also reports on the data that was collected for this dissertation project. 
Chapters 2-7 are the empirical chapters of this dissertation. Chapter 2 presents a thorough 
descriptive analysis of one of the local candidate characteristics and dependent variables used 
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in the other chapters: the place of residence of Belgian party candidates.  Data on the place of 
residence of 8.977 candidates will be analyzed to check which general trends have been taking 
place over time during the period of investigation. More specifically, Chapter 2 first focuses on 
the representation of large versus small municipalities: which category of municipalities has 
become over- or underrepresented on party lists? Second, the descriptive analysis in Chapter 2 
also examines the degree of territorial coverage on party lists: to what extent do all areas and 
municipalities of the districts and the country get represented by at least one candidate? These 
are two interesting, straightforward approaches that will provide more insight into the collected 
data. In addition, the most substantial results are also visually presented by means of mapping 
software for geographic analysis.  
Table 0.1 clarifies the connection between the other five empirical chapters. The table has two 
dimensions that serve as a guide for the structure of this dissertation: analytical perspectives 
and political institutions. With regard to analytical perspectives, I am interested in the role of 
local candidate characteristics from either the candidate or the candidate list perspective. Both 
candidates as candidate lists are distinct units of analysis that deserve to be addressed separately 
in this dissertation. 
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Table 0.1.: Analytical perspectives, political institutions and research questions in the 
empirical chapters of the dissertation 
Political institutions 
 Candidate Selections Parliamentary Elections 
A
n
a
ly
tic
a
l p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e 
Candidates 
Chapter 3 
RQ: How important are local 
candidate characteristics as 
selection criteria for party 
selectorates? 
Theory: Ticket-balancing and 
political recruitment 
Chapter 4 
RQ: Do local candidate 
characteristics determine the 
number of preferential votes in 
parliamentary elections? 
Theory: Personal vote 
Candidate 
lists 
Chapter 5 
RQ: How should one operationalize 
the concept of geographical list 
representation, and which 
institutional and party-related 
variables affect the levels of 
geographical representation? 
Theory: Ticket-balancing and 
candidate selection 
 
Chapter 6 
RQ: Does the level of geographical 
representation positively affect the 
electoral result of the party list 
compared to the previous election? 
Theory: ticket-balancing 
Chapter 7 
RQ: How do political parties 
change the level of geographical 
representation from one election to 
another, and to what are these 
changes related? 
Theory: ticket-balancing, candidate 
selection and friends and neighbors 
effect 
 
First, the individual candidate perspective will demonstrate how the local background 
characteristics of parliamentary candidates affect their list positions and individual election 
results. If parties indeed strongly focus on the geography criterion in the candidate selection 
process, then local characteristics of parliamentary candidates will highly affect individual 
candidate selection outcomes (i.e. the list positions of individual candidates). In other words, 
the local characteristics of candidates affect their individual candidate selection fortunes: it 
matters whether they are holding local office in their municipality, and it makes a difference 
whether the candidate is living in large or rather small municipalities. In the end, this analytical 
perspective will show the implications of local background characteristics on the political 
careers of parliamentary candidates: the individual candidate perspective demonstrates the 
importance of local background characteristics as nomination criteria in the candidate selection 
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process, and the extent to which these characteristics actually determine individual election 
results. 
Second, the candidate list perspective is another crucial analytical perspective which will be 
examined in this dissertation. In list PR systems, both the outcome of the candidate selection 
process as the election result can be analyzed not only from the individual candidate and 
political party perspective, but also from the list perspective, which serves as the meso-level 
between the party and candidate. Several of the real-life examples in this general introduction 
show that parties often focus on geographical/local characteristics of the candidate list in its 
entirety. For instance, the selection of one particular candidate should not be perceived as 
completely distinct from the selection of the other candidates on the same party list. If the party 
already selected a large group of candidates from city A, it will start looking for suitable 
candidates in city B in the same district. As I will discuss extensively in this dissertation, parties 
are inclined to balance the personal characteristics of all candidates on the party list. As a result, 
restricting the analysis solely to the individual candidate perspective would prevent me from 
addressing the research problem correctly and in its entirety, thus from this more additional, 
more aggregate list perspective.  
With regard to the other dimension in the figure, political institutions, I distinguish between 
candidate selections and parliamentary elections. While the dissertation focuses on the 
geographical dimension of candidate selections, the link with the actual election outcome is 
also relevant: by studying the effects of local candidate characteristics on electoral results, I 
will be able to assess whether geographical ticket-balancing efforts make parties win 
parliamentary elections. The combination of these two dimensions produces four analytically 
distinct cells (cf. Table 0.1), which all address a different facet of the research problem in the 
dissertation. Each of these cells have a separate research question that will be answered in at 
least one of the empirical chapters. Table 0.1 summarizes the research questions and theoretical 
frameworks used per empirical chapter and cell. In the general conclusion of the dissertation, 
this table will reappear and answers to these research questions will be provided based on the 
results of the empirical chapters. 
 The upper left cell deals with the effects of local and geographical candidate characteristics on 
the outcome of candidate selection processes for individual parliamentary candidates. Are local 
characteristics such as local political office or municipality size important selection 
criteria for party selectorates (Research Question 1)? Chapter 3 will examine whether the 
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importance of the geography criterion in candidate selection still holds while controlling for 
other important selection criteria such as incumbency, gender, previous campaign experience, 
etc. This chapter derives its explanatory variables and hypotheses from literature on political 
party recruitment. 
The upper right cell continues with the individual candidate perspective: it examines the effect 
of local candidate characteristics on the individual election results of parliamentary candidates. 
Do local candidate characteristics determine the number of preferential votes in 
parliamentary elections (Research Question 2)? In Chapter 4, I investigate the claim that 
local roots of candidates increase the number of personal votes, controlling for other social and 
political characteristics. This chapter aims to contribute to the personal vote literature, which 
provided the central concepts and theoretical grounds for this part of the dissertation. 
Moving on to the candidate list perspective, the lower left cell focuses on the concept of 
geographical ticket-balancing and geographical representation on party lists. Chapter 5 analyzes 
the determinants of geographical representation during the intraparty decision-making process 
of drafting candidate lists. How should the concept of geographical list representation be 
operationalized, and which institutional and party-related variables affect the levels of 
geographical representation (Research Question 3)? Furthermore, one additional chapter 
(Chapter 7) answers this research question from a more dynamic perspective: how do political 
parties change the level of geographical representation from one parliamentary election 
to another, and to what are these changes related? For this specific cell, the theoretical 
framework is derived from the literature on intraparty candidate selection processes, ticket-
balancing and the friends and neighbors effect. 
Finally, the lower right cell studies the effects of the aggregate geographical characteristics of 
party lists on their election results. By doing so, this analysis shows whether geographical 
ticket-balancing pays off in electoral terms. The main research question is: does the level of 
geographical representation positively affect the electoral swing of the party list compared 
to the previous election (Research Question 4)? Since most of the research on electoral 
determinants has focused on either the individual or aggregate party level, this chapter presents 
a rather novel approach by focusing on the meso-level of candidate lists. 
This PhD takes the form of a dissertation on articles. While Chapter 2 was previously published 
as a book chapter, Chapters 3-6 are four journal articles that have been subjected to double blind 
peer review and accepted for publication in international political science journals. Chapter 7 
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is currently under review at another journal. As the mentioned chapters have been published in 
different international peer-reviewed journals, they have been thoroughly reviewed by 
anonymous peer reviewers. Although the review process in itself has augmented the quality of 
each paper, it has sometimes also affected each paper in an idiosyncratic way, depending on the 
remarks of the reviewers. Table 0.2 lists the various chapters and shows under which title and 
in what journal they have been published. 
 
Table 0.1.: Dissertation chapters and corresponding publication references 
 Chapter title Publication reference 
Chapter 2 The geography of parliamentary 
candidates in Belgian Lower House 
elections (1987-2010) 
‘Een veilige thuishaven’ in: Maddens, B., Put, 
G.J. and Smulders, J. (2014). Het DNA van de 
kandidaten. Leuven: Acco. [translated] 
Chapter 3 The effects of local candidate 
characteristics on the selection of 
parliamentary candidates for 
realistic positions 
Put, G.J. and Maddens, B. (2013) ‘The 
selection of candidates for eligible positions 
on PR lists: The Belgian/Flemish federal 
elections’, Journal of Elections, Public 
Opinion and Parties, 23(1), pp. 49-65. 
Chapter 4 The effects of local candidate 
characteristics on the individual 
election result of parliamentary 
candidates 
Put, G.J. and Maddens, B. (2014) ‘The effect 
of municipality size and local office on the 
electoral success of Belgian/Flemish election 
candidates: a multilevel analysis’, 
Government and Opposition, published 
online. 
Chapter 5 Determinants of geographical 
representation on candidate lists in 
flexible-list systems 
Put, G.J. (2015) ‘Determinants of 
geographical representation on candidate lists 
in flexible-list systems: Lessons from the 
Belgian case’, Politics, published online. 
Chapter 6 The effects of aggregate candidate 
list characteristics on the electoral 
result of the party lists 
Maddens, B. and Put, G.J. (2011) ‘Maken 
sterke lijsten een verschil? Een analyse van 
de lijsten bij de federale en regionale 
verkiezingen in het Vlaams Gewest’, Res 
Publica: Tijdschrift voor Politologie, 53(2), 
pp. 165-188. [translated] 
Chapter 7 The effects of previous local 
election results on the presence of 
local candidates on party lists 
Put, G.J., Maddens, B. and Verleden, F. 
(2015) ‘The within-district distribution of 
party candidates: A geographical analysis of 
party lists for Belgian Lower House 
elections’, Acta Politica, under review. 
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The concluding chapter summarizes the most important findings for every chapter of the 
dissertation, and formulates an answer to the several research questions in presented in Table 
0.1. In addition, suggestions for future research venues will be presented and the concluding 
remarks section presents the take home message for party politics scholars, practitioners and 
other interested readers. 
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CHAPTER 1: THEORY, CASE SELECTION AND DATA 
 
 
The theoretical chapter of this dissertation will proceed as follows. First, the general theoretical 
framework, based on four different literature strands, will be discussed. For each of these 
literature strands, I will elaborate on how they form the theoretical background for one or more 
of the empirical chapters, either by providing relevant theoretical concepts, or offering a set of 
explanatory variables along with testable research hypotheses. Afterwards, the empirical 
chapters will further elaborate on these concepts, present the hypotheses that will be tested, and 
finally report the results of the empirical analyses. 
 
1.1. Theoretical framework 
All research should be embedded in what is already known about a particular research topic. 
An adequate theoretical framework does not only show how the novel research is related to 
earlier literature, the framework should also fuel the research with central theoretical concepts, 
explanatory variables and research hypotheses. In this section, I discuss the theories that are 
relevant to the present research, and clarify in what way they add to the general theoretical 
framework and our understanding of the research problem in this dissertation. 
As mentioned in the general introduction, three of the four literatures cited in this dissertation 
originate from the field of political science. First, I deal with the theory of descriptive 
representation and the link with ticket-balancing and candidate list representation. Although 
mainly focused on the aspect of women representation, this literature deals with a number of 
explanatory variables that also apply to geographical representation. In addition, ticket-
balancing is a central concept in several of the empirical chapters of this dissertation and refers 
to the incentive for parties to balance the characteristics of party candidates for organizational 
as well as electoral reasons.  
Second, the rich literature on intraparty candidate selection processes will be discussed. Ever 
since Rahat and Hazan (2001) developed their analytical framework, which focuses on four 
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dimensions of intraparty candidate selection, a large group of authors has studied both the 
determinants and consequences of these selection processes in comparative perspective. I 
borrow the concepts of inclusiveness of the selectorate and decentralization from this 
framework, and study their effects on the geographical composition of party lists.  
Third, I call on the seminal framework developed by Carey and Shugart (1995) on the personal 
vote.3 While electoral system attributes such as ballot control, pool and vote are the main 
explanatory variables in their model, the literature on the personal vote theorem recently 
developed theoretical arguments on candidate selection and party candidate characteristics. The 
concept of personal vote-earning attributes (PVEA) describes personal candidate characteristics 
that allow candidates to cultivate personal votes. As various authors identified local candidate 
characteristics such as local roots and local-level political experience as potential PVEA, this 
will be another central concept in the theoretical framework of this dissertation. 
The fourth and final literature strand is related to electoral geography. Both the neighborhood 
and friend-and-neighbors-effects describe the effect of local contexts on voting behavior, and 
contribute to the solution of the research puzzle dealt with in this dissertation. The added value 
of this final strand of literature is that it provides more insight into the mechanisms behind the 
local success of locally rooted candidates. Moreover, by measuring the place of residence of 
party candidates, it applies a different operationalization of local roots than the personal vote 
literature. 
 
1.1.1. Descriptive representation and ticket-balancing in PR systems 
The research puzzle of this dissertation is related to the issue of political representation in 
representative democracies. While earlier studies often link political representation to systemic 
factors such as the electoral system and territorial decentralization, political parties also carry a 
great deal of responsibility in this regard. Party selectorates affect the composition of 
                                               
3
 I am aware that the concept of the personal vote has already been discussed earlier by other authors, 
such as Cain et al. (1987) and Cain et al. (1984: 111), who argue that the personal vote refers to “that 
portion of a candidate’s electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, 
activities, and record.” Carey and Shugart’s comparative framework, however, more extensively 
impacted our understanding of the link between electoral rules and behavior. Their seminal article is 
believed to be the major milestone in research related to the personal vote.  
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representative political institutions through their nomination procedures and selection 
preferences. As the examples in the general introduction pointed out, political parties in PR 
systems go through a great deal of effort to draft geographically balanced and representative 
candidate lists for parliamentary elections. I browsed the literature on political representation 
looking for relevant concepts related to these efforts, and independent variables which explain 
the specific levels of representation achieved by parties on their candidate lists.  
The large majority of studies in this area focuses on the representation of women in the political 
realm, but the arguments and findings can easily be applied to the representation of other 
societal groups and factions. A crucial distinction in representational theories is the difference 
between descriptive and substantive representation (Pitkin, 1967). Descriptive representation, 
on the one hand, implies that the policy priorities of different societal groups are distinct, and 
only members of the group would be able to adequately represent the groups’ interests (Phillips, 
1995). Substantive representation, on the other hand, focuses on when the presence of societal 
groups in elected office actually makes a difference in terms of the representation of their 
interests (Celis and Childs, 2012; Childs and Krook, 2009). In other words, this second 
approach stresses that the ideas of different societal groups should be represented, regardless of 
the background characteristics defending these groups. 
This dissertation follows the line of reasoning of descriptive representation: I examine the level 
of geographical representation on candidate lists compared to the geographical composition of 
society. The underlying assumption is, then, that the various geographical areas in a country or 
electoral district can only be adequately represented by parliamentary candidates living in these 
areas. Empirical research on descriptive representation usually focuses on the number of 
women in elected office and its institutional, socio-economic and cultural determinants 
(Phillips, 1995; Reynolds, 1999; Kunovich and Paxton, 2005; Wagnerud, 2009). Important 
institutional factors are, among others, the electoral system, district magnitude and gender quota 
laws. It is widely supported that proportional electoral systems and high district magnitude lead 
to higher levels of representation for minority groups (Matland, 2005). Previous research also 
found that the introduction of gender quota laws generally increases the levels of women 
representation in political institutions (IPU, 2007; see, however: Schwindt-Bayer, 2009). The 
evidence for the effects of gender quota laws on other forms of representation, such as 
geography and ethnicity, are mixed (Ruedin, 2010).  
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With regard to the effects of the electoral system, ticket-balancing has been identified as an 
important intraparty mechanism enhancing descriptive representation in proportional electoral 
systems (Matland and Taylor, 1997; Matland and Studlar, 1996; Matland, 1998; Salmond, 
2006). As opposed to single member district (SMD) systems, party selectorates in PR systems 
are inclined to present a balanced ticket to their voters (Ware, 1996). This balance refers to the 
inclusion of parliamentary candidates from all relevant social cleavages (e.g. gender, race, 
religion, geography, etc.) (Valdini, 2012: 741). Selectorates have organizational as well as 
electoral incentives to balance their ticket: by selecting candidates from various societal groups, 
they keep party factions satisfied and avoid intra-party turmoil. Moreover, a variety of 
candidates signals to all social groups that their interests will be addressed by the party. In PR 
systems, by contrast, parties that ignore these groups and do not balance their tickets might face 
electoral penalties. Undiversified candidate lists without women or ethnic minorities might lead 
to significant negative publicity (Valdini, 2012: 741). The same argument can easily be applied 
to the geography criterion: a geographically unbalanced candidate list potentially creates 
internal discontent among underrepresented local party branches, and leads to electoral setbacks 
in the underrepresented local areas. 
In SMD systems, however, the incentives faced by parties are substantially different. The 
personal traits summed up earlier are sometimes considered as electoral liabilities if a party 
only has one sole candidate to select (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). Party selectorates will not 
be inclined to nominate candidates from ethnic minorities in the district, simply because of their 
lower electoral appeal to a large proportion of voters, who are simply not a member of this 
minority group. Put differently, parties in SMD systems pursue the strategy of the lowest 
common denominator (Tremblay, 2012), specifically by nominating the candidate with the 
broadest electoral appeal. Valdini (2006: 58-59) calls this the irony of diversity: “The very traits 
that are required to diversify the list and broaden the appeal in the proportional electoral system 
are seen as repellant in single member district systems.”  
A limited number of studies specifically dealt with the issue of geographical representation in 
PR systems. Latner and McGann (2005: 712-713) posit that parties in these systems choose to 
be regionally representative for reasons of vote maximization and internal political competition:  
 
In terms of electoral competition, a party would be extremely foolish to field 
a list made up of candidates from only one region (say, the capital city). Other 
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parties could easily point out this fact and use regionalism as an appeal. (…) 
Secondly, internal party competition is likely to generate some pressure for 
regional list balancing as party organizations from different regions compete 
for a fair share of list places for their candidates. 
 
These authors’ analysis focuses on geographical representation in the Netherlands and Israel, 
two PR systems with nationwide electoral districts. In SMD systems, geographical 
representation is merely an institutional matter: each electoral district automatically has its own 
representative, so the resulting legislatures will always be geographically representative. In 
national district proportional representation systems, however, geographical representation is a 
“strictly empirical matter” (Latner and McGann, 2005: 710): this form of representation is only 
reached through the incentives to be regionally representative and to geographically balance the 
ticket. Their results show that candidates from central metropolitan areas are somewhat 
overrepresented, due to the fact that parties tend to choose candidates from areas where they 
expect to be electorally competitive (Latner and McGann, 2005: 730-732). 
In sum, depending on whether the electoral system is PR or SMD, parties will have different 
candidate selection strategies. PR systems, on the one hand, stimulate parties to balance the 
ticket, but in SMD systems, on the other hand, candidate diversity is unnecessary and 
potentially damaging to the electoral result (Valdini, 2012: 741). Furthermore, levels of political 
representation tend to increase in large electoral districts. The research by Latner and McGann 
(2005) proves that even parties in nationwide electoral districts realize geographical balance on 
their candidate lists. Finally, while it is generally established that gender quota laws affect 
female representation in political institutions, it is unclear how these quota regulations affect 
other aspects of political representation. In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, I fill this lacuna in the 
literature by analyzing the effects of – among other independent variables – district magnitude 
and quota laws on the level of geographical representation of party lists. 
 
1.1.2. Candidate selection: dimensions, determinants and consequences 
Self-evidently, the geographical composition of candidate lists strongly depends on the intra-
party decision-making processes designed to nominate parliamentary candidates and draft 
candidate lists. Summarizing the massive literature on intra-party candidate selection on a 
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limited number of pages is certainly not a straightforward endeavor. At the start of this literature 
review, I was searching for specific indicators for measuring the nature of intraparty candidate 
selection processes, and the effects these processes have on the levels of geographical 
representation on party lists. However, in recent years this subfield has produced an incredible 
amount of research that is highly relevant to the research problem of this dissertation. This 
section presents a short summary of this massive literature, and identifies which concepts and 
variables from the field of candidate selection are borrowed for this dissertation project. 
Early authors such as Ostrogorski (1902), Michels (1915), Schattschneider (1942), Duverger 
(1954) and Kirchheimer (1966) all acknowledged the importance of candidate selection in 
democratic political systems. According to Schattschneider (1942: 64), candidate selection is 
one of the best points at which to observe the power distribution within party organizations 
because “he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party”. Duverger (1954: 368-
369) stressed the importance of candidate selection by stating that in certain electoral contexts, 
the candidate selection process largely determines who will get elected. Ever since these authors 
presented their seminal work, the neo-institutionalist school of political science continued to 
show interest in intraparty candidate selection processes, for instance as a dimension of party 
organizational change (for an overview, see: Krouwel, 2006). 
The study of candidate selection as a research topic in itself has especially flourished since the 
1980s, when the first attempts were made to analyze the determinants, dimensions and 
consequences of selection processes (Epstein, 1980; Ranney, 1981; Matthews, 1985).4 By the 
end of the decade, Gallagher and Marsh (1988) published their work on intraparty candidate 
selection in comparative perspective. Their book included an in-depth analysis of candidate 
selection processes in nine countries. In the concluding chapter, the degree of members’ and 
voters’ involvement in candidate selection is summarized under the heading ‘centralization’ 
(Gallagher, 1988: 245). Furthermore, it is discussed which objective and subjective personal 
characteristics of candidates (Seligman, 1971) are sought by the party selectorate – the body 
that selects the candidates (Gallagher, 1988: 247). Apart from obvious characteristics such as 
party loyalty, electoral appeal and ideological positions, the local background of candidates is 
also mentioned as an important candidate attribute: “When it comes to objective personal 
                                               
4
 Rare exceptions from earlier decades are, among other studies, Ranney (1965), Czudnowski (1970) 
and Obler (1974).  
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characteristics, one almost invariably sought is the possession of local roots” (Gallagher, 1988: 
251).  
During the 1990s, one of the most influential works was the demand and supply model of 
political recruitment by Norris (1997). In this model, intraparty candidate selection processes 
were presented as but one aspect of the more comprehensive process of parliamentary 
recruitment. The supply of aspirant-candidates, the demand of party gatekeepers (i.e. the 
selectorate) and the nature of the political system are considered equally important dimensions 
of legislative recruitment. The combined neo-institutionalist and behavioralist approach of this 
model was highly innovative to political recruitment studies. 
However, the strongest resurgence of academic interest for candidate selection was initiated 
later on, by the analytical framework of Rahat and Hazan (2001). Their model disentangles four 
dimensions of intraparty candidate selection processes. First, the candidacy dimension 
describes the group of candidates eligible for nomination by political parties. Intraparty rules 
concerning candidacy requirements can range from very inclusive, where aspirant-candidates 
have to meet little conditions in order to be eligible, to very exclusive, where only a limited 
group of people are considered for selection due to strict requirements (e.g. a long party track 
record). Second, the selectorate is the body that selects the candidates, and can be exclusively 
composed of only the party leader or a small party elite, to more inclusive groups such as all 
party members or even the entire electorate. This dimension measures the level of democracy 
in selection methods.  
Thirdly, the level of centralization expresses the dominance of the national party level in 
candidate selection. In highly decentralized selection methods, local party branches determine 
who gets selected without any form of national party influence. Finally, the model also 
discusses whether parties use appointment or voting systems or a mix of the two. Hazan and 
Rahat (2010: 72) call this “the hidden flowerbed within the secret garden”, as studies of 
candidate selection often ignore this dimension altogether. In appointment systems, decisions 
are reached through deliberation among a limited number of people (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 
73). In voting systems, general consent within the selectorate is not required and votes alone 
determine who gets selected and, in the case of multiple candidacies, which will be the list 
order. 
The added value of this four-dimensional model to the field is twofold. Firstly, the authors stress 
the important theoretical and analytical distinction between inclusiveness of the selectorate and 
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the level of centralization (Hazan and Rahat, 2010: 59-63). In earlier studies, these distinct 
dimensions often overlapped or were mixed up (see, for example: Bille, 2001; Lundell, 2004). 
Overlapping inclusiveness of the selectorate and centralization is problematic since these 
dimensions are not necessarily correlated. For instance, highly inclusive selection procedures 
(e.g. primaries, member polls) can be organized at the national level, but national parties can 
also assign the organization of primaries to district or even subdistrict branches. Second and 
even more important, the four dimensions represent empirically measurable indicators which 
can be used for comparative analysis of candidate selection processes worldwide. Party politics 
scholars studying the determinants and consequences of candidate selection methods are able 
to use (variants of) these scales in quantitative analysis (e.g.: Leduc, 2001; Lundell, 2004; 
Shomer, 2009). 
However, some significant barriers remain, even after the seminal work by Rahat and Hazan. 
One of the major problems in this field is the lack of or inaccessibility of reliable data. Even if 
parties are willing to open the gates of their secret garden, scholars often have to rely on party 
documents which only provide partial information on candidate selection processes. To my 
knowledge, cross-national data collection efforts on intra-party candidate selection methods are 
still relatively scarce, however there are some examples on smaller (Narud et al., 2002; Siavelis 
and Morgenstern, 2008) and larger scales (Katz and Mair, 1992; Kernell, 2008; Shomer, 2010). 
An additional barrier is the often higher complexity of real-world candidate selection methods 
compared to the often simplified scales designed to measure them. In practice, parties often 
appoint multiple selectorates with varying degrees of inclusiveness and centralization. Hazan 
and Rahat (2010) try to overcome this problem by distinguishing three complex selection 
methods with more than one selectorate: assorted, multistage and weighted methods (Hazan 
and Rahat, 2010: 35-38).  
Nevertheless, their analytical framework has been widely applied in the literature, and candidate 
selection has taken the role of dependent as well as independent variable in earlier comparative 
research. Some authors did a cross-national analysis of candidate selection processes, and 
examined which determinants explain the variation in this dependent variable (Lundell, 2004; 
Kernell, 2008; Shomer, 2014). Results from these studies show that especially region and 
territorial organization impacts candidate selection. However, the effect of electoral system 
attributes is limited. Earlier studies contained a strong claim that intraparty candidate selection 
procedures were mainly determined by electoral rules (Czudnowski, 1974; Epstein, 1980; 
Norris, 2004). However, this has never been empirically confirmed by cross-national analyses 
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(Hazan and Voerman, 2006). Shomer (2014: 534) emphasizes that while candidate selection is 
a variable at the party level, the electoral system varies at the country level. As a result, one 
should be careful not to amalgamate selections and elections in the same variable or 
automatically assume a strong correlation between the two. 
In addition, candidate selection has also been treated as independent variable in research 
focusing on its consequences (Pennings and Hazan, 2001; Hazan and Rahat, 2006a; Hazan and 
Rahat, 2006b; Rahat et al., 2008). Especially the effects on important democratic dimensions 
of participation, representation, responsiveness and competition have been studied extensively 
(Hazan and Rahat, 2010). It is often argued that political parties could increase external 
democracy by democratizing internal procedures (Shapira et al., 2010). Adopting primaries, for 
instance, is believed to strengthen competitiveness and improve representation, as legislators 
will be responsive and accountable to the wider selectorate that selected them (Kenig, 2009). 
However, these claims have not yet been confirmed by empirical research. On the contrary, 
democratization of party leadership selections have not been found to have a positive effect on 
participatory levels among citizens and members, nor did it lead to high levels of competition 
among candidates (Carty and Blake, 1999; Kenig, 2009; Put et al., 2015).  
Some authors even found negative effects of intra-party democracy on important democratic 
dimensions. Spies and Kaiser (2014) show that the representativeness of parties towards their 
voters is lower in inclusive candidate selection procedures. Finally, Rahat et al. (2008) find that 
democratized selection procedures lead to unbalanced candidate lists in terms of gender. These 
findings provide interesting insights for the topic of this dissertation: if it is the case that 
inclusive selection procedures lead to lower levels of gender representation, will this be the 
same with regard to geographical representation? And since we are dealing with geographical 
representation, one could expect that intraparty decentralization comes into play as well. The 
inclusiveness of the selectorate and centralization are therefore included as two explanatory 
variables in this dissertation. The effects of these candidate selection dimensions on 
geographical representation are examined in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7. 
 
1.1.3.  Personal vote  
The personal vote model provides a third important theoretical background for this dissertation 
on the geographical dimension of candidate selection. The main argument here is that in 
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electoral systems with personal vote-seeking incentives, it can be assumed that candidates and 
politicians will display personal vote-seeking behavior to cultivate personal votes. Other related 
literature states that, in this type of electoral system, candidates with so-called personal vote-
earning attributes (PVEA) are expected to be more successful in parliamentary elections. In this 
section, I first summarize the theory on personal vote, and then elaborate on how PVEA, one 
of the central theoretical concepts in this dissertation, is related to the theoretical model 
developed by Carey and Shugart (1995). At the end of the section, I discuss the added value of 
their framework for the dissertation.  
It is often assumed that politicians’ behavior is guided by their desire to seek reelection 
(Mayhew, 1974). The most effective strategic behavior to reach this goal, however, depends on 
four variables related to the electoral system at hand: ballot, vote pooling, type of vote and 
district magnitude. According to Carey and Shugart (1995), the variation in these four electoral 
system variables determines the importance of building a personal reputation, where politicians 
emphasize their personal achievements and individual characteristics, instead of playing the 
party label card. The argument is that electoral systems which allow for intraparty preference 
voting create incentives for politicians to cultivate personal reputations (Crisp et al., 2004).  
The first variable, ballot, consists of two dimensions: firstly, ballot access, which measures the 
degree of control that party leaders exercise over politicians’ access to the party list/label, and 
secondly, control over ballot rank, which expresses the degree to which voters can alter the 
candidate order on the party list by casting personal votes (Carey and Shugart, 1995: 420-421). 
While the first dimension is related to the intraparty candidate selection process, the second 
dimension deals with the electoral system type. Most authors focus on the effects of ballot 
control in empirical research, and find support for the hypothesis that low control over ballot 
rank by party leaders leads to more personalized behavior (e.g. Ames, 1995). However, other 
research instead focuses on ballot access, and examines the personal vote-seeking incentives of 
candidate selection processes (e.g. Shomer, 2009). More specifically, this line of research 
analyzes whether candidate selection methods that limit the control of party leaders over ballot 
access (e.g. primaries and high levels of decentralization) lead to more personalized behavior. 
The second variable of Carey and Shugart’s model is pool, which classifies electoral systems 
where votes cast for individual candidates are either pooled at the party list level, pooled across 
groups of candidates or not pooled at all. The first scenario means that every preferential vote 
for candidates is also used to determine the number of seats assigned to the entire party list. 
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Second, pooling across groups of candidates means that voters’ preference votes can be 
transferred to other candidates if their first choice did not get elected. Third, in electoral systems 
where no pooling occurs, incentives to build personal reputations are strongest.  
The third variable simply measures which type of vote voters can cast: party votes, multiple or 
single preferential votes. In the second and third category, voters can not only choose between 
parties, but also choose between co-partisans on the same party list. As a result, intra-party 
competition increases and with it the importance of personal reputations. However, if voters 
can only cast one preferential vote, competition between co-partisans becomes more fierce as 
voters cannot spread their support across different candidates. In other words, co-partisans are 
competing simultaneously for the “same indivisible support of each voter” (Carey and Shugart, 
1995: 422). Consequently, personal vote-seeking behavior will be more likely in this latter 
category. 
Finally, the effect of district magnitude (DM) depends on the occurrence of intraparty 
competition: in systems with competition among co-partisans, the importance of personal 
reputation increases as DM grows. In systems that do not allow intraparty competition, 
however, DM is negatively associated with the value of personal reputations. Parliamentary 
candidates campaigning in closed-list systems with large electoral districts, for instance, will 
be inclined to cultivate party votes as their chances on obtaining a parliamentary seat depends 
on the aggregate party list result. As voters are not able to give preferential votes, it makes no 
sense to display personal vote-seeking behavior. 
To clarify the theory, I will describe two hypothetical electoral systems: one with extremely 
strong personal vote-seeking incentives, and another system with extremely high value of party 
reputation. An electoral system that allows voters to change the rank order based on their 
preferential votes (e.g. open-list PR system), and additionally offers no vote pooling 
possibilities, leads to highly personalized behavior by politicians. Additionally, if political 
parties in this system apply candidate selection methods where party elites have little control 
over who gets selected and in which list position (e.g. primaries) politicians will be even more 
inclined to cultivate personal votes. 
If, by contrast, the electoral system does not allow voters to disturb the rank order and only 
party votes are allowed (i.e. all votes are pooled across the party list), the party reputation 
becomes extremely important and politicians have strong incentives to display the party label 
and toe the party line. At the political party level, candidate selection methods with strong ballot 
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access control by party leaders reinforce this party vote-seeking behavior. A real-world example 
are parties with highly exclusive candidate selection methods in closed-list systems. On the 
continuum of personal vote seeking versus party vote seeking incentives, flexible-list systems 
constitute something of a compromise, with incentives in both directions (Crisp et al., 2013). 
The personal vote model has unmistakably changed the field of election studies. The classical 
research on electoral systems strongly focused on aspects such as multipartism and the degree 
of proportionality: the extent to which vote distributions are accurately translated into seat 
distributions (see, for example: Gallagher, 1991; Lijphart, 1985; Lijphart, 1990; Lijphart 1994; 
Rae, 1971). Carey and Shugart’s model, however, explains how the nature of electoral systems 
influences the behavior of legislators and legislative candidates. And as some authors argue that 
a general trend takes place towards personalization of politics and candidate-centered electoral 
systems (Karvonen, 2010; Pilet and Renwick, 2015), the future relevance of the personal vote 
model seems to be ensured. 
After this general summary of the personal vote literature, I will now argue how this theory will 
be used as a part of the theoretical framework for this dissertation. The research on personal 
vote has developed into an active subfield of political science where the strategic behavior of 
various political actors – legislators, candidates, parties and voters – is analyzed. Legislators 
can use various personal vote-seeking tools to build personal reputations, such as bill initiation 
(Crisp et al., 2004; Rahat and Sheafer, 2007; Bräuninger et al., 2012) or bringing questions to 
the plenary assembly (Shomer, 2009). Parliamentary candidates, on the other hand, may 
cultivate personal votes by running highly personalized election campaigns through the use of 
personalized campaign means (e.g. personal campaign posters and flyers, personal website) (De 
Winter and Baudewyns, 2014; Lutz and Selb, 2010; Zittel and Gschwend, 2008), or personal 
campaign spending (Put et al., 2015). 
Another strategy of candidates for building personal reputations, however, is to exhibit personal 
characteristics that might signal a candidate’s credibility of being well aware of the 
particularistic needs of his constituents. Shugart et al. (2005) argue that there are certain 
personal vote-earning attributes (PVEA) which function as informational shortcuts to voters 
lacking knowledge about candidates and parties in parliamentary elections. Examples of these 
attributes are local roots, local-level political experience and previous electoral experience 
(Shugart et al., 2005: 438). Previous studies have shown that the possession of these attributes 
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significantly affects both the behavior of legislators (Tavits, 2009) and the electoral success of 
candidates (Parker, 1983; Marsh, 1987; Tavits, 2010). 
The theory on PVEA produces the relatively novel insight that not only the behavior, but also 
the individual attributes of parliamentary candidates are linked to the personal vote-seeking 
incentives created by the electoral system (Valdini, 2006). With regard to local roots, for 
example, Shugart et al. (2005) state the following: “The value of such attributes varies 
systematically with the extent to which electoral rules generate a demand by voters for locally 
committed legislators”. In highly personalized electoral systems, for instance, candidates will 
be more inclined to display their possession of PVEA since these are electorally more valuable. 
Arguably, even voters will increasingly be influenced by these candidate-based attributes while 
making their voting decisions (Thijssen, 2013).  
Until now, I have elaborated on the effects of the personal vote on legislators, candidates and 
voters, but what about the political parties? Does the literature argue how personal vote seeking 
incentives affect party behavior? Following the argument that candidates with PVEA are 
electorally more valuable, parties in personalized systems will be more inclined to select 
candidates with strong PVEA (Smith et al., 2012). In this sense, electoral systems also shape 
the candidate selection decisions of political parties. However, selecting candidates with strong 
personal reputations and individual support bases might come at a price, more precisely the 
price of party unity (Crisp et al., 2013). Since candidates with strong individual bases of support 
are less dependent on the party for their political career, they are more independent in their 
policy preferences and thus more inclined to defect from the party line (Tavits, 2009). Parties, 
in turn, perceive these politicians as electorally valuable and therefore resist the temptation to 
punish them for dissident behavior (Tavits, 2010). 
Finally, although this dissertation does not deal with the analysis of personalized vote choices 
(see, for example: Kaase, 1994; Brettschneider, 2008), it should at least be mentioned that 
voters too are affected by personal vote-seeking incentives in electoral systems. Gschwend and 
Zittel (2014) find that voters are affected by the personal vote-seeking behavior of candidates, 
but they need to be asked and mobilized to cast a personal vote. This is a crucial underpinning 
for the personal vote literature, as it confirms that voters are more inclined to cast personal votes 
as candidates display personal vote-seeking behavior (be it by emphasizing their PVEA or by 
promising pork). Recently, experimental studies have analyzed individual voting decisions and 
the size of local candidate effects on these decisions. Campbell and Cowley (2014) demonstrate 
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that, even in the UK with an electoral system that does not create strong incentives to cultivate 
personal votes, respondents’ ratings of candidates are highly affected by their place of 
residence. Roy and Alcantara (2015) add that such candidate effects are especially strong in 
voters with weak partisan ties. 
In sum, the personal vote literature provides a number of arguments with regard to local 
candidate characteristics. First, candidates with PVEA are expected to be more successful in 
elections, since this group provides voters with the information that they are high-quality 
candidates suitable for legislative office. One of these attributes is localism, the central focus 
of this dissertation. According to Tavits (2009: 798), “Localism, as manifested in legislators’ 
local roots and prior local-level political experience, is expected to help legislators win votes 
and get elected, find easier exit options from political careers, and make them more independent 
in their policy preferences”. This research hypothesis will be tested in Chapter 4 of the 
dissertation.  
Second, given the electoral value of local roots, we can also assume that political parties will 
actively recruit and nominate parliamentary candidates with local roots or local political 
experience, even though there are indications that these candidates might endanger party unity. 
Put differently, even when controlled for other relevant candidate characteristics such as 
incumbency or campaign experience, locally rooted candidates will still be preferred over other 
candidates by the party selectorate. Chapter 3 focuses on this hypothesis and presents the result 
of an empirical analysis based on the Belgian case.  
 
1.1.4. The friends and neighbors effect in electoral geography 
The fourth and final literature cited in this theoretical chapter is, in fact, strongly related to the 
personal vote literature. Similar to the third literature strand on personal vote, the friends and 
neighbors effect explains why locally rooted candidates enjoy an electoral bonus. However, the 
operationalization of local roots is different. The personal vote literature operationalizes this 
concept as being a district native or having local-level experience (Shugart et al., 2005; Tavits, 
2010; Smith et al., 2012). The friends and neighbors effect in electoral geography rather focuses 
on the place of residence of parliamentary candidates. This operationalization will be applied 
throughout various empirical chapters of this dissertation. Moreover, this classic geographic 
theory improves our understanding of the mechanisms behind the positive effects of local 
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candidate characteristics on election results. It also explains why and how parties would use 
these local candidate characteristics as strategic resources. Chapter 7 examines how party 
selectorates change the within-district distribution of candidates from one election to another to 
exploit the friends-and-neighbors effect in specific areas of the electoral district. 
I will start this section with a summary of the friends and neighbors effect. Although political 
science and political geography can be considered relatively distinct disciplines, there are clear 
connections which are not always recognized by scholars from both sides. According to 
Ethington and McDaniel (2007: 129), “two large, discursive communities are studying the same 
phenomena (politics in all its forms) and simply failing, overall, to take advantage of one 
another’s perspectives, or even to engage in a conversation.” Indeed, all political action, events 
and institutions have intrinsic spatiality, but the contextuality of political phenomena is not 
always accurately taken into account in political science research. 
Arguably, the subfield of electoral geography is most strongly related to the electoral politics 
literature cited in the previous sections of this theoretical chapter. During the better part of the 
twentieth century, electoral geography was largely limited to mapping election results and 
comparing them with maps of possible explanatory factors (Taylor, 1985). However, the 
frequent publication of electoral data since the 1960s resulted in the rise of quantitative electoral 
studies in geography (Agnew et al., 2008).5 A popular research subject is the geography of 
voting, where the geographical dispersion of party votes over the nation’s territory is explained 
using Lipset and Rokkan’s social cleavages model (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Another 
literature tradition emphasizes the local context in which voting decisions occur, and identifies 
a number of local predictors in voting behavior, such as local campaign effects (e.g. Fieldhouse 
et al., 1996; Pattie et al., 1994; Pattie and Johnston, 2003; Denver et al., 2004), neighborhood 
effects – social interaction within local contexts affects political attitudes and voting behavior 
– (MacAllister et al., 2001; Taylor and Johnston, 1979), and candidate effects (Taylor and 
                                               
5
 In Belgium, the majority of early studies in the field of electoral geography followed the traditional 
approach of comparing electoral maps with maps of explanatory factors (see, for example: De Smet and 
Evalenko, 1956; Dewachter, 1969). Recently, however, there has been a renewed interest in this field of 
research in Belgium, more specifically on the spatiality of elected representatives (Van Hamme and 
Marissal, 2008; De Borman et al., 2001; De Maesschalck, 2009; De Maesschalck and Luyten, 2006; De 
Maesschalck, 2011; De Maesschalck, 2005; Pilet 2004; Pilet, 2007; Wauters et al., 2003; Frognier et al., 
2003; Smulders and Put, 2014). 
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Johnston, 1979: 274-294). The latter is more commonly known as the friends and neighbors 
effect and, given its theoretical relevance for this dissertation, deserves a more detailed account. 
The friends and neighbors effect, which was initially discussed by Key (1949) and Cox (1969), 
has been widely cited in both electoral geography and political science literature (for an 
overview, see: Johnston and Pattie, 1997). The theory explains the tendency of voters to support 
candidates living in, or close to, their respective local areas (Gorecki and Marsh, 2014). The 
significance of local candidates in elections has also been confirmed by political science 
scholars in the cases of Ireland (Gorecki and Marsh, 2012), Canada (Blais et al., 2003), Finland 
(Arter, 2011), the UK (Arzheimer and Evans, 2012) and Israel (Hazan, 1999). As a 
consequence, the strong effects of geographic proximity of candidates on voting behavior is not 
limited to any particular type of political context (Gorecki and Marsh, 2014: 12). Local 
candidates are more likely to be known in their local area, to have a personal organization in 
the area active to help them during election campaigns, and are more aware of local interests 
and aspirations. The friends and neighbors effect has been confirmed in both urban (Johnson, 
1989) as well as rural settings (Kavanagh, 2010). In this literature, the locality of parliamentary 
candidates is operationalized as their place of residence. This is a major difference with the 
personal vote literature, where local roots are usually operationalized as being a local native or 
having local political experience in the area. I will use place of residence in several of the 
empirical chapters. Additionally, the friends and neighbors effect is the main theoretical ground 
for Chapter 7, which examines how and why parties shuffle their parliamentary candidates over 
different areas of the electoral district for strategic reasons. 
 
1.2. Case selection 
The empirical analyses in this dissertation focus on the case of the Belgian political parties and 
their candidate lists for the elections of the Belgian Lower House (1987-2010). More 
specifically, most empirical chapters focus on eight parties: the Flemish and francophone 
Christian-democratic, socialist, liberal and green parties.6 This selection of parties is based on 
                                               
6
 Some of the empirical chapters include more parties as a result of the peer-review processes, and others 
include only the Flemish parties for reasons of data availability. An overview of the analyzed parties per 
chapter: Chapter 2 (the eight selected parties); Chapter 3 (five Flemish parties: the four selected parties 
and far right Vlaams Blok/Belang); Chapter 4 (seven Flemish parties: the four selected parties, far right 
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two criteria: on the one hand, the extent of party consolidation measured by parliamentary 
presence and continuous participation in parliamentary elections, and on the other hand the 
existence of an ideological and organizational counterpart in the other region’s party landscape.   
First, an exclusive focus on parties which are consolidated actors in the party system reduces 
the chance that results will be biased by observations on younger, smaller and non-
institutionalized parties. From all parties in the Belgian party landscape, the Christian-
democratic, socialist and liberal parties have the longest history. During the 1970s, the Belgian 
party system ultimately split into two separate regional party systems, one for each language 
group (Verleden, 2009). Since this split, Flemish and francophone parties have been functioning 
as independent party organizations in the Belgian political system. Additionally, the green 
parties can also be considered consolidated party organizations with a quasi-permanent 
parliamentary representation in the federal parliament.7 The same holds for the far right Vlaams 
Blok/Vlaams Belang, but this party has no significant counterpart in the francophone party 
landscape. For this reason, the party was not selected as case for this dissertation. Other 
important Belgian parties (e.g. VU, FN or N-VA) are not included in the study because of their 
limited presence in federal parliament during the period of investigation. 
Besides the more pragmatic reasons to choose the case of Belgian parliamentary elections, there 
are several substantial arguments why the empirical reality of Belgian parties forms the ideal 
testing ground for the arguments and hypotheses derived from the literature. The earlier 
mentioned independent variables show considerable variation over the demarcated time period 
of investigation (1987-2010), and among the selected political parties. This variation between 
1987 and 2010 is the central argument as to why I chose to examine these seven subsequent 
parliamentary elections. In the following sections, I discuss the variation in three independent 
variables: district magnitude, gender quota laws and intraparty candidate selection processes. 
Finally, previous Belgian research on geographical representation and local candidate 
characteristics are summarized. 
                                               
Vlaams Blok/Belang, Flemish Nationalist VU/N-VA, liberals Lijst Dedecker/LDD); Chapter 5 (the 
eight selected parties); Chapter 6 (eight Flemish parties: the four selected parties, far right Vlaams 
Blok/Belang, Flemish Nationalist N-VA, liberals Lijst Dedecker/LDD and SLP); Chapter 7 (the eight  
selected parties). 
7
 The only exception being the Flemish green party during the 2003-2007 legislative term, in which they 
did not have any representatives in federal parliament. 
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1.2.1. District magnitude: the electoral district reforms of 1993 and 2002 
As part of the Saint-Michel treaty, which constitutes the fourth Belgian state reform in 1993, 
the smaller arrondissemental electoral districts for the elections of the Lower House were 
merged (Fiers, 2009). This reform thus led to the first significant increase in the size of the 
electoral districts during the period of investigation in this dissertation.8 About a decade later, 
the Belgian federal government decided to carry through another substantial electoral reform. 
Several aspects of the electoral system for the election of the Lower House were changed, but 
especially the introduction of larger, provincial electoral districts and an electoral threshold of 
5% at the district level took center stage in the media and political debates (Pilet, 2007).  
These fairly large districts were mainly criticized by politicians representing the more rural 
areas of the country: they feared that this larger electoral scale would lead to a systematic 
geographical and demographical underrepresentation (Pilet, 2004). The assumption was made 
that candidates and politicians from small municipalities would disappear from party lists and 
parliaments, and that the importance of local roots in candidate selections as well as 
parliamentary elections would severely diminish. Earlier research on this matter suggests that 
these fears were unjustified (Pilet et al., 2007; Maddens et al., 2014). In sum, with regard to 
electoral districts, the period of investigation can be divided in three stages: (1) for the first two 
Lower House elections (1987-1991), the small arrondissemental electoral districts were still in 
place; (2) for the 1995 and 1999 elections, these arrondissemental districts were enlarged as a 
result of the fourth state reform; and (3) from 2003 onwards, Lower House elections were 
organized over large provincial districts. 
Another interesting aspect of Belgian electoral districts, and an additional argument to focus 
this dissertation on Belgian parties, is the discrepancy in electoral districts between the Flemish 
and Walloon regional elections. After the abovementioned 2003 federal district reform, the 
Flemish parties decided to carry through the exact same reform for the election of the Flemish 
regional elections. This implied that, from the regional elections of 2004 onwards, provincial 
                                               
8
 Another novelty in the 1995 Lower House elections was the possibility for voters to cast votes for 
multiple candidates (on the same list, panachage is not allowed). According to Smits and Thomas (1998), 
this compensated the introduction of larger constituencies as the multiple preferential vote allows to 
vote for a local candidate as well as the party figurehead. 
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electoral districts were used, and the electoral districts for the election of the Flemish regional 
parliament and the Belgian Lower House were identical for the Flemish political parties. The 
francophone parties, however, did not follow the example of their Flemish counterparts: for the 
Walloon regional elections, the system of arrondissemental districts was preserved for the 2004 
election of the Walloon regional parliament, creating an institutional discrepancy between the 
two regions. Table 1.1 summarizes the evolution of electoral districts for Lower House elections 
and regional elections in Belgium. 
 
Table 1.1.: Electoral districts for Belgian parliamentary elections, 1987-2010 
 Lower House Flemish Parliament Walloon Parliament 
1987 Arrondissements / / 
1991 Arrondissements / / 
1995 Merged arrondissements Merged arrondissements Merged arrondissements 
1999 Merged arrondissements Merged arrondissements Merged arrondissements 
2003 Provinces / / 
2004 / Provinces Merged arrondissements 
2007 Provinces / / 
2009 / Provinces Merged arrondissements 
2010 Provinces / / 
 
 
Since this dissertation examines Belgian parties in the federal Lower House elections, district 
size at the regional level only has an indirect impact on the dependent variables. There is, 
however, a possible effect of the regional level districts on the federal level candidate lists: the 
fact that the Flemish parties use the provincial districts for both regional and federal elections, 
led their party organizations to become more centralized, with candidate selection processes 
organized at the provincial party level (Smulders, 2012). The francophone parties, on the other 
hand, have to deal with different electoral districts at the regional and federal levels, and did 
not centralize their internal structures after the 2002 electoral reform (Vandeleene et al., 2013). 
As a result, I expect to see substantial differences in the level of geographical representation on 
Flemish versus francophone party lists from the 2003 elections onwards. The empirical analyses 
in Chapter 2 clarify which effects these district changes have had on the Belgian party lists. 
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1.2.2. Gender quota laws 
In this section, I briefly discuss the evolution of quota regulations with regard to the presence 
of women in Belgian parliament. The gradual introduction of rather strict gender quota 
regulations strongly modified the intraparty candidate selection processes of Belgian parties, 
and the composition of parliament. In 1987, at the start of the investigated time period, only 
7.7% of Lower House MPs were female. In 1994, this male dominated parliament approved a 
law on the more equal distribution of candidate list positions between men and women. The 
federal elections of 1999 were the first parliamentary elections in Belgium where the new quota 
regulations were applied. More specifically, the law stated that no more than two third of the 
candidates on a list could be of the same sex. The law did not mention anything on the realistic 
or eligible positions on the list. As a result, the effect of the quota law was relatively limited at 
first: the number of elected female MPs increased only from 11.5% in 1995 to 19.3% in 1999. 
In 2002, the law became more strict as the number of male and female candidates on the lists 
had to be equal (difference of one candidate allowed in the event of uneven numbers of 
candidates). Additionally, at least one of the top three candidates had to be female. Before the 
2007 elections, this was even changed to one of the top two candidates. This resulted in a 
significant increase of female MPs: 34.9% in 2003, 36.8% in 2007 and 38.5% in 2010. Table 
1.2 gives an overview of the quota regulations per Lower House election. 
 
Table 1.2.: Overview of gender quota laws for Belgian Lower House elections 
1987 No limitations 
1991 No limitations 
1995 No limitations 
1999 Maximum of 2/3 of candidates from the same sex 
2003 Equal number of male and female candidates First three candidates cannot be from the same sex 
2007 Equal number of male and female candidates First two candidates cannot be from the same sex 
2010 Equal number of male and female candidates First two candidates cannot be from the same sex 
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1.2.3. Intraparty candidate selection processes in Belgium 
There is a considerably body of literature available on the nature of candidate selection 
processes within Belgian parties. The main explanation for this amount of scholarly attention 
is the importance of intraparty candidate selection in the Belgian political system. The electoral 
system applied for the election of the Belgian Lower House is a semi-open or flexible list 
system. In this type of system, voters are able to endorse a party list as a whole or to cast one 
or more preferential votes for specific party candidates. In theory, both the list order and the 
number of preferential votes play an important role in the intraparty seat allocation. In practice, 
however, the threshold of preferential votes to overcome the list order is reached very 
infrequently, which led scholars to characterize flexible list systems as closed-list systems in 
disguise (De Winter 2005; Crisp et al. 2013). 
This statement also holds for the Belgian system, as the number of candidates overcoming the 
threshold of preferential votes is extremely limited. Fiers (2009) calculated that only 30 out of 
4719 MPs over the period 1919-1995 got elected from an unfavourable position on the list. This 
finding supports the argument that intraparty candidate selection is by far the most crucial phase 
of the political recruitment process. In 2002, the Belgian system has been reformed to increase 
the importance of preferential votes. More specifically, the electoral law was changed in the 
sense that the transferral of list votes was reduced by half. This implies that the number of 
candidates that can be elected on the basis of list votes is reduced and intra-list competition 
between candidates has become more important (Wauters and Weekers 2008).  
However, the effect of this reform should not be overstated: the number of candidates elected 
from an unfavourable position on the list is still very limited. For the Flemish parties, these 
numbers jumped from zero to ten in the 2003 elections, but decreased to six in 2010 and only 
two MPs in the 2014 elections (Put et al., 2014). As a consequence, the quote of Lieven De 
Winter, in the chapter on Belgium in the seminal work of Gallagher and Marsh (1988) on 
candidate selection, still holds true: “So the Belgian voters decide only on the number of seats 
a party gets; the parties themselves decide who will receive them” (De Winter, 1988: 21). As a 
consequence, it does not come as a surprise that there is quite a volume of work available on 
candidate selection methods within Belgian parties.  
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Simultaneously, this body of literature appears relatively patchy. While the intraparty candidate 
selection processes of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s are widely studied, the more recent 
procedures in Belgium remain question marks. Obler (1974) presents a systematic analysis of 
the role of primaries in the three major Belgian parties during the 1960s. Several studies 
examine the evolution of the Belgian candidate selection procedures in the 1970s and 1980s 
(De Winter, 1980; Ceuleers and De Winter, 1986; De Winter, 1988). Concerning the 1990s, 
only the contribution of Deschouwer (1993) on the general structure of Belgian party 
organisations briefly discusses the nature of the selection processes in the beginning of this 
decade. Recently, I noticed a surge in attention for candidate selection among Belgian scholars, 
resulting in a number of interesting case-studies and empirical exercises (Verleden, 2013; 
Wauters, 2009; Vandeleene et al., 2013; Fiers and Pilet, 2006; Vandeleene, 2014).  
Studying intraparty candidate selection methods is always a complicated endeavor. This has 
also been the case for the analysis of Belgian parties, during which I encountered some 
complications for which I was already warned at the start of the literature review by Gallagher 
and Marsh (1988, 4-8). In what follows, I briefly discuss how these difficulties were handled 
for this dissertation. At the end, I present the scales that will be used for measuring candidate 
selection. 
The main sources of information for composing a detailed and chronological overview of the 
Belgian intraparty candidate selection methods are party regulations, press articles and earlier 
studies on Belgian candidate selection used as secondary literature.9 Party regulations were 
collected from the archives of the Centre for Political Research at the KU Leuven. On the basis 
                                               
9
 This footnote contains an overview of the earlier literature and studies on Belgian candidate selection 
used as data source for my own analysis of selection procedures between 1987 and 2010: De Winter  
(1988): party statutes and figures on poll participation rates; Katz and Mair (1992) summarized the 
nature of CS methods looking at party statutes only; Maddens, 1995; Deschouwer, 1993; Delwit and 
Dewaele (1997); Fiers and Pilet (2006) general literature review of the evolution of Belgian candidate 
selection procedures; Libeer (2011): study of CD&V and SP.A, in-depth interviews with party officials; 
Vanhooren, 2011: Interviews, party statutes and press articles on the Flemish liberal party; Smulders 
(2012): study of CD&V and CDH, in-depth interviews with party officials; Verleden (2013): general 
literature study of Belgian candidate selection procedures; Vandeleene et al. (2013): interviews and party 
statutes ; Vandeleene (2014): interviews and party statutes, nine Belgian parties among which the eight 
parties studied in this dissertation. 
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of annual reports on Belgian political parties10, I checked whether parties changed their 
regulations and introduced an updated version. If some of these updated versions were not 
available in the archive, I contacted the national party headquarter to get a digital or hard copy.  
Press articles were consulted through the website Gopress, which is an online databank of 
Flemish and francophone newspapers and journals. I searched for articles with keywords (e.g. 
candidate selection, nomination of candidates, list formation, party list) in combination with the 
party name during the four months preceding the election. The articles that described the 
candidate selection procedure were collected and compared with the (often limited) formal 
explanation in the party regulations. Another strategy for finding information on candidate 
selection processes was to search for intraparty conflicts or dissatisfied candidates. Articles on 
conflicts often bring about additional information on the nature of selection processes. 
But even this variety of sources did not tackle a number of difficulties associated with studying 
internal party rules. First, in some of the Belgian parties, (sub)district party organisations were 
free to determine their own rules and procedures concerning the selection of parliamentary 
candidates. However, I did not find any evidence on intraparty variation between the 
constituencies in terms of the followed procedures. Moreover, research on candidate selection 
in other countries shows that little variation exists across the country and selection processes 
are consistent within each party (Cross, 2008; Williams and Paun, 2011).11 In any case, the 
more general evolution described in Appendix 1 ignores potential intraparty differences 
between constituencies and presents the general and common pattern of the candidate selection 
process detected within each party. 
Second, press articles dealing with candidate selection processes are often relatively confusing 
and only provide very partial information. Using this information correctly requires an in depth 
knowledge of the structure and decision-making procedures of the political party organisations 
under consideration. Fortunately, this has been well-documented by the annual publication of 
the Morphology of Belgian political parties in the Belgian-Dutch political science journal Res 
Publica. This annual overview reported on various dimensions of party organisations, such as 
                                               
10
 Annual morphology of Belgian political parties, published by Res Publica, the Belgian-Dutch journal 
of political science. 
11
 A notable exception is the Australian case, where significant diversity exists among state branches 
within each party (Cross and Gauja, 2014). 
38 
 
the number of congresses, the composition of party committees, the party membership numbers 
and party finance.12 
Third, some candidate selection methods are partly coordinated and initiated by relatively 
informal party committees. These committees are very exclusive in nature and often called list 
formation committees (‘lijstvormingscomité’ in Dutch), which were never mentioned in the 
official party regulations. Moreover, parties are not very open on the composition and 
competences of these committees. They are often established from within one of the formal 
party committees, such as the board or the bureau of the district party. Given the vagueness of 
their roles and the incomplete information on their part in the process, I will only take into 
account the more formal party committees to determine the level of inclusiveness of the 
selectorate and centralization in the candidate selection processes. Because of this decision, the 
analysis of candidate selection processes in this dissertation is limited to the more formal 
aspects of the procedure.  
Fourth, some of the procedures contain unimportant steps which can often be regarded as mere 
formalities. For example, if the bureau of the district party level is entitled to draft model lists, 
the party regulations sometimes state that the national party council (or any other national party 
actor) might formulate a number of non-binding recommendations on the list composition. It is 
unclear and hardly detectable to what extent these recommendations had an impact on the actual 
candidate selection process. Moreover, since this stage is a formality rather than a crucial part 
of the process, they should be removed from consideration (Hazan and Rahat, 2010, 38). For 
reasons of simplification, we will not report on this type of stage in the description of the 
candidate selection processes. 
Appendix 1 provides a detailed analysis of the evolution in the candidate selection methods of 
the eight Belgian parties studied in this dissertation. The two candidate selection dimensions of 
selectorate and centralization have to be systematically measured and categorized if they are to 
be used in quantitative analysis. The selected measurement scales follow the approach of 
Shomer (2010), who used the criteria of selectorate and decentralization to produce an eight-
point scale of selection processes. Earlier literature on candidate selection procedures has 
mostly neglected to detect the separate effects of these two dimensions on outcomes such as 
legislators’ behavior (Crisp et al., 2004). As I will discuss in the empirical chapters, 
                                               
12
 Unfortunately, the journal stopped publishing these overviews after 2008. 
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inclusiveness and centralization in candidate selection processes are expected to have distinct 
effects on the outcome variables dealt with in this dissertation. As a result, I choose to use two 
distinct scales for these candidate selection dimensions. 
I argued earlier that candidate selections are very complex processes with various stages and 
intraparty actors involved. Summarizing the complexity of these processes with specific 
indicators or measurement scales is not a straightforward task. Therefore, some authors opt for 
very extensive measurement scales where every nuance in the selection process can be 
measured (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). However, there are some problems with this approach. 
Using 30+ point scales of inclusiveness makes it more difficult to generalize the effects of 
candidate selection processes. If, for instance, a candidate selection process is characterized by 
member involvement but also includes a very dominant nomination committee that vetoes all 
the decisions of members, the inclusiveness score may strongly resemble the score obtained by 
candidate selections without any member involvement at all. So while these two processes are 
fundamentally different in nature, they might end up receiving comparable scores on the 
inclusiveness scale.  
As a result, although these larger scales allow to grasp subtle differences in candidate selection 
processes, they simultaneously make it more challenging to make a general statement about 
crucial attributes of these processes, such as member involvement, a delegates system or 
district-dominated selections. In this dissertation, I will use indicators of candidate selections 
that summarize these intraparty institutions by marking their main attributes. Figure 1.1 and 
Figure 1.2 depict the decentralization and inclusiveness scales used in several chapters of this 
dissertation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3 
1: The national party level dominates the final phase of the selection 
process and/or has veto power 
2: The selection process is an interaction/cooperation between the 
national and district level 
3: The selection process takes place at the district level, national level 
is not involved 
Figure 1.1.: Scale of decentralization 
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Figure 1.1 presents the three dimensions of the decentralization scale. The first category groups 
the candidate selection processes that are completely dominated by the national party level, for 
instance by having the final word at the end of the process, or by practicing veto power over 
the decisions of any subnational party selectorates. The second category deals with candidate 
selection processes where the resulting candidate lists are the products of interaction between 
the national and district level. The difference with the previous example is that in some 
procedures, the national party level may once offer recommendations to the district party level 
for revisions of the candidate list, and the district party level does not have to send the candidate 
list back to the national party level after revisions. A more common example is where the model 
lists are first drafted by a national party selectorate, but a more decentralized selectorate is able 
to have a vote over these model lists. The third and final category are the selection processes 
where the national level has no responsibility in the nomination of parliamentary candidates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 summarizes the three dimensions in the inclusiveness scale. The most exclusive 
category is formed by candidate selections organized by intraparty nomination committees that 
do not involve any member delegates or member participation. Party organs such as the party 
board or council are typical examples of this type of selectorate. The second category is when 
parties use a system of member delegates in the appointment of legislative candidates. A typical 
example is when every local party branch is allowed to appoint a fixed number of 
representatives or delegates to participate in such a member delegate conference (at either the 
district or national party level). Finally, the most inclusive selection processes are the ones 
1 2 3 
1: The selection process is dominated by one or more non-selected 
nomination committees 
2: Member delegates participate in the selection process 
3: Members participate in the selection process 
Figure 1.2.: Scale of inclusiveness of the selectorate 
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where party members are directly involved in the selection of their candidates, for instance 
through the use of party primaries or the system of member polls. 
In what follows, I will elaborate on the evolution of Belgian candidate selection procedures for 
the Lower House elections between 1987 and 2010. Belgian parties have, however, also 
experienced a number of intraparty reforms prior to the 1987 elections which are relevant to the 
focus of this dissertation. Until the beginning of the 1970s, it was common practice for Belgian 
parties to organize member polls at the electoral district (i.e. arrondissement) level where 
members were able to decide on the composition of candidate lists. This procedure implied that 
a list of arbitrarily ordered aspirant-candidates was presented to the members, who could 
anonymously vote for the most preferred candidate list. Usually the party elite was still able to 
modify the result of this procedure by means of a qualified majority in the party bureau. 
However, already from the second half of the 1960s, the system of member polls has been in 
decline (De Winter, 1980). To some extent, the entry of new parties in the Belgian party system 
can explain this decline, as these parties were able to build their internal organizations from 
scratch and often chose more centralized decision-making processes. Both the Volksunie and 
Vlaams Blok designed selection procedures where members were not involved (Maddens, 
1995). 
Apart from the entry of new challengers to the party system, the increasing number of early 
elections in Belgium is the second factor that explains the decline of member polls. Member 
involvement in candidate selection is relatively time-consuming, and in the case of early 
elections this argument can easily be used by party elites to circumvent democratically 
organized selection procedures. Most Belgian parties anticipated early elections in their party 
laws by providing a provisional procedure in which member involvement becomes more limited 
or is skipped altogether (Delwit and De Waele, 1997). Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, when 
early elections were frequently organized, parties jumped from one election campaign to 
another which created the need for more streamlined candidate selection procedures. 
This summarizes the context in which the first election under investigation, the 1987 Lower 
House election, took place. Figure 1.3 shows the general evolution in decentralization and 
inclusiveness of the selectorate, for eight parties over the seven consecutive elections between 
1987 and 2010. I calculated the mean score over the eight parties on the three-point scales 
developed for these two candidate selection dimensions. I now discuss what general factors 
explain the evolutions in both dimensions. Appendix 1 presents a more detailed discussion of 
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the candidate selection procedures of the eight parties under investigation, and their index 
scores per election year for both dimensions. 
 
 
Figure 1.3.: Evolution in Belgian candidate selection procedures (Mean Index Scores for 
Decentralization and Inclusiveness), 1987-2010 
 
Figure 1.3 clearly shows that the level of decentralization in Belgian candidate selection 
processes has decreased over time. From 1995 onwards, the consecutive electoral district 
reforms seem to have led to more centralized candidate selection procedures. As a consequence 
of the St.-Michel treaty, a number of small electoral districts were merged, which automatically 
created pressures for more centralized candidate selection procedures. In 1995 and 1999, the 
mean decentralization score decreased to 2,25 and 2. Additionally, the introduction of 
provincial electoral districts also had a major impact on Belgian candidate selection processes: 
while the mean level of decentralization stabilized in 2003, the decentralization score 
diminished from 2 to 1,63 in 2007. Especially Flemish parties restructured their internal 
procedures in response to the latter district reform, but these reforms were only put to practice 
in 2007. Indeed, earlier research shows that in 2003 the old arrondissement level still took the 
lead role in candidate selection in the Flemish Christian-democratic and liberal parties 
(Smulders, 2012; Vanhooren, 2011). My analysis of the Flemish green party also points to the 
use of a more centralized candidate selection procedure from 2007 onwards: while previously 
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the poll committees at the district level had full control, the national level started to get more 
involved in drafting the model lists.  
The popularity of party cartels further reinforced these centralization tendencies during the 
2000s. Not to be confused with cartel parties (see: Katz and Mair, 1995), party cartels are 
electoral alliances between separate political parties. These alliances were usually agreed upon 
by the national party elites of the cartel partners, and implied that these parties ran joint 
campaigns and formed joint candidate lists. On the Flemish side, three such party cartels were 
formed: CD&V/N-VA, the electorally most successful cartel between the Flemish Christian-
democrats and Flemish nationalists, sp.a-Spirit which was an agreement between the Flemish 
socialists and the left-liberals and finally the Flemish liberal cartel VLD-Vivant. On the 
francophone side, the liberal cartel MR is the best known example.13 In such a party cartel, 
candidate selection tends to be more complex, as cartel partners need to agree on how list 
positions will be distributed over cartel partners before nominating actual candidates in these 
positions. As this process needs a relatively strict coordination, party cartels leave less room for 
internal democracy and member influence. 
The evolution in the inclusiveness of the selectorate, on the contrary, takes another form: while 
inclusiveness first increased during the 1990s, it mainly stabilized afterwards and even 
moderately declined towards the end of the period of investigation. As Figure 1.3 shows, the 
more inclusive procedures such as member polls and primaries regained popularity in the 
beginning of the 1990s. The mean score on the inclusiveness scale rose from 2,3 in 1987 to 2,63 
in 1999. During the following decade, however, Belgian parties did not maintain the democratic 
character of their selection procedures: scores on the inclusiveness scale averaged 2,25 in 2010. 
In other words, the level of democracy among these Belgian candidate selection processes 
dropped back to the initial level from 1987. Again, the popularity of party cartels form a 
potential explanation for the evolution to more exclusive party selectorates. How exactly each 
of the studied parties have changed their candidate selection procedures over the years is 
explained in detail in Appendix 1. 
                                               
13
 In fact, MR consisted of four partners: PRL, which was the traditional liberal party in Wallonia; FDF, 
originating from Brussels and defending francophone interests in the Brussels region; MCC, a smaller 
Christian-democratic party founded by Gerard Deprez; and PFF, the liberal party of the German-
speaking community. 
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1.3. Data 
There are two main sources for the data on local characteristics in this dissertation. A first source 
is the data from the longitudinal KANDI-research project, in which the social, political and 
electoral characteristics of Belgian parliamentary candidates were collected.14 Since the Belgian 
federal elections of 2003, the profiles of election candidates and elected legislators for the 
Flemish political parties have been systematically analyzed and reported in various papers, 
press notes and research articles.15 Later on, the scope of this massive data collection process 
has been widened to include the Flemish candidates for regional elections (i.e. Flemish 
Parliament, Brussels Parliament), the elections for the European Parliament and finally even 
the local elections for a limited sample of municipalities.  
Secondly, within the framework of this dissertation, I expanded the existing datasets with data 
on candidate lists for earlier Belgian Lower House elections (as early as 1987). The candidate 
lists of the francophone parties were also registered at this time. The Belgian Commission for 
the Protection of Privacy (CPP) granted permission to consult the archives of the Belgian Lower 
House. In these archives, the acts of appointment of all the candidates for this federal assembly 
have been stored. These documents contain the name, sex, date of birth, profession and place 
of residence of all the candidates on the party lists. In sum, 7.113 unique candidate profiles 
were registered between March 2011 and October 2011 in the parliamentary archives of the 
Belgian Lower House.  
 
 
                                               
14
 Over the years, the KANDI project has been run and supported by a number of other scholars than 
myself who deserve to be thanked for their much appreciated contributions to data-collection, -analysis 
and -cleaning, and the writing of internal and external reports: Sam Depauw, Stefaan Fiers, Liselotte 
Libbrecht, Bart Maddens, Jo Noppe, Jef Smulders, Ine Vanlangenakker, Frederik Verleden en Karolien 
Weekers. 
15
 An overview of all the publications related to the KANDI-project can be found here: 
http://soc.kuleuven.be/io/verkiezingen . 
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Table 1.3.: Registered candidacies for the Lower House elections, per year and party 
 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2010 Total 
PSC/Cdh 181 183 127 128 121 121 121 982 
CVP/CD&V 238 241 167 168 157 129 156 1.256 
PS 172 175 121 125 118 119 121 951 
SP/sp.a 233 233 168 168 158 158 159 1.277 
PRL/MR 184 183 127 127 120 121 121 983 
PVV/(Open) VLD 235 241 168 168 158 159 159 1.288 
Ecolo 177 182 128 128 121 121 121 978 
Agalev/Groen 219 236 168 168 158 154 159 1.262 
Total 1.639 1.674 1.174 1.180 1.111 1.082 1.117 8.977 
 
Data were already collected for the Belgian Lower House elections of 2003, 2007 and 2010 on 
1.864 unique candidates for the Flemish parties studies in this dissertation. The resulting dataset 
thus contains information on 8.977 unique candidacies during these seven consecutive Lower 
House elections. Table 1.3 provides an overview of the number of candidates per party and 
election year. The differences between parties in the same election can be explained by missing 
documents which self-evidently led to lower numbers of registered candidate profiles.16 
Besides the place of residence of candidates, this dissertation also focuses on the effects of local 
offices in candidate selections and parliamentary elections. However, I was only able to collect 
information on local office for the Flemish parties between 1999 and 2010. These data were 
collected by accessing party websites for the most recent elections, municipality websites for 
                                               
16
 Some of the electoral districts for the Lower House elections were missing in the archives of the 
Lower House, which reduced the number of observations. More specifically, the following districts (and 
party lists in these districts) were not registered: Arrondissement of Bruges, 1991; Province of Liège, 
2003;  Province of Walloon Brabant, 2003; Province of Hainaut, 2007. Moreover, some parties did not 
provide the correct information on the acts of appointment for candidates from the Brussels-Halle-
Vilvoorde district. They registered every candidate on the list as living in the city of Brussels. Therefore, 
the analyses in this dissertation could not be expanded with these candidate observations. 
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the 2010 election, and the ‘Municipal Pocketbook’ on local politics for the Flemish 
municipalities.17 For reasons of data availability, the analyses which focus on the effects of 
local office (Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 6) only include the Flemish parties. 
Apart from the local candidate characteristics, the various empirical chapters of this dissertation 
also use other variables in the analyses (i.e. other candidate characteristics, aggregate list 
characteristics, campaign spending information, etc.). In order to provide more details on the 
operationalization and exact measurement of these variables, an overview of the used variables 
in each of the chapters is provided in Appendix 3. 
 
 
                                               
17
 These pocketbooks have been published since the end of the 1980s by Wolters Kluwer, and contain 
detailed information on municipalities regarding their websites, contact information, municipal services 
and local office holders. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE GEOGRAPHY OF PARLIAMENTARY 
CANDIDATES IN BELGIAN LOWER HOUSE ELECTIONS 
(1987-2010)18 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The set of examples in the general introduction made clear that parties are well aware of the 
place of residence of their parliamentary candidates when preparing the party lists. The place 
of residence seems to be an important criterion in the candidate selection process: if candidates 
do not meet the geographical profile the party selectorate is looking for, they might get offered 
a far less attractive list position than expected, or get de-selected altogether. 
At first sight, it might come across as bizarre that parties attach that much importance to the 
place of residence of their parliamentary candidates. After all, article 42 of the Belgian 
Constitution states that members of the federal parliament not only represent their voter’s 
interests, but the interests of the entire nation. Apparently, the authors of the Belgian 
constitution were fearful that members of parliament would only defend very particularistic 
interests while they are in office, such as the interests of their municipality or electoral district. 
However, this constitutional article is merely symbolic and does not have any practical 
implications (Rimanque, 2005). In fact, there does not have to be a strong geographical 
connection between a member of parliament and his or her electorate. This also appears from 
the fact that parliamentary candidates should not necessarily reside in the electoral district 
where they run for election. Nothing bars a politician who works and lives in Arlon (southern-
east part of Belgium, province of Luxembourg) to run for election in the most western located 
district of Western Flanders.  
                                               
18
 This chapter has been published as: ‘Een veilige thuishaven’ in: Maddens, B., Put, G.J. and Smulders, 
J. (2014). Het DNA van de kandidaten. Leuven: Acco. [translated] 
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Once in a while, Belgian politicians actually make use of this possibility. Wilfried Martens, 
who lived in Ghent at the time, ran for the Senate election in 1991 in the electoral district of 
Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. The second chairman of the Flemish nationalist party Volksunie, 
Frans van der Elst, lived in Neder-Over-Heembeek (one of the 19 municipalities in the Brussels 
region), but was elected in the electoral district of Antwerp in the 1958 national elections. After 
all, it was easier for Flemish nationalists to win seats in this district. And in 2014, Veroniek 
Dewinter (daughter of Vlaams Blok/Belang MP Filip Dewinter) ran for election in the Walloon 
district of Hainaut, even though she declared never to have set foot in that area of the country 
(Knack, 24.11.2013). 
The data collected for this dissertation prove that these examples are rare exceptions. For all 
seven elections between 1987 and 2010, it occurred only 150 times (1,4% of all candidacies for 
the Lower House elections) that a politician ran for election in another district than where he or 
she lived. Looking at the numbers per election, it seems that these moves have become even 
more unusual over the last few elections. In 1987 (2,8%) and 1991 (1,9%), especially candidates 
from Agalev (Flemish greens) and Vlaams Blok campaigned away from home. These were 
young parties at the time, which had serious difficulties in recruiting sufficient numbers of 
candidates to fill the party lists. Recruiting from other districts solved this problem. In the last 
few elections (2010 and 2014), this percentage has decreased to 0,5%. 
Obviously, it is not a coincidence that nearly all MPs are elected in the district where they 
reside. After all, the connection between politicians and their geographical constituency is of 
the utmost importance for their political careers. Former prime minister Wilfried Martens 
acknowledges this common wisdom in his memoires: “Leaving your electoral district is often 
perceived as a crime, as foolishness, as some of my co-partisans came to tell me after the 1991 
elections. Who wants to play it safe in his political career, must remain true to his home base” 
(Martens, 2006). Earlier Belgian research has indeed shown that preferential votes for 
candidates are often strongly concentrated in the municipality or local area in which they reside 
(Wauters et al., 2003). The number of preferential votes partly depends on strong local ties. A 
local office as mayor or alderman also helps the candidate forward in national elections (Put 
and Maddens, 2013a). From the political parties’ point of view, it is crucial to valorize all the 
available local political capital by recruiting locally embedded candidates and drafting 
geographically balanced candidate lists. The party selectorate wants every voter to find as many 
‘nearby’ candidates as possible on the party list. Candidates with strong local ties are expected 
to attract a lot of votes from their home base. 
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The difficulty for party selectorates is the fact that there are often more municipalities in 
electoral districts than list positions. With regard to age, gender and professional background, 
parties are, in theory, able to create a well-balanced list of candidates. But as concerns the place 
of residence, tough decisions have to be made during the candidate selection process. As there 
are sometimes not enough list positions for every local area or municipality, a number of 
municipalities will be neglected and will not have any candidate on the party list. This poses a 
strategic dilemma for political parties. They could aim to recruit candidates from as many 
municipalities as possible on the party list, which leads to a substantial degree of territorial 
coverage. In this case, the list will also contain candidates from smaller municipalities. And the 
smaller the municipality, the smaller the electoral appeal of the candidate on the basis of its 
place of residence. However popular a mayor from a small town might be, he will most likely 
appeal to less candidates on the basis of his local office than local officeholders in larger 
municipalities. As a result, parties might be inclined to recruit candidates from mainly large 
municipalities and cities. This is an alternative approach to tackle the strategic dilemma on 
candidate lists. The downside of this alternative is the fact that more municipalities will be 
neglected, since they have no candidates on the party list. As discussed in the theoretical 
chapter, this could lead to intraparty turmoil and electoral setbacks in certain areas. 
The larger the electoral districts, the larger also the ‘geopolitical’ maneuvering space for parties. 
In the case of the smallest electoral districts, with only one seat to be distributed, geographical 
dispersion is guaranteed as these small districts will end up with one of their candidates in 
parliament. Especially in cases where, for instance, every municipality forms a separate 
electoral district, political parties do not have to face this strategic dilemma.19 As a 
consequence, parties in these single-member-district (SMD) systems do not have the possibility 
to recruit large city candidates instead of candidates from less populated areas or small towns. 
This only becomes possible in larger electoral districts, where different types of municipalities 
are merged. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Belgium has experienced two electoral district reforms during the 
period of investigation, which led to larger districts for the election of the Lower House. For 
the 1987 and 1991 elections, 212 Lower House seats were elected over 30 electoral districts, 
                                               
19
 One could argue, of course, that the dilemma would then shift to the intra-municipality level, where 
candidates from different neighborhoods can be selected or mainly candidates from one centrally 
located, demographically dominant neighborhood.  
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with on average 7,1 seats per district (See Figure 2.1, left map). In fact, there even were three 
districts (Ieper, Oudenaarde and Neufchâteau) with only two seats. In 1993, the fourth state 
reform included the decrease of Lower House seats from 212 to 150. As a result, it was also 
necessary to redistrict and merge some of the smaller electoral districts. In Western Flanders 
and Hainaut, the number of districts was reduced from five to three. In the provinces of 
Limburg, Namur and Luxembourg, two districts were merged to a single one, which implies 
that in these cases the district borders coincided with the province borders. The reform reduced 
the number of electoral districts from 30 to 20 (see Figure 2.1, center map). However, the 
average district magnitude remained stable (7,5). As part of the electoral reform of 2002, all 
electoral districts were enlarged to coincide with the provinces (see Figure 2.1, right map). The 
only exception was the former province of Brabant, for which the old districts were kept in 
place after a ruling of the Belgian constitutional court. The number of seats remained constant 
(150), and the average district magnitude rose significantly to 13,6. 
 
Figure 2.1.: The electoral districts for the election of the Lower House: 1987-1991 (Left); 
1995-1999 (Middle); 2003-2010 (Right) 
 
The electoral reform of 2002 was relatively controversial. Opponents feared that these larger 
electoral districts would lead to the substantial overrepresentation of large cities on candidates 
lists and in parliament. Because of their limited demographic weight, candidates from small 
and rural municipalities would be increasingly ignored by parties in the candidate selection 
process (Pilet, 2007). This chapter presents a comprehensive analysis of the evolutions in the 
place of residence of parliamentary candidates: has the number of large city candidates severely 
increased over the years? And did this occur at the cost of the representation of small 
municipalities on candidate lists? 
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The analysis in this chapter will differentiate between central cities and small municipalities 
(with medium sized municipalities as the residual category).20 The categorization and 
demarcation of central cities was derived from the geographical literature on the hierarchy of 
municipalities. Van Hecke (1998) identifies thirteen Flemish and eight Walloon large and 
regional cities, which I will call central cities in this chapter. In Flanders, these are Antwerp, 
Turnhout, Mechelen, Ghent, Aalst, Sint-Niklaas, Bruges, Kortrijk, Oostende, Roeselare, 
Leuven, Hasselt and Genk. In Wallonia, the cities are Liège, Verviers, Charleroi, Mons, 
Tournai, La Louvière, Namur and Arlon. The proportion of central cities in the entire Flemish 
population fluctuated around 25% between 1987 and 2010. In Wallonia, this percentage 
amounts to more or less 24% (Table 2.1; General Directorate of Statistics and Economic 
Information, 2013). 
 
Table 2.1.: Descriptive statistics on the category of central cities 
Year % of total population 
% of total 
population Flanders 
% of total 
population Wallonia 
1987 25,66 25,88 25,27 
1991 25,42 25,61 25,09 
1995 24,88 25,02 24,62 
1999 24,41 24,59 24,10 
2003 24,37 24,66 23,85 
2007 24,34 24,72 23,66 
2010 24,39 24,82 23,60 
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 Candidates from the 19 Brussels municipalities were not included in this analysis. In other words, the 
analysis is limited to the Flemish and Walloon Regions. The reason is that a large group of Brussels 
candidates (or in some cases their local party branches) inaccurately filled in their place of residence on 
the acts of appointment registered in the Lower House. For some party lists, the place of residence 
‘Brussels’ was filled in for every candidate on the list, which does not make clear whether they meant 
the city or the region. These data are not detailed enough for the analysis of the place of residence. In 
addition, this geographical analysis gets simplified if we only compare the Flemish and Walloon regions 
with each other. It would not make sense to apply the same typology of small and large municipalities 
to the Brussels Region, since it only consists of 19 municipalities. 
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The demarcation of a comparable group of small municipalities is based on a straightforward 
population criterion: a municipality is small if it has less than 13.000 inhabitants. Using 13.000 
as the cut-off point leads to a set of municipalities of which the proportion in the entire 
population is relatively comparable to the proportion of central cities. This facilitates the 
interpretation of the results. The number of municipalities that falls into this category varies 
depending on the election. Over the last decades, the number of municipalities with less than 
13.000 inhabitants has gradually diminished from 360 municipalities in 1987 to 326 
municipalities in 2010. As a result, the population share of these municipalities in the entire 
population has also decreased. In Wallonia, these small municipalities outweigh the ones in 
Flanders: there are more Walloon small municipalities, and they are inhabited by a larger 
fraction of the entire francophone population. In 2010, Flanders had 141 small municipalities 
comprising 20% of the Flemish population. In Wallonia, there were 185, comprising no less 
than 34,2%. Table 2.2 shows how these statistics evolved during the period of investigation. 
 
Table 2.2.: Descriptive statistics on the category of small municipalities 
Year 
Small 
municipalities 
(Total)  
% of total 
population 
Small 
municipalities 
(Flanders) 
% of 
population 
Flanders 
Small 
municipalities 
(Wallonia) 
% of 
population 
(Wallonia) 
1987 360 28,85 162 24,03 198 37,37 
1991 359 28,89 161 23,95 198 37,63 
1995 344 27,13 150 21,75 194 36,68 
1999 336 26,31 147 21,23 189 35,33 
2003 334 26,10 146 20,94 188 35,30 
2007 329 25,50 144 20,48 185 34,44 
2010 326 25,10 141 20,02 185 34,17 
 
In what follows, I first analyze the geographical composition of party lists from the perspective 
of the candidates. In other words, I will examine which proportion of candidates in realistic 
positions21 live in central cities and small municipalities, and how these proportions have 
                                               
21
 Throughout this dissertation, the concepts of “realistic” and “unrealistic” list positions are frequently 
used. A realistic position is a list position from which a candidate has a realistic chance of getting elected, 
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changed over the last decades. Additionally, I will also focus on the municipalities themselves 
and analyze the degree of territorial coverage on party lists: how many municipalities are 
represented on the party lists, and which municipalities are substantially under- or 
overrepresented? So while the first approach analyzes the place of residence of parliamentary 
candidates with the candidates themselves as units of analysis, the second approach instead 
analyzes the same dependent variable from the municipality perspective. 
 
2.2. Candidates from central cities and small municipalities 
Figure 2.2 shows the percentages of candidates living in central cities and small municipalities. 
What strikes the eye when looking at this graph is that the proportion of candidates from central 
cities was relatively stable over the last 25 years. This number consistently fluctuated around 
20%, with a slight increase in 1987 and 2007 (both 22,5%) and a slight decrease in 2010 
(19,5%). These proportions approximate the actual population share of the central cities (see 
Figure 2.1). Apparently, it is not the case that the two electoral district reforms led to an 
oversupply of large city candidates. However, with regard to the candidates living in one of the 
small municipalities, a very clear and consistent evolution has taken place: their share on 
candidate lists gradually decreased from 33% in 1987 to 25,1% in 2003. The first electoral 
reform seems to have led to a sharp decline in candidates from small municipalities, which 
persisted on the candidate lists for the 1999 and 2003 elections. After 2003, the representation 
of small municipality candidates has stabilized. The second electoral reform clearly did not 
result in decreased representation of this category of candidates. 
In 1987 and 1991, small municipalities were strongly overrepresented on the analyzed 
candidate lists. While their population share was only 29%, these municipalities delivered 33% 
of the party candidates on the lists for the Lower House elections. In the last election, the 
population and candidate shares of small municipalities was more or less in balance. Because 
of this evolution, the initial underrepresentation of medium sized municipalities has gradually 
disappeared. In other words, the geographical dispersion of candidates has been more in 
accordance with the demographic reality than at the beginning of our period of investigation. 
                                               
based on the previous election result in the district. The operationalization of these concepts can be 
found in Appendix 2.  
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Figure 2.2.: Percentage of candidates living in central cities and small municipalities 
 
As mentioned, while the population share of central cities is slightly lower in Wallonia 
compared with Flanders, the share of small municipalities is higher. This is also reflected in the 
geographical dispersion of candidates on the party lists. Figure 2.3 demonstrates that the share 
of central city candidates is consistently higher in Flanders. The difference between the two 
regions is a bit too large to be entirely caused by the slightly higher population share of central 
cities in Flanders. As expected, the candidates from small municipalities are clearly better 
represented on the francophone party lists than on the Flemish ones (see Figure 2.4). But in this 
case, the difference is substantially larger (20 percent points on average) than what would be 
expected on the basis of population share. The earlier described decrease in the share of small 
municipality candidates takes a different course in both regions. In Wallonia, the first reform 
seems to have lowered this share, but afterwards it remained quite stable. In Flanders, there is 
not only an effect in 1995, but the trend gradually continues afterwards. 
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Figure 2.3.: Percentage of candidates living in central cities among Flemish and francophone 
parties 
 
 
Figure 2.4.: Percentage of candidates living in small municipalities among Flemish and 
francophone parties 
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 The fact that Flemish candidates are more concentrated in central cities than francophone 
candidates can also be graphically illustrated. Figure 2.5 shows the geographical dispersion of 
all candidates, aggregated over all seven Lower House elections. I calculated the absolute 
number of candidates per Belgian municipality. One of the more prominent findings is the 
dominance of candidates from the axis Mechelen-Antwerp in the province of Antwerp. In 
Western Flanders, it strikes the eye that the Westhoek area is less populated with candidates 
than the eastern part of the province, which is dominated by central cities such as Kortrijk, 
Bruges and Oostende. In the province of Limburg, the dominance of central cities seems less 
outspoken and there is a more even dispersion of candidates over the municipalities.  
 
Figure 2.5.: Geographical dispersion of all candidates for the Belgian Lower House elections, 
1987-2010 
 
The high concentration of candidates in the Flemish peripheral area around Brussels is related 
to the peculiar situation of the electoral district Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. This has always been 
a relatively large district, but the candidates on the lists of Flemish parties are mostly living in 
the Halle-Vilvoorde area, and to a lesser extent in Brussels, where the number of Flemish voters 
is limited. As a result, the representation of municipalities of Halle-Vilvoorde on Flemish party 
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lists is artificially high. In Wallonia, especially the central cities of Liège, Namur, Mons and 
Charleroi are well represented on the candidate lists. The area of the Ardennes, on the contrary, 
has several small municipalities which have not delivered a lot of candidates over the years. 
Still, of all the small municipalities in Wallonia, only seven have never been represented by at 
least one candidate since the 1987 Lower House elections. 
As previously mentioned, the electoral district reforms have generally resulted in a more 
balanced geographical dispersion of candidates. But does this also hold true for candidates in 
realistic list positions? After all, what matters most for municipalities is that one of their 
candidates has a considerable chance of getting elected, which will lead to representation of 
local interests in parliament. This primarily depends on the selection of parliamentary 
candidates in realistic positions by political parties. For this category of list positions, parties 
seem to prefer candidates from central cities, especially since 1999 (Figure 2.6). Before 1999, 
realistic positions were more equally distributed over central cities and small municipalities. 
But after 1999, the representation of small municipalities has gradually decreased (from 26,5% 
in 1995 to 16,6% in 2007). The share of central city candidates takes a giant leap forward in 
2003, more specifically from 27,5% to 33,7%. The result is an increasing gap between central 
cities and small municipalities, which narrows slightly in 2010 because of the increase in the 
share of small municipality candidates. In sum, with regard to realistic list positions, small 
municipalities have gradually evolved towards a slight underrepresentation compared with their 
population share. The central cities, on the other hand, have jumped from a more or less 
proportional representation to a clear overrepresentation in 2003. This seems to be the result of 
the introduction of provincial electoral districts. 
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Figure 2.6.: Percentage of candidates in realistic list positions living in central cities and small 
municipalities 
 
Figure 2.7 shows the geographical dispersion of candidates on realistic positions aggregated 
over the seven elections. While there is, again, a high concentration of candidates in central 
cities, the contrast with the other municipalities is now more outspoken in comparison with the 
first map based on all candidates. Moreover, the group of municipalities that did not have any 
candidate in realistic positions since 1987 is now considerably larger, especially in the 
provinces of Luxembourg, Liège and Namur. No less than 110 municipalities have not 
delivered a single candidate in realistic list positions since the first Lower House election taken 
into consideration. 
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Figure 2.7.: Geographical dispersion of candidates in realistic list positions for the Belgian 
Lower House elections, 1987-2010 
 
Figure 2.7 thus shows that the concentration of realistic candidates in central cities is generally 
higher in Flanders than in Wallonia, which is confirmed by Figure 2.8: the giant leap forward 
by central cities in 2003 appears to have been caused by the Flemish party lists. In Flanders, the 
share of central city candidates increased by 7%, in Wallonia by 1,4%. In the francophone part 
of the country, the opposite scenario has taken place: after the electoral district reform, the 
smaller municipalities were considerably better represented among realistic candidates (Figure 
2.9). In 2003, their share increased from 32,3% to 43,3%. Still, there has also been a decrease 
in Wallonia in comparison with the earliest elections under investigation. As a consequence, 
the difference between the two regions remains more or less intact: the share of small 
municipality candidates in realistic positions is 25% larger in Wallonia compared to Flanders. 
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Figure 2.8.: Percentage of candidates in realistic positions living in central cities among 
Flemish and francophone parties 
 
 
Figure 2.9.: Percentage of candidates in realistic list positions living in small municipalities 
among Flemish and francophone parties 
 
Arguably, political parties follow different approaches with regard to geographical 
representation on party lists. This approach will be strongly related to their local embedment 
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over the country. The Flemish Christian-democrats CVP/CD&V are traditionally considered 
the party that dominates the smaller, rural parts of Flanders. One might argue that this should 
then result in more small municipality candidates in realistic list positions on the Flemish 
Christian-democratic lists. The Flemish socialists, on the other hand, score better in the central 
cities. The same holds for the francophone socialists, who are still strongest in the old Walloon 
industrial cities of Charleroi and Liège. The logical consequence is that these cities are always 
extensively represented on the socialist candidate lists.  
The data show that only the Flemish socialist party prefers central city candidates. The 
difference with the other parties is, however, not that large (Graph 2.10). In 1987, the Flemish 
socialists had 3,5% more central city candidates on their lists compared to the other parties. 
This difference gradually increased to 7,8% in 2010. With regard to the Flemish greens, a 
comparable trend towards growing overrepresentation of central city candidates has taken 
place, both for realistic and unrealistic list positions. Surprisingly, there is no sign of the 
expected overrepresentation of central city candidates on the party lists of the francophone 
socialists. Instead, their candidates are equally dispersed over smaller and larger municipalities. 
Moreover, the hypothesis that Christian-democrats are traditionally recruiting more candidates 
in rural areas is not confirmed by the data. In sum, there is not that much difference between 
the parties with regard to the representation of central cities on candidate lists. 
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Figure 2.10.: Percentage of candidates living in central cities, by party 
 
Especially the lists of the far-right Vlaams Blok/Belang show a deviating pattern with regard to 
the geographical dispersion of candidates. Initially, this party’s lists were completely dominated 
by candidates from central cities: in 1987, nearly half of their parliamentary candidates were 
living in one these 13 Flemish cities. Afterwards, this number declined, and after 2003 it 
stabilized around 23%. In 2010, the Vlaams Belang merely had 22,2% central city candidates, 
which is relatively close to the aggregate mean for all the parties. The contrast between 1987 
and 2010 is also clear when we compare the candidate maps for Vlaams Blok/Belang in 1987 
and 2010 (Map 2.11 and 2.12). In 1987, the far-right party was largely absent in the less 
urbanized areas of Flanders. In 2010, on the other hand, candidates were more equally dispersed 
over the entire region. 
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Figure 2.11.: Geographical dispersion of Vlaams Blok candidates, 1987 Lower House elections  
 
Figure 2.12.: Geographical dispersion of Vlaams Belang candidates, 2010 Lower House 
elections 
64 
 
 
Self-evidently, this geographical pattern is related to the electoral evolution of Vlaams 
Blok/Belang. Initially, their electoral support was highly concentrated in central cities, but the 
party has gradually gained electoral support in the peripheral areas and the entire Flemish region 
(Pauwels, 2006). The organizational development of the party followed a comparable pattern, 
and initially candidates were mainly recruited from central cities because of a lack of local party 
branches in other areas. 
 
2.3. The territorial coverage of candidate lists  
The geography of candidate lists can also be analyzed from the perspective of the 
municipalities. The question is, then, how many municipalities in the electoral districts are 
represented by at least one candidate on the party lists. This percentage expresses the degree of 
territorial coverage on the party lists. Arguably, the territorial coverage primarily depends on 
the number of list positions. If this number decreases, the chance that all municipalities in the 
district are represented on the list will decrease as well. 
As shown by Figure 2.13, the electoral district reform of 1993 has automatically decreased the 
degree of territorial coverage for all municipalities (from 84,6% in 1991 to 77,2% in 1995). The 
second electoral district reform in 2002 only had limited impact on the territorial coverage of 
party lists. The relatively sharp decrease in 2007 is caused by the electoral alliance between N-
VA and CD&V, as a result of which the number of candidates included in the analysis suddenly 
dropped. 
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Figure 2.13.: Percentage of municipalities (total and small) with at least one candidate on the 
party lists 
 
As expected, especially the smaller municipalities are frequently forgotten by the party 
selectorates when drafting the candidate lists. Within the category of small municipalities, 
78,3% had at least one candidate on one of the lists in the 1987 elections. This number 
dramatically declined to 59,5% in 2010. 
The fact that territorial coverage is consistently lower in Wallonia than in Flanders (Figure 
2.14), is related to the lower number of seats, parties and consequently also candidates in the 
southern part of the country. In addition, Wallonia has more municipalities in proportion to its 
population and its number of Lower House seats. For the 1987 and 1991 elections, the number 
of municipalities per Lower House seat amounted to 2,4 in Flanders and 3,1 in Wallonia.22 In 
1995, this average increased to 3,4 in Flanders and 4,4 in Wallonia.23 As a consequence, 
Walloon municipalities have considerably lower chances to get represented on party lists. Still, 
taking this into account and observing the evolution of territorial coverage in both regions, we 
                                               
22
 Under the assumption that 16 out of 33 seats in the electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde are 
assigned to Flemish parties, which was the case in 1987. 
23
 Under the assumption that 11 of the 22 seats in the electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde are 
assigned to Flemish parties, which was the case in 1995 and 1999. 
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see strongly diverging patterns emerge over the last seven elections. The decline after the 1993 
reform is mainly a francophone phenomenon. In Flanders, the number of candidates was still 
large enough to represent nearly 90% of the municipalities on the candidate lists. The 2003 
reform, however, only had an effect on Flanders: the territorial coverage decreased from 89,9% 
to 82,8%, but stabilized in Wallonia. 
 
 
Figure 2.14.: Percentage of municipalities (Flemish and Walloon) with at least one candidate 
on the party lists 
 
Previously, we also found that the share of small municipality candidates stabilized in Wallonia 
after the electoral district reform of 2002, while it slightly decreased in Flanders. This is related 
to the differences between the regions in terms of the electoral districts at the regional level. 
For the election of the Walloon parliament, the francophone parties preferred to retain the old 
electoral districts. The 75 members of Walloon parliament are thus still elected over 13 
relatively small electoral districts. The Flemish parties, on the contrary, introduced provincial 
districts. As discussed in Chapter 1, this difference is also reflected in the internal party 
organizations. In Wallonia, the party branches at the old ‘arrondissemental’ level still play a 
determining role in intraparty decision-making. In Flanders, however, this intraparty level has 
largely disappeared. Intraparty decision-making is organized at a more centralized level in 
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Flanders. In the francophone parties, the arrondissemental party branches are still involved in 
decision-making (Smulders, 2012). These more decentralized decision-making procedures 
apparently result in a more balanced representation of small municipalities on candidate lists. 
The Belgian case suggests that intraparty decentralization, and more specifically 
decentralization in candidate selection processes, increases the representation of these small 
municipality candidates. More centralized processes, however, lead to a decreased 
representation of small municipalities. 
If we limit the analysis to the realistic list positions, the degree of territorial coverage is of 
course significantly lower, precisely because the number of realistic positions on the party lists 
is very limited. The evolution of the territorial coverage for these positions strongly resembles 
the evolution for all candidates (Figure 2.15). An interesting difference is the more outspoken 
decline in 2003: the degree of territorial coverage for realistic list positions decreases from 
37,4% to 32,2%. Put differently, before the electoral district reform, nearly four out of ten 
municipalities had a reasonable chance of getting at least one candidate, after the reform this 
was only the case for one third. 
 
 
Figure 2.15.: Percentage of municipalities (total and small) with at least one candidate in 
realistic list position 
 
Again, it is no surprise that mainly the small municipalities are neglected with regard to realistic 
list positions. Their presence on realistic positions has been cut in half over 15 years. In 1991, 
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35,7% of the small municipalities were represented on a realistic list position, in 2003 merely 
18,2%. Barely one out of five small municipalities had a realistic chance of obtaining a seat in 
parliament. After 2003, the degree of territorial coverage has stabilized on this low level. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter analyzed the place of residence of the Belgian party candidates for the Lower 
House elections between 1987 and 2010. Over a period where two electoral district reforms 
were introduced, I first examined how the number of large city and small municipality 
candidates has changed over time. Secondly, I focused on the degree of territorial coverage of 
party lists:  has the number of municipalities with at least one candidate on the lists significantly 
decreased over the period of investigation?  
Between 1987 and 2010, the share of candidates living in large cities stabilized around 20%. 
The share of small municipality candidates, with less than 13.000 inhabitants, systematically 
declined from 33% in 1987 to 24,3% in 2007. Because of this, the original underrepresentation 
of medium-sized municipalities gradually disappeared over time. In other words, it is not the 
case that large cities linearly became more dominant on the candidate lists for Belgian elections. 
However, it became more difficult for candidates from small municipalities to get selected by 
parties for parliamentary elections. 
The comparison between candidates from the Walloon and Flemish regions produced some 
interesting findings with regard to interregional differences. In Wallonia, the share of small 
municipality candidates is more or less 20% higher than in Flanders. While the francophone 
share of small municipality candidates remained relatively stable since 1999, this category of 
candidates decreases further on the Flemish party lists. When looking at the realistic list 
positions, the number of large city candidates has substantially increased since 2003. At first 
sight, this appears to be the effect of the second electoral district reform, which introduced large 
provincial electoral districts for the Lower House elections. However, this finding only holds 
for the Flemish party lists: in Wallonia, the presence of large city candidates has even decreased 
in 2007, the second election with provincial districts. 
Also with regard to the territorial coverage on party lists, I see notable differences between the 
two regions. After the provincialization of electoral districts, the Flemish parties nominated 
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candidates from significantly less municipalities than before. These important differences 
between the regions mirrors the divergence in candidate selection methods I observed during 
the elections under investigation (see Chapter 1). The resemblance between the evolutions in 
place of residence and intraparty candidate selection methods raises the question about what 
exactly affected the changes in the candidates’ place of residence: was it merely the effect of 
larger electoral districts, or rather the effect of intraparty changes to candidate selection 
processes, for instance in terms of inclusiveness of the selectorate and/or decentralization? 
Chapter 5 of the dissertation will take a closer look at this relationship.
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CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECTS OF LOCAL CANDIDATE 
CHARACTERISTICS ON THE SELECTION OF 
PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES FOR REALISTIC 
POSITIONS24 
 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The representativeness of parliaments is a long standing concern of political scientists. The 
extensive empirical research shows that the somewhat obsolete ideal of a legislature as a perfect 
mirror of society is seldom met (e.g. Ross, 1955; Aaronovitch, 1961; Putnam, 1976; Norris, 
1997; Best and Cotta, 2000). Important determinants of the bias in the composition of 
parliaments are the electoral system and the candidate selection procedures in the parties. This 
article focuses on the second factor. The selection of candidates is a notoriously difficult object 
of research and has been called ‘the secret garden of politics’ (Gallagher, 1988). More in 
particular, it is very difficult to assess on the basis of which criteria candidates are selected. We 
believe that we can lift a piece of the veil by contrasting the candidates who obtain a realistic 
or eligible position on the list in a proportional system, and those who do not. We will apply 
this approach to the Belgian Lower House elections in the period 1999-2010. 
In this way, we hope to contribute to the growing body of literature on candidate selection. Most 
studies in the subfield concentrate on the procedures which parties apply (Bille, 2001; Lundell, 
2004; Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). They focus on the level of inclusion 
and decentralisation within parties and try to determine the exogenous and endogenous factors 
which influence selection processes. Other studies look at the outcome of the selection process 
and map the characteristics of the selected candidates (Seligman, 1971; Gallagher, 1988; Bochel 
and Denver, 1983). In these studies, a distinction is normally made between the objective 
characteristics (such as race, gender, age and place of residence) and the subjective 
                                               
24
 This chapter has been published as: Put, G. and Maddens, B. (2013). The selection of candidates for 
eligible positions on PR lists: The Belgian/Flemish federal elections 1999-2010. Journal of Elections, 
Public Opinion and Parties, 23 (1), pp. 49-65. 
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characteristics (such as eloquence, management and media skills). It is assumed that the 
selectorate aims for a particular combination of these characteristics, an exercise which is called 
ticket-balancing (Valen, 1988; Matthews and Valen, 1999). 
Of course, the nature of this exercise is largely determined by the electoral system. In a FPTP 
system, the party selectorate has to select a single candidate who appeals to the entire electorate 
of the constituency. As a result, there is generally a significant gender and social bias in the 
group of selected candidates (Matland and Studlar, 1996). In a list PR system, the selectorate 
can put a wide variety of candidates on the list, allowing for a more balanced ticket. The larger 
the constituencies are, the easier it is for parties to present representative lists to the voters. 
However, which candidates are eventually elected will very much depend on the rank order on 
the list. This is most evident in (semi-)closed list systems, where the allocation of seats is 
determined by the rank order on the list.  But in open systems as well, parties retain some control 
over the election of MPs. This is so because candidates at the top of the list normally obtain 
most preferential votes (Miller and Krosnick, 1998). As a result, a distinction can be made 
between the ‘realistic’ and ‘unrealistic’ candidates on the list. The former stand a real chance 
of being elected because they have a promising position on the list. The latter are largely 
symbolical candidates who ‘fill’ the list.  At the same time, this distinction is not so clear-cut. 
Apart from the realistic candidates who stand a very high chance of being elected, and the non-
realistic ones, whose chances are almost non-existent, there are also candidates whose position 
on the list is precarious. Their election is a real possibility on condition that either they obtain 
a very high personal score or that the list performs exceptionally well in comparison to the 
previous election. By analogy with the uncertain seats in majoritarian systems, we can label 
these positions as ‘marginal’. It is the normal practice for political parties to differentiate 
between these types of candidates and sometimes a different selection procedure is applied 
(Hazan and Rahat, 2010; De Winter, 1988; De Winter and Brans, 2003; Obler, 1970). 
We believe that this important distinction between ‘realistic’, ‘marginal’ and ‘unrealistic’ 
candidates can be used to solve one of the endemic problems of candidate selection research. 
Mapping the characteristics of the candidates is one thing. But in order to pinpoint the selection 
criteria used by the parties, a control group of potential candidates is needed. The biased 
composition of parliament can in part be attributed to the biased supply of potential candidates 
(Narud et al., 2002). If all available politicians are male whites with brokerage jobs, the party 
can hardly be accused of being biased if it only selects such candidates. As Holland (1987) has 
argued: “only by juxtaposing [office-holders] with both non-elected and non-selected 
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candidates can recruitment studies progress beyond the status of a superficial check-list of 
socio-economic similarities and differences”. However, the candidate selection procedure is a 
notoriously secretive and opaque business, and it is exceptional that parties select the candidates 
on the basis of transparent primaries or polls. Therefore, it is very difficult to collect a 
representative sample of ‘aspiring’ or ‘potential’ candidates. But an alternative approach is to 
use the unrealistic candidates as a control group. A comparison between the more ‘realistic’ 
candidates, the ‘marginal’ candidates and the less successful ‘unrealistic’ candidates is a useful 
way to analyse the importance of objective candidate characteristics in the selection process. 
Obviously, this research design only makes sense in PR systems with large constituencies, in 
which the number of available positions on the list substantially exceeds the number of available 
seats, or the number of seats a party can realistically expect to obtain. Identifying these groups 
of candidates is not straightforward and requires an in depth analysis of the electoral system 
and the selection routines within parties. Another practical problem is that the number of 
candidates on realistic and marginal positions will normally be very limited, rendering 
multivariate statistical analysis more difficult.  
Belgium is a good case for trying out this research design. The elections for the Lower House 
are held under list PR, with large constituencies. We constructed a vast dataset with information 
about a number of objective characteristics of the candidates. This dataset, which is limited to 
the constituencies in the Flemish part of Belgium, covers the four most recent federal elections 
(1999, 2003, 2007, 2010). Pooling the data of these four elections yields a sufficient number of 
realistic and marginal candidates for multivariate analysis. On the basis of an in-depth analysis 
of candidate selection procedures, we were able to define criteria for distinguishing between 
the realistic, marginal and the unrealistic positions. In what follows, we will first propose some 
testable hypotheses about the selection criteria with regard to the objective characteristics of 
the candidates, derived from the existing literature. As these hypotheses involve characteristics 
at both the individual and the municipality level, we will test them on the basis of a multilevel 
multinomial regression analysis.   
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3.2.  Independent variables and hypotheses  
On the basis of the existing literature, a distinction can be made between three groups of 
independent variables: (1) individual social background variables (gender, age and occupation), 
(2) individual political variables (offices held at the regional, national and local level, campaign 
experience) and (3), at an aggregated level, the population of the municipality where the 
candidate lives.  
 
3.2.1. Social background variables 
While women used to be strongly underrepresented in Western European parliaments, this 
gender bias has gradually diminished (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993; Philips, 1995; Diaz, 2005). 
Party selectorates used to have a preference for male candidates (Bochel and Denver, 1983). 
However, in many countries, quota regulations have obliged the parties to reduce the gender 
bias in the selection of candidates. In most cases, the quota mechanism takes the complexity of 
the electoral system into account and therefore not only leads to a significant female 
representation on the list as a whole, but guarantees that women candidates are selected for 
realistic positions. For instance, the Argentinean quota legislation explicitly differentiates 
between eligible and non-eligible list positions (Jones, 1996). To the extent that this is the case, 
there will be no effect of gender on the odds of being selected for a realistic or marginal position. 
In Belgium, a quota regulation was first applied in the 1999 election: at least one third of the 
candidates on the list had to be women. From 2003 onwards, half of the candidates had to be 
women. It is only since 2003 that quota were specifically applied to realistic positions: in that 
election at least one of the three top candidates had to be a woman and from 2007 onwards at 
least one of the two top candidates. We therefore expect that the gender bias in the selection of 
realistic or marginal candidates will still be present in 1999, but will have diminished in 2003 
and almost disappeared in 2007 and 2010. 
As concerns occupation, research has shown that so-called ‘brokerage jobs’ or ‘politics-
facilitating occupations’ such as teacher, journalist, government official and political researcher 
are overrepresented in parliament (Cairney, 2007; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995).  It is argued 
that candidates with such an occupational background have a number of subjective personal 
characteristics which increase the odds of being selected by the party. We expect that these 
professions will be overrepresented amongst the realistic and marginal candidates on the list. 
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There are also good reasons to assume that the selectorate will particularly favour one category 
of brokerage professionals, namely (former) party employees. These political professionals 
have already had the opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty and discipline within the party. 
And it also helps that they are familiar with the decision making process in the party and know 
who pulls the strings. Therefore, we expect that the bias in favour of brokerage jobs will be 
particularly strong with regard to (former) members of the party staff or the minister’s personal 
staff.    
The selection bias with regard to age has been much less researched. Yet there are indications 
that party selectorates have a preference for middle aged candidates. Research on the political 
recruitment within British parties has shown that candidates in their forties are dominant in both 
the Labour and the Conservative party (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). The parties may have a 
good reason to avoid young candidates. In Belgium, lists have been shown to be less successful 
if the candidates are less than 25 years old (Maddens and Put, 2011). This selection bias is also 
reflected in the composition of parliaments: in most European parliaments, the average MP is 
in his or her early forties (Best and Cotta, 2000).  This overrepresentation is probably due to the 
fact that middle aged candidates have already made a professional career and developed a wide 
social network in doing so. Probably, this also implies that older, retired persons will be much 
less sought by the parties. Therefore, we expect to find a curvilinear effect of age on the odds 
of being selected as a realistic or marginal candidate: the odds will first increase with age and 
decrease once the retirement age (65 years in Belgium) is reached.  
 
3.2.2. Political variables 
It is an understatement that the party selectorate is favourably biased towards incumbents. This 
is so because incumbents have an important competitive advantage in the election. They are 
well known in the constituency, get more media coverage and have more financial and 
organisational resources at their disposal (see for example: Gelman and King, 1990; Cox and 
Katz, 1996). Voters also tend to prefer incumbents because they are perceived to have more 
experience (Bernhardt and Ingberman, 1985). Incumbents developed a political network that 
will help them secure their selection as a realistic candidate (Ranney, 1981). In many cases, 
they have a decisive voice in the selectorate. While the incumbency bias in the selection process 
has been mainly studied in majoritarian systems, Liang (2013) argued that it is also important 
75 
 
in proportional systems. We therefore expect that an incumbent will have a much stronger 
chance of being selected as a realistic or marginal candidate.  
Some of the reasons why incumbents are more often selected will also apply to frequent 
challengers. A politician who runs time and again in the election will also obtain a certain 
notoriety in the constituency and gradually expand his or her political and campaign network. 
This will not only help in the actual election, but also strengthen the position of the candidate 
in the party. Their previous involvement in the campaign will arguably give these candidates 
an easier access to key persons and resources within the party organisation. Also, the fact that 
a politician has already run in previous elections attests to his or her commitment to the party 
and its ideology. In this sense, a selection as a realistic or marginal candidate can be considered 
as a reward for previous campaigning from an unrealistic position. In empirical research, this 
notion of campaign experience is mostly closely linked to incumbency (see, for example, 
Marsh, 1987; Van Dunk, 1997; Hoffman et al., 2001). However, we argue that campaign 
experience may be an asset apart from incumbency: the more a politician has run as a candidate 
in the past, the larger the odds that he or she will be selected as a realistic or marginal candidate. 
The notion of incumbency can also be extended to offices at the local level. Politicians who 
hold a local office will be more familiar to voters and have more campaign resources. This will 
particularly be the case for executive office holders such as mayors and aldermen. Local offices 
are also indicative of a candidate’s strong ties to the local community. These local roots 
constitute an important electoral asset (Tavits, 2010; Blais et al., 2003; Shugart et al., 2005) and 
should normally increase the odds of being selected as a realistic or marginal candidate. 
 
3.2.3. Municipality characteristics 
At the same time, it is obvious that the effect of holding office at the local level will be closely 
intertwined with a variable at a higher level, namely the size of the municipality. The magnitude 
of the electoral capital which a local office holder can acquire is bounded by the population of 
the municipality. However popular the mayor of a village may be, if the population size is small, 
the electoral effect in a general election will be negligible. Conversely, a mayor of a large town, 
while perhaps somewhat less popular, may have a much more important impact on the result. 
Hence, it will be particularly the local office holders of larger municipalities which will be 
sought by the selectorate for the realistic and marginal positions on the list. We therefore expect 
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that the effect of local office on the odds of being selected will interact with the population size 
of the municipality. 
But even apart from the effect of local office, it is clear that the size of the municipality of a 
candidate will somehow interfere with the selection process. In proportional systems, the party 
selectorate will normally aim at a geographically balanced list, which covers the entire 
constituency. This spatial dimension of the candidate selection process has never been seriously 
studied. Nevertheless, common sense dictates that a party aiming at geographical balance faces 
some tough choices. The problem is that, even in large constituencies, the number of positions 
on the list will always be much smaller than the number of municipalities in the constituency. 
This is a fortiori the case for the subsets of realistic and marginal positions.  
It can be argued that the party has to choose between two alternative geographical strategies 
(Maddens and Put, 2011; Put et al., 2011). The population strategy implies that a municipality 
will be represented on the list in proportion to its demographic size. For instance, if a large town 
constitutes 25% of the constituency’s population, approximately one fourth of the positions on 
the list will be reserved for candidates living there. The municipality strategy, on the other hand, 
implies that the party will try to get as many municipalities as possible represented on the list. 
This strategy will put the larger towns at a disadvantage, as they will only have one 
representative on the list, irrespective of their population size. The population strategy, on the 
other hand, will always favour the larger municipalities at the expense of the smaller ones. 
The individual level relationship between the size of the politician’s place of residence and the 
odds of being selected is hard to predict, as it will depend on the party’s geographical strategy. 
If a party chooses the municipality strategy, and attempts to have as many municipalities as 
possible represented amongst the realistic candidates, politicians from larger municipalities will 
stand a smaller stand of being elected. This is so because only one can be chosen, even though 
there will be relatively many competitors due to the large size of the city. If a party chooses the 
population strategy, no significant effect is expected. A larger town will have more candidates, 
but this does not translate to a higher odds at the individual level, due to the higher number of 
competitors. The relationship between the odds of being selected and the size of the 
municipality can thus be considered as an indication of the dominant geographical strategy 
followed by the parties.     
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3.3. Realistic and marginal positions in the Belgian electoral system 
Whether or not a position on the list can be considered as realistic depends on the electoral 
system and the strength of the party in the constituency (Hazan and Rahat, 2010). In closed list 
PR systems, it suffices to assess how many seats the party can be expected to win in the 
constituency. If a party can realistically hope for four seats, than the first four positions on the 
list can be considered ‘realistic’. In open or semi-open list PR systems, the exercise is more 
complicated. It also has to take into account the seat allocation formula. This may explicitly 
favour the candidates at the top of the list, for instance by transferring some or all of the list 
votes to these candidates. But even in fully open systems, candidates on the more visible 
positions (at the top or at the bottom) will almost automatically obtain more votes and thus 
stand a better chance to obtain one of the seats allocated to the list. The parties have learnt from 
practice to identify several categories of candidates on the list. Distinguishing between 
‘realistic’, ‘marginal’ and ‘non-realistic’ positions thus requires an in-depth knowledge of both 
the electoral system and the decision-making procedures in the parties.  
Belgium has a semi-open list PR system with fairly large constituencies. Voters can cast either 
a vote at the top of the list or a preferential vote for one or more candidates on one and the same 
list. Candidates with a specified number of preferential votes are directly elected. Next, the list 
votes are distributed to the highest ranked unelected candidates, until they reach the amount of 
votes needed for election. In practice, the system functions as a quasi-closed system as the 
allocation of seats is largely determined by the order on the list. This is due to the list votes 
distribution formula and to the habit of voters to prefer the higher ranked candidates.  In the 
past, it was nearly impossible to get elected from an unfavourable position on the list (Fiers, 
2009). Recently this number has slightly increased for two reasons. Firstly, more and more 
voters cast a preferential vote and secondly, the number of list votes to be distributed to the 
candidates was halved from 2003 onwards. In some cases, the candidates at the bottom of the 
list (the so called ‘list pushers’) manage to get elected instead of a higher ranked candidate 
(Wauters et al., 2004).  This is so because parties often choose popular politicians for this last 
position on the list. A particularity of the Belgian electoral system is that voters are presented 
with both a list of effective candidates and a list of substitute candidates. The substitutes for the 
elected MPs are rank ordered according to their preferential votes, after redistribution of the list 
votes. MPs who become minister or secretary of state are replaced in parliament by the first 
substitute. As a result, the first position on the list of substitute candidates is also a very 
important one.      
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An analysis of the candidate selection procedures of the Belgian parties (Put and Maddens, 
2011) confirms that, in practice, the selectorate distinguishes between the realistic, marginal 
and non-realistic positions on the list. Parties primarily use the election result at the previous 
election as a benchmark. For instance, if a party won four seats in a constituency at the previous 
election, the first four positions on the list are normally considered as eligible or realistic. The 
fifth position will be considered as a marginal position: a candidate on such a position stands a 
real chance of being elected on condition that his or her number of preferential votes is high 
and/or the party realises a significant upward swing in the constituency. For the reasons 
explained above, the last position on the list of effective candidates is also normally considered 
as marginal by the party. The first position on the substitute list is regarded as a realistic and 
not as a marginal position. The candidates on this substitute list do not compete with the 
effective candidates. These candidates are rank ordered on the basis of preferential votes, to 
which the transferred list votes are added (just as with the effective candidates). The result is 
that the first substitute candidate is always the first in line to replace an elected MP, either 
because this MP becomes minister or resigns. Given the large size of the constituencies, the 
odds of either eventuality are quite high. As a result, the parties consider the first position on 
the substitute list as a realistic one. 
From 2003 onwards the Lower House elections were held in larger, provincial constituencies. 
In the Flemish part of the country (including the bilingual constituency of Brussels-Halle-
Vilvoorde), the average constituency size increased from 9,3 seats to 16,8. This also implies 
that the number of positions increased (from an average of 14,4 to 26,5).  This reform did not 
involve a complete redrawing of the boundaries, but merely a merger of constituencies at the 
provincial level. As a result, the number of realistic seats in 2003 can easily be calculated by 
adding the number of seats obtained in 1999 in the former, smaller constituencies.   
 
3.4.  Data and method 
The hypotheses are tested using social and political background data about the candidates for 
the election of the Belgian lower Chamber in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2010. The analysis is limited 
to the Flemish parties competing in the six constituencies situated in the Flemish region, 
including the bilingual district of Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde. As we want to test the effect of 
successive candidacies on the odds of being selected, we have to restrict the analysis to the 
parties that contested all four elections, i.e. the Christian-democrats, the liberals, the socialists, 
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the ecologists and the far right. Parties such as the Flemish nationalists (Volksunie and N-VA) 
and the radical liberals (LDD) which only contested some of the elections, were not included. 
The units of analysis are candidacies and not individual candidates. Politicians can obviously 
stand in various separate elections. But it is also possible, but exceptional, that a single politician 
stands twice in one and the same election: once as an effective candidate and once as a substitute 
candidate. The dataset includes 3.225 candidacies, involving 2.334 individual candidates. 
Furthermore, there are 46 candidates participating in all four elections, 144 candidates in three 
elections, and finally 437 and 1.707 candidates in respectively two and one single election. It 
also has to be taken into account that the constituency size varies considerably (from 4 to 24). 
As larger constituencies obviously have more realistic candidates, the odds of occupying a 
realistic position on the list increases with constituency size in the pooled dataset. To control 
for this strong mechanical effect, constituency size (as measured by the number of seats) will 
be included as an independent variable in the model.  
Whether or not a candidate was selected for a realistic position on the list (as defined according 
to the criteria discussed above) will be related to a number of independent variables: gender, 
occupation, age, incumbency, local offices, campaign experience and population size of the 
place of residence. In order to capture the hypothesised curvilinear effect, age will be treated as 
a categorical variable (with five age groups). Six categories of occupational status are 
distinguished : (1) candidates without a job, (2) self-employed candidates, (3) workers, (4) 
employees, (5) civil servants and (6) party professionals or members of the personal staff of a 
minister.  
Incumbents are defined as candidates who are already an MP or a minister at the moment of the 
election, at either the regional or the federal level. The distinction between the regional and the 
federal level is highly blurred in Belgium. It is quite normal for a regional MP or minister to 
run in the federal election and vice versa. This is related to the fact that all political parties are 
split across the language divide, as a result of which there are no national or federal parties. 
This implies that both the regional and federal elections are contested by the same regional 
parties and the federal election is a de facto regional one. We also take into account incumbency 
at the local level, more in particular holding an office as either mayor, alderman or member of 
the local council. Each of these local offices can be combined with the office of MP.   
As concerns campaign experience, we counted the number of previous candidacies of every 
single candidate on the lists, starting from the federal elections of 1987. We counted the 
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candidacies at every legislative election, including Lower House, Senate, Flemish and Brussels 
Parliament. The average campaign experience will automatically be smaller for the candidates 
in the earlier elections under investigation, because less previous elections were taken into 
account. In order to control for this bias, a relative measure of campaign experience is used in 
the analysis: the actual number of candidacies is divided by the potential number of candidacies 
given the number of elections counted. This number ranges from three (for the 1999 election) 
to eight (for the 2010 election). We counted the number of candidacies, irrespective of the party 
for which a candidate stood. This is particularly relevant for the candidates on cartel lists. After 
the 1999 election the small regionalist party Volksunie split up into two segments (Spirit and 
N-VA). Spirit formed a cartel with the socialists in 2003 and 2007 and disappeared afterwards. 
The N-VA formed a cartel with the Christian-democrats in 2007 and participated as a separate 
party in the 2003 and 2010 election. In the case of the Spirit- and N-VA-candidates on cartel 
lists, the previous campaign experience on Volksunie lists was also taken into account. 
Campaign experience is treated as a continuous variable. 
Finally, the population size of the candidate’s municipality is added to the model as a macro-
level explanatory variable. This variable is standardised so as to allow for comparisons and 
improve the overall interpretability of the model. Including data at the municipality level 
implies that the dataset is hierarchically structured (candidates within municipalities). As a 
result, it is appropriate to apply multilevel analysis. The classical statistical techniques would 
not take the possible correlations within municipalities into account, resulting in inaccurately 
estimated parameters. Multilevel analysis allows for taking the intra class-correlation and the 
variance between municipalities into account (Welkenhuysen-Gybels & Loosveldt, 2002). 
Since the dependent variable is a categorical response variable with three categories, we will 
apply a multilevel multinomial regression analysis.  
 
3.5. Analysis 
We first take a look at the bivariate relationship between the dependent variable and the above 
described independent variables (Table 3.1). As can be seen from the bottom row, according to 
the criteria discussed above, 13,9% of all candidates can be considered as realistic and 9,4% as 
marginal. The cross-tabulation with gender shows that women are significantly 
underrepresented amongst realistic candidates: only 33,3% of these candidates are women, 
against 42,1% women amongst the marginal candidates, and 46,6% in the population at large. 
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In other words, the Belgian quota regulation has not completely succeeded in eliminating the 
gender bias for the realistic positions on the list. There is also a significant occupational bias. 
Non-employed politicians (students, pensioners and unemployed) are underrepresented 
amongst the realistic and marginal candidates (2,3 and 7,1% against 12,5 amongst the 
unrealistic ones). But it is particularly the labourers who fail to obtain a realistic or marginal 
position on the list. Only 2,0 and 1,7% of these positions is occupied by a labourer.  On the 
other hand, labourers are also underrepresented amongst the other candidates. They constitute 
only 3,1% of all candidates. This indicates that the selectorate is not only biased against 
workers, but also has a very limited supply of available candidates from this occupational group. 
Members of the party staff and of the personal staff of ministers, on the other hand, are seriously 
overrepresented and constitute 16,8% of all the realistic candidates and 11,9% of the marginal 
candidates, against only 5,7% of the non-realistic ones. The relationship with age is also 
significant, but the difference is smaller. Only the youngest (8,0%) and oldest (2,4%) age groups 
are slightly underrepresented among the realistic candidates.   
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Table 3.1.: Bivariate analyses of realistic/marginal/unrealistic positions on the Flemish party 
lists (1999-2010) 
Notes: Sign.: * p<0,05; ** p<0,01; *** p<0,001. The last column displays χ²-scores in the case of 
categorical independent variables, and F-scores in the case of continuous independent variables. 
 
As expected, incumbent MPs are especially favoured by the selectorate. Two third of the 
realistic candidates are MP, against only 7,2% of the non-realistic candidates. This is also 
reflected in the significant relationship with campaign experience (F-score=504,43, p<0.001). 
Realistic candidates were a candidate in more previous elections than the non-realistic ones. 
 Realistic Marginal Unrealistic All candidates χ² score 
Gender     44,37*** 
Male 66,67 57,88 50,35 53,43  
Female 33,33 42,12 49,65 46,57  
Profession     154,02*** 
Non-employed 2,29 7,14 12,49 10,67  
Independent 38,93 31,29 23,88 26,51  
Labourer 2,04 1,70 3,46 3,11  
Clerk & Exec. 25,45 32,31 37,93 35,80  
Civil servant 13,49 12,59 14,81 14,43  
Party/Cab. Staff 16,79 11,90 5,74 7,76  
Age     54,62*** 
-30 8,04 11,65 17,63 15,67  
31-40 27,83 23,62 27,03 26,81  
41-50 39,78 36,89 30,84 32,72  
51-60 21,96 20,71 17,96 18,81  
60+ 2,39 7,12 6,54 6,00  
Incumbency     926,25*** 
Incumbent 64,94 27,65 7,18 17,43  
Non-incumbent 35,06 72,35 92,82 82,57  
Local-level incumbency     95,01*** 
Mayor 14,72 11,90 4,73 6,85  
Alderman 11,47 14,47 13,74 13,49  
Local councillor 41,99 34,41 35,60 36,40  
No local office 31,82 39,23 45,92 43,26  
N 462 311 2.452 3.325  
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Local-level incumbency is particularly important as far as mayors are concerned. 14,7% of the 
realistic positions and 11,9% of the marginal ones are occupied by mayors, against only 4,7% 
of the non-realistic ones. But being alderman or local councillor does not appear to increase the 
odds of being selected as a realistic candidate. Finally, we find that candidates on realistic 
positions live in municipalities with a significantly higher average population size (70.464,67) 
than the candidates on non-realistic positions (52.216,69) (F-score=21,98, p<0,001). 
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Table 3.2.: Multilevel multinomial logit model 
 Multinomial logit 
 Realistic position Marginal position 
District size 0,088 *** (0,011) 0,112 *** (0,011) 
Social background variables       
Gender       
Male 0,093  (0,135) -0,112  (0,135) 
Profession       
Non-employed -0,621  (0,383) -0,395  (0,285) 
Independent & lib. prof. 0,379 * (0,152) 0,297  (0,158) 
Laborer 0,027  (0,413) -0,791  (0,534) 
Civil servant 0,038  (0,204) -0,010  (0,281) 
Party/cabinet staff 0,579 ** (0,219) 0,848 *** (0,235) 
(Baseline cat.=Clerks)       
Age       
-30 0,003  (0,231) -0,219  (0,218) 
31-40 0,182  (0,162) -0,158  (0,172) 
(Baseline cat.= 41-50)       
51-60 -0,439 * (0,179) -0,149  (0,183) 
60+ -1,563 *** (0,396) -0,130  (0,295) 
Political variables       
Incumbent 2,771 *** (0,160) 1,247 *** (0,186) 
Mayor 0,809 ** (0,269) 0,840 ** (0,264) 
Alderman 0,214  (0,204) 0,184  (0,200) 
Local councilor 0,052  (0,151) -0,004  (0,152) 
Campaign experience -1,588 *** (0,250) -1,279 *** (0,249) 
Municipality characteristics       
Population size -0,959 * (0,481) -1,361 ** (0,440) 
Mayor*std. population size 0,417  (0,419) 0,710 * (0,360) 
Alderman*std. pop. size 0,347  (0,056) 0,468 ** (0,177) 
Local councilor*std. pop. size 0,005  (0,124) 0,076  (0,149) 
N (level 2 units) 3.225 (308)  3.225 (308)  
Notes: Sign.: * p<0,05; ** p<0,01; *** p<0,001. Standard errors in parentheses. Reference category is 
unrealistic position. 
 
The results of the multilevel multinomial regression analysis are reported in Table 3.2. This 
model estimates the simultaneous impact of the abovementioned independent variables on the 
chance of getting realistic or marginal positions on the list. When controlling for age, 
occupation and political variables, gender does not have a significant effect for any of the 
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categories. The bivariate relationship reported above was only due to the underrepresentation 
of women amongst incumbents and local office holders. The multivariate analysis confirms the 
bivariate result that party staff members or previous personal staff of ministers have a 
competitive advantage over other occupational categories. Independents and candidates with a 
liberal profession have a slightly significant higher chance on getting a realistic position, but 
are not advantaged with regard to marginal positions. As concerns age, party selectorates clearly 
avoid candidates from the older age categories on realistic positions. But this does not apply to 
marginal positions, which appear to be equally open to all age categories. As expected, being 
an incumbent MP has one of the strongest effects on obtaining a realistic or a marginal list 
position. More surprising is the negative effect of campaign experience. Once the other relevant 
variables are controlled for, the positive bivariate relationship with campaign experience is 
reversed. Contrary to what we expected, the party selectorate does not appear to favour 
candidates who have already run in preceding elections. Once incumbency is controlled for, 
‘candidate seniority’ does not appear to matter. Candidates who run time and again, and 
gradually build up a campaign network and an electoral capital, are not eventually rewarded 
with a realistic or a marginal position. It is rather the contrary. The longer a politician has 
‘served’ as a candidate, the lower the odds of being rewarded. But this is probably not a causal 
effect. We suspect that there is a more or less fixed group of loyal candidates who are time and 
again asked to fill the non-realistic positions on the list, but who do not have the ambition to 
climb up the ladder and eventually obtain a realistic or marginal position and a seat in 
parliament.  The analysis also confirms that only mayors have a significantly larger chance of 
being selected as a realistic or marginal candidate. Holding the local office of alderman or 
councillor does not make a difference.  
Contrary to what was found in the bivariate analysis, the standardised population size has a 
slightly significant negative effect on the odds of getting a realistic position. The smaller his or 
her place of residence, the larger the chance that a politician will obtain a realistic position. As 
explained above, this result suggests that the parties follow the municipality strategy : they aim 
at giving as many municipalities as possible a realistic or marginal candidate. The result is that 
candidates from smaller municipalities have an advantage compared to candidates from larger 
cities. Finally, a number of cross-level interaction terms was included in the analysis to check 
for a possible interaction between local level incumbency and municipality size. With regard to 
the realistic positions, the interaction is not significant. This implies that parties have a 
preference for mayors on the realistic positions, irrespective of the size of their municipality. 
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But municipality size does play a role with regard to marginal positions. Mayors from larger 
municipalities stand a significantly better chance of obtaining a marginal position on the list, 
and this is now also the case with aldermen. Being an alderman as such does not make a 
difference, as discussed above, but being an alderman from a larger municipality does. 
Apparently the parties particularly seek politicians holding executive office in larger 
communalities for these marginal and hence crucial positions on the list.  
 
3.6. Conclusion and discussion 
The composition and representativeness of parliament is in large part determined by the 
selection process in the political parties. Finding out which criteria the parties apply requires 
that the group of selected candidates is contrasted with the group of potential candidates. 
However, we obviously have no information about these potential candidates. In list PR systems 
this problem can be solved by contrasting the realistic and marginal candidates with the non-
realistic candidates. Candidates can be considered as realistic if they stand a real chance of 
being elected. They are marginal if they only stand a realistic chance if their personal score or 
the result of the party is exceptionally good. The non-realistic candidates merely occupy a 
symbolical position on the list. By applying this approach to the Belgian Lower House elections 
in the period 1999-2010, we have attempted to shed some light on the candidate selection 
criteria.  
In some respects, the initial hypotheses were confirmed. The selectorate has a marked 
preference for incumbent MPs and for mayors, and it is averse to older candidates for realistic 
positions. The selectorate also favours politicians who work for the party or as a personal staff 
member of a minister. We found no evidence of gender bias. Women are still underrepresented 
amongst the realistic candidates, but this is because they are less often incumbent or mayor. In 
other respects, the results were more surprising. Contrary to what was expected, the odds of 
being selected as a realistic candidate decreases with the number of previous candidacies. In 
other words, there is no ‘slow and steady wins the race’ dynamic, in the sense that candidates 
gradually build a campaign organisation and an electoral network as a stepping stone to a 
realistic position. It appears that there is a more or less fixed group of candidates who are 
content to act as extras time and again, without any further ambition.  
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The population size of the candidate’s municipality affects the selection in a complex way. The 
electoral capital resulting from local office can be assumed to be bounded by the size of the 
municipality. Hence the hypothesis that the selectorate would particularly prefer local office 
holders from larger municipalities. It appears that parties follow this logic for the marginal 
positions on the list. They apparently hope and expect that mayors and aldermen from large 
municipalities will fully capitalize on their broadly based popularity in order to capture this 
extra seat for themselves and for the party. Aldermen are only sought for these marginal 
positions if they come from a larger municipality. For mayors, the odds of obtaining a marginal 
position are significantly higher irrespective of the size of the municipality, but they increase if 
the municipality is larger. Mayors also stand a higher chance of being selected for a realistic 
position. Apparently, the function of mayor is considered as so important and resourceful that 
it gives candidates a substantive head start in the selection process, even if they live in smaller 
villages. Once these effects of local office are controlled for, the size of the place of residence 
has a negative effect on the odds of obtaining a realistic or marginal position. This is probably 
due to the fact that political parties follow a municipality strategy when geographically 
balancing the list. They do not aim at a proportional representation of the municipalities, 
according to their population size. Instead, they try to get as many municipalities as possible 
represented amongst the realistic positions on the list. As a consequence, the candidates from 
smaller municipalities have an advantage.  
To a certain extent, the profile of the realistic or marginal candidates, as revealed by our 
analysis, is very similar to the profile of the elected MPs. MPs are often incumbent, often hold 
executive office at the local level, are hardly ever labourers, etc. This is a logical corollary of 
the fact that it is mainly the realistic candidates who are eventually elected. But it raises the 
question whether our analysis has an added value compared to an investigation of the profile of 
the elected MPs as such. The answer is that by comparing the realistic and the non-realistic 
candidates, we can find out to what extent the bias in the composition of parliament can be 
attributed to the selection by political parties and not to a lack of supply of candidates. Labourers 
are clearly underrepresented in parliament because hardly any labourer aspires to become an 
MP. Hence this variable hardly has an effect in our multivariate analysis. On the other hand, 
the overrepresentation of mayors, aldermen and political professionals is apparently due to the 
fact that the party deliberately selects such candidates. This does not mean that we have entered 
the secret garden, but at least we have been able to peek over the wall. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECTS OF LOCAL CANDIDATE 
CHARACTERISTICS ON THE INDIVIDUAL ELECTION 
RESULT OF PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES25 
 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This article examines the effect of local characteristics of candidates on their results in 
legislative elections. Previous research (Tavits, 2010; Smith et al., 2012) has shown that local-
level political experience is a trait which has a significant effect on the number of preferential 
votes. This contribution adds to this research by focusing on the combined effect of local 
political office and the size of the candidate’s place of residence. We argue that the local office 
effect is dependent on the size of the municipality: the larger the municipality, the stronger the 
effect of local office on the number of preferential votes at the aggregate district level. By 
analysing the impact of these two local background variables, we attempt to gain a better 
understanding of which candidates can build a personal reputation on the basis of their local 
ties, and to what extent this personal reputation secures their (re)election.  
Our research builds on the growing literature about local ties of a candidate as a crucial personal 
vote-earning attribute (PVEA). Earlier research has shown that having local ties increases the 
chances of a politician to be selected as a candidate (Gallagher, 1988). Other studies have 
focused on the effects of these attributes on legislative behaviour (Crisp et al., 2004; Tavits, 
2009; Marangoni and Tronconi, 2011). They have shown that candidates and legislators with 
local PVEA attributes are more likely to display constituency-oriented behaviour. But, most 
crucially, there is also convincing evidence that candidates can earn votes by emphasising their 
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 This chapter has been published as: Put, G. and Maddens, B. (2014). The effect of municipality size 
and local office on the electoral success of Belgian/Flemish election candidates: a multilevel analysis. 
Government and Opposition, published online: 
[http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9396712&fileId=S0017
257X14000360].  
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local roots and their local political experience during the campaign. Candidates with local 
PVEA appear to obtain significantly more votes than candidates without such attributes. 
Moreover, holding local office is found to be a crucial attribute in that respect (Blais et al., 
2003; Tavits, 2010; Smith et al., 2012). 
The hypothesis that this impact of local office on the electoral result depends on the size of the 
municipality will be tested with data about five consecutive federal and regional elections in 
Belgium. These elections are useful cases as they are held under a semi-open proportional or 
flexible list system (Marsh, 1985; Shugart, 2005). Recently, electoral reforms adapted both 
district magnitude and the relative weight of the party list vote, making the Belgian system more 
candidate-centred. These two developments led to the increased importance of the personal 
versus party reputation: upgrading the impact of preferential votes created a stronger incentive 
for candidates to cultivate personal votes. In turn, this might lead Belgian parties to nominate 
increasingly more candidates with personal vote-earning attributes. 
In what follows, we first outline the main theoretical argument on the basis of the existing 
literature on the personal vote, and develop a number of hypotheses. Subsequently, we discuss 
the recent reforms in the Belgian electoral system and their consequences. The next section 
elaborates on the dataset of personal characteristics of Belgian/Flemish election candidates, the 
variable operationalization and the used method. In the fifth section, we discuss the results of 
the multilevel analyses. Finally, the conclusion puts the implications of this study in theoretical 
perspective. 
 
4.2. Theoretical arguments and hypotheses 
As originally argued by Carey and Shugart (1995), the importance of the personal vote heavily 
depends on the electoral system type and how votes are cast. More specifically, ballot and vote 
type, vote pooling and district magnitude determine whether the electoral system is more party- 
or candidate-centered. In party-centered electoral systems, politicians are inclined to display 
the party label during campaign time and cultivate party votes. In candidate-centered systems, 
however, it is more important for candidates to cultivate personal votes and to build personal 
reputations. Some authors claim that in the latter category of electoral systems, the political 
party is being replaced by the individual candidate as the primary criterion of choice (van 
Holsteyn and Andeweg, 2010). Candidates will increasingly display personal vote-seeking 
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behavior to cultivate personal votes. This implies that parties will have more difficulties in 
maintaining internal cohesion, and that voters are increasingly more influenced by candidate-
based attributes than party-based attributes (Thijssen, 2013). 
One strand of research on the personal vote has focused on how candidates or legislators 
cultivate personal votes, and build personal reputations that increase their chances of reelection. 
Legislators could, for example, engage in constituency service or pork barrel politics to please 
their constituents (Mayhew, 1974; Lancaster and Patterson, 1990). In addition, some authors 
claim that specific personal characteristics of legislators allow them to earn personal votes, 
reducing the need to cultivate personal votes by means of constituency service (Shugart et al., 
2005; Martin, 2010). The literature provides several examples of these so-called personal vote-
earning attributes (PVEA). Voters use these attributes as an information shortcut in their voting 
decisions, resulting in significantly more personal votes for this type of candidates.  
Firstly, the gender, class, race and religion of candidates possibly attracts personal votes from 
their respective subgroups in society. Ethnic voters might, for example, feel that their concerns 
will be addressed by the party that includes candidates with the same ethnic background on 
their list. As a result, the inclusion of candidates from all social groups is an easy way for party 
selectorates to broaden the appeal of their list to a larger group of voters. However, in some 
electoral systems party selectorates might feel that candidate diversity on lists is undesirable 
(Valdini, 2012). Especially in single member district systems, selectorates fear that candidates 
with other ethnic backgrounds or with a very specific religious profile will harm their electoral 
fortune.  
Secondly, another category of candidate characteristics are universally interesting and 
appealing, regardless of the electoral system, such as previous electoral and political 
experience, and local roots. The incumbency advantage, for example, has been extensively 
documented in the literature (Gelman and King, 1990; Cox and Katz, 1996; Carson et al., 2007). 
Incumbents have already proven their electoral appeal in the previous election. Their office also 
provided them with ample media attention and visibility, as well as an organizational capacity 
which can be relied on during the campaign. But especially the fact that incumbent candidates 
have some previous experience in what they are running for, might shape voters’ ballot 
decisions and attract additional personal votes. In addition, the possession of local roots in the 
electoral district is also a universally appealing candidate trait. Candidates with these 
characteristics, often referred to as local PVEA, can make a more convincing claim that they 
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are well aware of local constituency needs. As a consequence, one expects candidates with local 
PVEA to be electorally more successful than competitors without local roots. Tavits (2010) 
provides the most thorough and systematic empirical test of this hypothesis on the basis of data 
on national election candidates from Estonia. 
In that study, local political experience and being a district native are used as indicators of local 
ties. The first measure appears to be an adequate predictor of individual candidate performance. 
There are several reasons why local office-holders would have significantly more electoral 
appeal. First, holding local office leads to a level of name recognition among the electorate. 
Second, local office-holders might have done some casework for (influential) members of the 
community, thereby proving their commitment to the local needs and strengthening their local 
networks. And third, as previously mentioned, local councillors, aldermen and mayors are 
generally more convincing in their claims to know what the local community wants.  
The political experience at the local level has thus been recognized as a reliable indicator of 
local ties. Holding political office in the municipality has already been shown to constitute a 
useful measure of local ties, and appears to be an electorally rewarding personal attribute for 
candidates. Hence the first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Candidates who hold a political office at the local level are likely to 
be more successful in terms of preferential votes than candidates who do not.  
According to previous research, holding local office is an important asset in parliamentary 
elections. Moreover, this effect increases with the prominence of the office. It is particularly 
the executive functions in the municipality which provide an electoral bonus for candidates in 
national elections.  
The second measure used in the analysis of Tavits (2010), however, lacks explanatory power. 
Being a district native failed to have any substantial effect on the individual candidate results. 
A second relevant study also uses local birth as one of three components in their PVEA index, 
and comes to a similar conclusion when testing the effect of local PVEA on candidate success: 
locally born candidates are not more likely to get elected than candidates lacking such ties 
(Smith et al., 2012). 
There are several reasons why district nativity or local birthplace might not be a good predictor 
of candidate success. Perhaps, being born in a particular district or municipality is not so 
important to voters at all. It might only be a weak proof of local ties, and is far less salient than 
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being a local politician. As Tavits (2010: 226) correctly states: ‘Birthplace may not convey any 
meaningful information about a candidate who has lived most of their adult life elsewhere.’ 
Indeed, even the parachutists – i.e. candidates coming from outside the district, but nominated 
and elected in their new constituency (Pedersen et al., 2007) – might be able to develop local 
ties in their new district, making their local birthplace totally irrelevant for their new voters. 
Moreover, the birthplace of candidates is not always very well-known to the electorate.  
In the present research, we focus on municipality size instead of birthplace. We hypothesize 
that the municipality size of candidates is an important variable which moderates the effect of 
local roots on the individual result of election candidates at the aggregate level.26 Candidates 
will be able to capitalize on their knowledge of the local needs and sensibilities, and on the local 
political network they have developed in the municipality. This will increase the electoral result 
within the municipality. But it is only when the municipality is sufficiently large relative to the 
constituency as a whole that this effect will also translate into a significantly better electoral 
result at the constituency level. In other words, candidates living in relatively large 
municipalities will be advantaged compared to candidates from smaller municipalities. This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The larger the population share of the candidate’s municipality in 
the electoral district, the higher the relative number of preferential votes for that 
candidate. 
Additionally, we argue that municipality size will interact positively with the political office 
variable: the larger the municipality, the larger the effect on the number of preferential votes at 
the municipality level. This is so for two reasons. First, holding local political office in a large 
city leads to a comparatively larger local network than in a small municipality, both in terms of 
grassroots party volunteers and constituents. Activating this network in parliamentary elections 
would then result in a higher level of electoral success compared to local office-holders in small 
municipalities. Second, the electoral appeal of holding a local office is larger for election 
candidates in large municipalities, simply because they appeal to a larger group of constituents 
than their colleagues in small municipalities. There are substantially more inhabitants who feel 
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 Of course, this argument does not hold in political systems with high numbers of parachutists, hopping 
from one electoral district to another in between elections. Parachuting is not typical in the Belgian case 
(Pedersen et al., 2007). De Winter (1997) states that most Belgian MPs have strong local ties and have 
lived in their constituency most of their life. 
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that they share their local background with the candidate, and perceive them as truly committed 
to the needs of the local community.  
We acknowledge that, on the basis of the political geography literature, one might arrive at an 
opposite hypothesis. According to this literature, the social distance between constituents and 
local representatives is substantially larger in cities than in the less densely populated areas: 
smaller municipalities provide the opportunity for greater levels of contact, peer networks and 
knowledge of the representatives (Lewis-Beck and Rice, 1983). Also, local attachment in 
urbanised areas is often comparatively weaker (Sampson, 1988). According to this reasoning, 
the effect of local office will decrease if the candidate lives in a larger municipality. However, 
we believe that the aforementioned positive effect of living in a larger municipality will 
outweigh these possible negative effects. This implies that local office-holders in large cities 
have a structural advantage, and that the size of their place of residence functions as a personal 
vote multiplier, reinforcing the positive effect of holding local political office. 
In other words, however popular the mayor of a village may be, if the population size is small, 
the electoral effect in terms of individual preferential votes at the aggregate constituency level 
will be relatively smaller than the effect for local office holders in large municipalities. This 
leads to a third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Candidates who are local political office holders in large 
municipalities are likely to be more successful than similar candidates in small 
municipalities. 
 
4.3. The electoral system of Belgium 
The Belgian electoral system is often characterized as a semi-open or flexible list PR system 
(Marsh, 1985; Shugart, 2005). In such a system, voters are able to endorse a party list as a whole 
or to cast one or more preferential votes for specific candidates. In theory, both the list order 
and the number of preferential votes play an important role in the intraparty seat allocation. In 
practice, however, the threshold of preferential votes to overcome the list order is reached very 
infrequently, which led scholars to characterize flexible list systems as closed-list systems in 
disguise (De Winter, 2005; Crisp et al., 2013).  
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In recent years, the Belgian system has experienced a number of important electoral reforms. 
In the remainder of this section, we shortly discuss these reforms and their impact on the 
personal vote-seeking behaviour of Belgian party candidates.  
First, the relative weight of the list vote in determining which candidates are elected was 
changed. The impact of the preferential votes on the actual allocation of seats used to be very 
marginal. This was so because the votes at the head of the list, the so called list votes, were first 
transferred to the candidates in the order of their position on the list. As a consequence, the 
candidates at the top of the list were almost guaranteed of their seat and the intra-list competition 
between candidates was to a certain extent neutralized. Thus, the system effectively functioned 
as a closed list system, the allocation of seats to candidates being determined in large part by 
pre-electoral intra-party bargaining. In 2000, the electoral law was changed in the sense that the 
transferral of list votes was reduced by half. This implies that the number of candidates that can 
be elected on the basis of list votes is reduced and intra-list competition between candidates has 
become more important (Wauters and Weekers, 2008). This resulted in a larger share of 
candidates leap-frogging past higher-ranked co-partisans (Wauters et al., 2004).  
Second, the mean district magnitude in Belgium has increased significantly over the last two 
decades. The two district reforms of 1993 and 2002 also led to more intra-list competition 
between candidates, and thus encourages candidates to maximise their personal score. 
Especially the second district reform was relatively controversial and has been debated 
extensively in the Belgian political arena. Opponents feared that the enlargement of electoral 
districts would lead to an increased nationalization of election campaigns and scores, rendering 
the local ties of candidates unimportant (Pilet, 2007). In addition, it was argued that it would 
become increasingly difficult for rural candidates to get campaign visibility, or even to get 
nominated on candidate lists (Maddens et al., 2014). 
Both the increase in district magnitude and the decreased relative weight of list votes resulted 
in a more transparent system, in which it is easier to understand for the voter how seats are 
allocated to parties and candidates. At the same time, these reforms strengthened the tendency 
towards more candidate-centred campaigns, with a strong focus on the competition between 
individual candidates, both between and within lists (De Winter, 2005). This focus on 
candidates is reflected in the voting behaviour. The percentage of voters casting a preferential 
vote increased substantially during the previous decade. André et al. (2012) calculated that more 
than 60% of Belgian voters cast a preferential vote in the federal elections of 2003, with a slight 
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decline at the subsequent federal elections. Moreover, they find comparable percentages for the 
2009 Flemish and Walloon elections. 
The fact that local ties are important in the Belgian system is also reflected by the relatively 
high share of candidates with local office selected by the Flemish parties for the federal and 
regional elections since 2003. Taken together, 50.4% of all the candidates are incumbent local 
office holders. Most of these candidates (65.9%) are a member of the local council. 
Furthermore, 34.1% are a member of the executive, of which 23% are alderman (i.e. a member 
of the executive body) and 11.1% are mayor (i.e. the head of the executive body). Previous 
research has shown that these local office holders, particularly the mayors, are also more likely 
to be selected as a realistic candidate, i.e. a candidate who has a realistic chance of obtaining a 
seat (Put and Maddens, 2013).  
 
4.4. Data and method 
The data cover the elections for the federal House and the Flemish Parliament during the period 
2003-2010. The analysis is limited to the Flemish parties that already had at least one seat in 
one of the Belgian Parliaments during the legislative term preceding the election under 
investigation.27 This results in a vast dataset of 5540 election candidates28 on 179 different party 
lists.  
There are substantial reasons why we do not expect to see differences between the elections of 
the federal Lower House and the Flemish Parliament. In the Flemish part of the country, the 
scale on which the elections take place on both levels since 2003 is identical, i.e. provincial 
constituencies. Moreover, Belgium has the peculiar feature of having two completely separate 
regional party systems in Flanders and Wallonia, which implies that the parties competing with 
each other on the federal and regional level are exactly the same (Verleden, 2009). As already 
mentioned, the amount of local office holders among the candidates for both assemblies is also 
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 The following parties were included in the analysis : 2003 : CD&V, VLD, SP.A-Spirit, N-VA, Vlaams 
Blok, Agalev; 2004 : CD&V-N-VA, VLD, SP.A-Spirit, Vlaams Blok, Groen!; 2007 : CD&V-N-VA, 
VLD, SP.A-Spirit, Vlaams Belang, Groen!, LDD; 2009 : CD&V, VLD, SP.A, Vlaams Belang, N-VA, 
Groen!, LDD, SLP; 2010 : CD&V, VLD, SP.A, Vlaams Belang, N-VA, Groen!, LDD.  
28
 Strictly speaking, the units of analysis are candidacies and not individual candidates, as politicians 
obviously stand in various consecutive elections. 
96 
 
comparable. In addition, the fact that there is a relatively high degree of level-hopping in the 
Belgian political arena, proves that politicians themselves rate the federal and regional level as 
relatively equal (Vanlangenakker et al., 2013).  
Alternatively, a counterargument might be that local policy issues are more salient in regional 
elections, as the regions have the legislative powers with regard to local matters. More 
specifically, candidates for the regional assembly might stress local issues more strongly than 
their counterparts at the federal level, resulting in a stronger impact of local PVEA in regional 
elections. We add a dummy variable to the model indicating whether the candidate stands in 
the federal and the regional election, and test whether there is an interaction effect with local 
office and municipality size. 
We will apply multilevel analysis when testing the aforementioned hypotheses. First, these 
election data have a nested structure. In the Belgian flexible list system, each individual election 
candidate is placed on a party list among other candidates. These lists all have their own 
characteristics, and constitute an additional explanatory level for the individual number of 
preferential votes. Second, we expect some of the aggregate characteristics of these party lists 
to contribute to the electoral success of individual candidates. More specifically, the percentage 
of votes for the list in the constituency will automatically have a positive effect on the number 
of preferential votes of every candidate on that particular list. As a result, it is appropriate to 
apply multilevel analysis. Classical regression models would not take the possible correlations 
within party lists into account, resulting in inaccurately estimated parameters. Multilevel 
analysis allows for taking the intra class-correlation and the variance between party lists into 
account. 
The dependent variable is the percentage of preferential votes for the candidate, calculated on 
the basis of the total number of valid votes in the constituency.29 As this variable is highly 
skewed and values are all-positive, it is advisable to apply a logarithmic transformation.30 This 
transformation overemphasizes differences between candidates in the low range of preferential 
votes, and underemphasizes differences among candidates in the high range, which we see as 
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 In the constituency of Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde, where voters have a choice between Flemish and 
Francophone lists, the percentage of preferential votes was calculated on the basis of the total number 
of valid votes for the Flemish lists. 
30
 We applied a natural log transformation. We also checked for outliers on the basis of the externally 
studentised residuals. 
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an additional argument rather than a problem: we wish to explain significant differences in 
numbers of preferential votes among a large group of candidates, by testing the effect of a 
number of political and socio-economic candidate traits. For candidates in the high range, there 
are often idiosyncratic factors at work, which might explain their unusual high numbers of 
preferential votes, but are less interesting in explaining the variation in preferential votes for a 
large number of election candidates.31  
Of course, transforming the dependent variable often makes it more difficult to interpret the 
meaning of the Beta coefficients of regression models. In addition, our dataset contains a 
number of variables that measure on completely different scales. To make the estimated Beta 
coefficients of the independent variables at least comparable in terms of scale and size of the 
effects, we standardized the continuous variables included in the analysis.32 Categorical 
variables are not standardized, as there is no meaningful interpretation for their standardized 
coefficients. 
In sum, we disentangle three groups of independent variables. Firstly, it is important to control 
for some mechanical effects. At the individual level, the electoral result is in large part 
determined by the position on the list. It has been shown that candidates in critical positions on 
the ballot form automatically draw more votes, even when other factors such as incumbency 
are controlled for (Geys and Heyndels, 2003). There are several explanations for this 
phenomenon, such as the fact that voters are inclined to start evaluating candidates from the top 
of the ballot, and are decreasingly capable, willing and interested to consider options as they 
move down the ballot (Taebel, 1975; Lutz, 2010). Furthermore, undecided voters tend to give 
preferential votes to candidates who appear at the top of the ballot list (Miller and Krosnick, 
1998). High positions on the list also imply higher campaign spending caps, which gives the 
candidates more leeway to wage an extensive campaign. The main critical positions are those 
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 The best example is Steve Stevaert, a Flemish socialist and former pub owner, who realized an 
exceptional individual result in the federal elections of 2003, making him a strong outlier in the dataset 
of election candidates. Stevaert’s success was explained by his typical style of keeping things 
understandable and his strong local accent. Political opponents often labeled him as a populist. It would 
be virtually impossible, and also not desirable to include the candidate traits explaining Stevaert’s 
success in our analysis. 
32
 These are: age, municipality size, personal campaign investment, percentage of list in the constituency 
and the dependent variable. 
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at the top and the bottom of the list. We include the first five positions, the before last and the 
last position on the list as dummies in our analysis, with the other positions as reference 
category.  
Secondly, at the list level, the party strength (i.e. the number of votes for the list as a percentage 
of the total number of valid votes in the constituency) is a crucial variable that has an automatic 
effect on the electoral result at the individual level: the more votes the list obtains in the 
constituency, the larger the potential number of preferential votes available for the candidates 
on the list. The second list level variable is the election type, measured as a binary variable 
indicating whether the candidate list is for the federal or regional elections. The interaction of 
this variable with local office and municipality size will indicate whether there are any 
substantial differences between the effects of local PVEA in regional and federal elections. 
The third group of independent variables are the candidate characteristics. We collected 
information about the age, occupational status and sex of candidates. Six categories of 
occupational status are distinguished: (1) candidates without a job, (2) self-employed 
candidates, (3) workers, (4) employees, (5) civil servants and (6) party professionals or 
members of the personal staff of a minister. In addition to a binary variable expressing the sex 
of the candidate, we also add a dummy variable to indicate the first female candidate on the list. 
Previous research has demonstrated that ‘gender voters’ are highly selective and tend to vote 
for those women candidates who occupy the best ballot position (Thijssen, 2013).33  
Candidates can also increase their votes by waging an extensive electoral campaign. A number 
of authors have examined the effect of several campaigning variables on the amount of 
preferential votes. First, media exposure and electoral success are often considered to go hand 
in hand (Van Aelst et al., 2008). Previous research has indeed confirmed that media attention 
contributes to the individual success of candidates (Maddens et al., 2006). Second, there has 
been a recent surge in attention for the political impact of social media campaigns (Spierings 
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 While the same argument could be made with regard to ethnic minority candidates, our data do not 
allow to do the same exercise for ethnic voters: only 3.5% of all candidates were labeled ethnic on the 
basis of a name recognition method similar to one used in Thijssen (2013). This implies that a candidate 
list contains on average only one ethnic candidate. We included this binary ethnic minority variable in 
the analysis, but found no significant effect (the variable was omitted from the reported analyses). In 
addition, given that there are so few ethnic minority candidates, it does not make sense to control 
additionally for the effect of being first ethnic candidate.  
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and Jacobs, 2013). Third, the amplitude of a candidate’s election campaign can also be 
measured by his/her level of campaign spending. We collected data on the personal investment 
of each of the 5540 candidates in our dataset, and add it as a control variable to the multivariate 
analysis. It can be assumed that the relationship between the expenses and the electoral outcome 
is non-linear, in the sense that the marginal returns of spending will gradually decrease with the 
amount spent. To allow for this possibility the normal practice in campaign expense research is 
to also include the squared expenses in the regression model. The squared spending term is 
expected to have a negative coefficient (e.g. Palda, 1994; Samuels, 2001).  
In addition, we also registered whether the candidates have previously been minister or MP at 
any given point in their career. Self-evidently, former ministers and MPs are highly attractive 
candidates and their level of political experience will result in a substantially higher number of 
preferential votes. By controlling for the former offices of electoral candidates, we exclude the 
possibility that the apparent positive effect of their local office is actually caused by their 
previous experience at the regional or national level. To the extent that local office holders in 
large municipalities used to be prominent figures at a higher political level, their electoral 
success might not be due to their local PVEA, but rather to their national reputation built up 
during an earlier stage of the political career. These former office-variables are expected to have 
high explanatory power in our multilevel models. A former MP/minister is defined as a 
candidate who has already been MP or minister before the election, at either the regional, federal 
or European level. To avoid multicollinearity between these two binary independent variables, 
we include them as mutually exclusive variables: a candidate with previous experience as both 
a minister and MP will only be registered as former minister. 
More important for this study, we take into account local-level incumbency, more in particular 
currently holding an office as either mayor, alderman or member of the local council. As 
explained above, we will also investigate whether the effect of holding local political office 
interacts with municipality size, i.e. the population size of the candidate’s place of residence. 
 
4.5. Multilevel analysis 
We test two multilevel regression models to address the three hypotheses formulated earlier in 
this article. The first model includes the mechanical effects that function as control variables, 
and the candidate characteristics which include local political office and relative municipality 
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size. The results of this first analysis indicate whether Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 hold true 
on the basis of our data on the Belgian case. The second model adds the interaction effects 
between these two local PVEA, which allows us to test Hypothesis 3.  
 
Table 4.1.: Random intercept fixed slope models 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 B SE B SE 
Intercept -0.185*** (0.039) -0.180 *** (0.039) 
Candidate-level mechanical effects      
List position (after 5th position= ref.)      
First  2.761*** (0.053) 2.712 *** (0.053) 
Second  0.654*** (0.061) 0.590 *** (0.061) 
Third 0.388*** (0.048) 0.379 *** (0.048) 
Fourth 0.246*** (0.046) 0.243 *** (0.046) 
Fifth  0.151*** (0.046) 0.146 *** (0.046) 
Last but one  0.004 (0.046) -0.003  (0.045) 
Last  0.286*** (0.048) 0.247 *** (0.048) 
Successor  -0.133*** (0.019) -0.134 *** (0.019) 
First successor 0.193*** (0.050) 0.196 *** (0.049) 
Second successor -0.045 (0.048) -0.046  (0.047) 
List-level mechanical effects      
% of list in constituency 0.369*** (0.022) 0.365 *** (0.022) 
Candidate list for federal elections   0.068  (0.045) 
Candidate characteristics      
Gender -0.037* (0.017) -0.035 * (0.017) 
First female candidate -0.107  (0.061) -0.062  (0.060) 
Age -0.018* (0.009) -0.019 * (0.009) 
Profession (Employees=ref.)      
Without job 0.032 (0.029) 0.030  (0.029) 
Self-employed 0.021 (0.021) 0.027  (0.021) 
Worker 0.032 (0.047) 0.037  (0.047) 
Civil servant -0.062* (0.025) -0.055 * (0.025) 
Party professional -0.018  (0.033) -0.020  (0.033) 
Individual campaign spending 0.105*** (0.020) 0.110 *** (0.020) 
Squared campaign spending -0.003  (0.003) -0.003  (0.003) 
Former minister 1.149*** (0.052) 1.172 *** (0.052) 
Former MP 0.289*** (0.026) 0.300 *** (0.026) 
Local office (no office=ref.)      
Mayor 0.205*** (0.040) 0.271 *** (0.062) 
Alderman 0.005 (0.028) -0.027  (0.042) 
Local councillor 0.005  (0.019) 0.019  (0.028) 
Relative municipality size 0.024** (0.009) 0.009  (0.014) 
Interaction effects      
Mayor * relative municipality size   0.564 *** (0.029) 
Alderman * relative municipality size   0.064 * (0.029) 
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Notes: Beta coefficients and standard errors shown; Log (% preferential votes) as dependent 
variable. Sign.: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
Table 4.1 reports the results of these two multilevel models. The size and sign of these beta 
coefficients indicate the change in the dependent variable (standardized logged preferential 
votes of candidates). With regard to Model 1, it can be observed that both the candidate-level 
and list-level mechanical effects have the expected strong impact on the relative number of 
preferential votes for individual candidates. Concerning list position, the size of the coefficients 
decreases neatly which confirms that the visible positions at the top of the list are electorally 
far more attractive. In addition, the results show that candidates on the list pusher position enjoy 
an electoral advantage (+0.29) compared to the less visible positions in the middle of the list. 
In general, successor candidates34 obtain significantly less preferential votes compared to the 
reference category (-0.13). At the list level, the electoral strength obviously has a significant 
effect on the percentage of preferential votes for individual candidates (+0.37).  
No less than four individual-level social background variables included in the model have a 
significant effect. Controlling for list position and political office variables, there seems to be a 
small difference in the number of preferential votes for men and women. The results of Model 
1 point in the direction of a disadvantage for male candidates compared to their female 
counterparts. It is often the case that women candidates are disadvantaged by some other 
factors. For instance, previous research has shown that women generally occupy a lower 
position on the list, are less often incumbent or spend less than men. Once such disadvantages 
                                               
34
 Successor candidates form a separate and additional list of election candidates from each party in 
every constituency. In the event that an elected representative would not take up his/her seat, resigns or 
leaves his/her seat vacant due to death or illness, there would be no need for by-elections. the seat will 
be assigned to one of the successor candidates, again based on the interplay of rank order and the number 
of preferential votes. 
Local councillor * relative mun. size    0.038 * (0.018) 
Mayor*list for federal elections    0.183 * (0.075) 
Alderman*list for federal elections    0.061  (0.055) 
Local councillor*list for fed. Elections    -0.026  (0.038) 
List for fed. elections*rel. mun. size     -0.018  (0.017) 
Between list variance (Level 2) 0.071 *** (0.009) 0.069 *** (0.009) 
Between candidate variance (Level 1) 0.330 *** (0.006) 0.324 *** (0.006) 
IGLS Deviance 
N 
9631.39 
5540 
9537.51 
5540 
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are controlled for, the negative effect for women disappears, or is sometimes even reversed 
(Wauters et al., 2010). Being the first female candidate on the list does not yield an electoral 
bonus according to our data. Age, operationalized as a continuous variable, has a significant 
but negligibly small effect on the number of preferential votes, in the sense that older candidates 
will on average receive less votes.35 Profession also has an effect in the sense that candidates 
with a job as civil servant have a small electoral disadvantage (-0.06) compared to the reference 
category of employees. Finally, the individual campaign spending variable proves that personal 
investments in campaigning significantly increases a candidate’s preferential votes (+0.11). The 
squared expenses-variable has the expected negative sign, but it does not have a significant 
effect. 
Model 1 also includes the size of the candidate’s municipality, measured as the population share 
of the municipality in the constituency. The results indicate that this attribute in itself increases 
the candidate’s preferential votes, albeit rather modestly (+0.02). Model 1 suggests that the 
electoral success of individual party candidates is positively influenced by the relative size of 
his municipality in the constituency, which is in line with the second hypothesis.  
The first hypothesis, however, is but partially confirmed. Only the highest local office 
significantly increases the relative number of preferential votes for individual candidates. This 
large effect of being mayor (+0.21) contrasts with the other two types of local office, alderman 
and local councillor. Apparently, these local political functions do not generate any additional 
personal votes. It appears that the mayors capitalize on their prior local experience, and eclipse 
the other types of local office. Nevertheless, these effects of local ties are dwarfed by the effect 
of being a former minister (+1.15). But the electoral advantage of being a former MP (+0.29) 
is more or less comparable to the effect of being a mayor. The final rows in the table report the 
level 1 (between candidates) and level 2 (between lists) variance. At both levels, there is still 
some significant variance to be explained, especially at the candidate level. The IGLS deviance 
is a measure that allows us to compare the goodness of fit of the multilevel model. The lower 
the score, the better the fit. 
In Model 2, we add the interaction terms for each of the local offices and relative municipality 
size. If Hypothesis 3 holds true, all three interactions should have a significant and positive 
                                               
35
 We also ran the model with age as categorical variable to check for any curvilinear effects. None of 
the age categories had a significant effect on the dependent variable. 
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effect on the dependent variable. This appears to be the case, but the level of significance varies 
strongly over the type of local office. For mayors, there is a large interaction effect (+0.56) 
which is significant at the level of α = 0.001. Concerning aldermen and local councilors, this 
effect is considerably smaller, and significant at the level of α = 0.05. Adding the interaction 
terms has strengthened the size of the main effect of being a mayor. At the same time, this made 
the significant main effect of municipality size, which was present in Model 1, disappear. 
Additionally, we added the interaction terms for the local offices and election type. Only the 
interaction term with mayors is significant, but it has a positive sign. Earlier, we argued that 
local PVEA might have a stronger effect in regional elections, as the regions are competent for 
local matters. The data do not support this argument: on the contrary, mayors seem to get an 
even stronger bonus at the federal level. Finally, the interaction term of municipality size and 
election type is also not significant. 
In sum, these results suggest that the local office of mayor in itself generates a large electoral 
advantage compared to election candidates without any local office, or other types of local 
officeholders. In addition, the electoral asset of being a mayor increases significantly with 
municipality size. The larger the municipality of the mayor, the stronger his/her advantage in 
terms of preferential votes. Second, the local office of alderman and local councillor is not 
rewarding in itself. In other words, Hypothesis 1 only holds for the office of mayor. Still, this 
does not mean that holding a less important office is not electorally rewarding. But this effect 
is limited to the office holders from the larger municipalities, as indicated by the significant 
interaction effect. For the office of mayor, both the main effect and the interaction with 
municipality size are significant. Hence, Hypothesis 3 is confirmed. Once the interactions 
between office and municipality size are included in the model, the main effect of municipality 
size disappears. Hence, Hypothesis 2 has to be rejected. Municipality size only affects the 
number of preferential votes of local officeholders through the interaction terms with the type 
of local office. The argument that large city candidates appeal to a larger share of voters in the 
district on the basis of a shared local background, does not hold true according to our data. This 
logic only works for local officeholders, whose electoral advantage appears strongly dependent 
on the size of their municipality. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
The present study has examined the impact of local ties on electoral success in the case of the 
Belgian Lower House elections and Flemish regional elections. We argued that local birthplace, 
which is frequently used in existing research, is not a suitable indicator of local ties. Instead, 
we operationalized the local ties of a candidate on the basis of the political functions he/she 
occupies in the municipality, moderated by the size of their respective municipalities. 
Our multilevel analyses lead to three findings. First, the idea that holding political office at the 
local level is an important PVEA for party candidates, only counts for mayors in our analysis. 
To our knowledge, previous studies did not make the distinction between various types of local 
office. However, our research shows that the effect depends on the nature of the local office, 
and that it is thus crucial to distinguish between, for instance, mayors and local councillors. 
Second, while the relative size of a candidate’s place of residence in the electoral district 
originally also determined the number of preferential votes, this effect disappeared when we 
added the interaction terms with local offices. The advantage of living in a large municipality 
is only substantial for election candidates when they hold a local office in their place of 
residence. If this is the case, these election candidates seem to appeal to a larger group of voters 
in the district. This brings us to the third and final finding: the effects of holding political office 
at the local level and municipality size interact. The electoral advantage of being a mayor, 
alderman or local councillor increases with the relative size of the municipality in the district.  
While Belgium is of course a case with notoriously complex territorial and electoral dynamics, 
we believe that the results of these analyses can, to a certain extent, be generalized to other 
flexible list systems, and even other types of list PR systems with the possibility of casting 
preferential votes. The result that local political experience leads to significantly more 
preferential votes has previously been confirmed in a latent list system such as Estonia, and the 
MMP system of Japan. As the data on the Belgian flexible list system points in the same 
direction with regard to mayors, we might conclude that local political experience is a crucial 
candidate trait to attract personal votes in any system where voters are able to cast preferential 
votes. And even if it is the case in most flexible list systems that the number of votes cast for 
individual candidates almost never attains the threshold required to obtain a seat, candidates do 
seem to earn increasingly more individual-level preferential votes, because parties reward vote-
earning candidates with better list positions in the future (Crisp et al., 2013). Earning personal 
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votes is important for one’s political career, irrespective of the extent to which the odds of 
obtaining a seat is dependent on the number of preferential votes.  
The interaction with municipality size indicates that the group of voters which can be persuaded 
by having prior local political experience, is to a certain extent geographically bounded. On the 
basis of these results, we cannot say whether these boundaries coincide with the municipality 
boundaries. A more detailed analysis, including the individual candidate results per 
municipality or even neighbourhood within the constituency boundaries, could provide us with 
more insight into the geographical boundedness of local office-holders’ electoral appeal. 
Unfortunately, these data are not available for Belgian elections. 
Finally, It would be interesting to investigate whether the established effects of local ties in 
previous studies are also dependent of the size of candidates’ localities. With regard to local 
political experience, this future research will also have to take into account that, according to 
our findings, it is crucial to distinguish between the various types of political office at the local 
level.  
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CHAPTER 5: DETERMINANTS OF GEOGRAPHICAL 
REPRESENTATION ON CANDIDATE LISTS IN FLEXIBLE-
LIST SYSTEMS36 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The focus of this paper is on the geographical representativeness of party lists. It examines 
which party- and electoral system-related attributes explain the variation in that response 
variable. By doing so, this contribution seeks to improve our understanding of the geographical 
dynamics of intraparty candidate selection processes. 
Electoral systems are often evaluated on the basis of their ability to translate election results 
into legislatures that reflect the composition of society. In proportional systems, we expect vote 
shares to be accurately translated into seat shares. In addition, members of parliament should 
also be a representative sample of society, for instance in terms of gender, ethnicity, age and 
geography. This argument stems from the theory of descriptive representation, which posits 
that a political institution must mirror the image of society to be viewed as legitimate by all 
segments of society (Pitkin, 1967; Birch, 1993).  
Of the personal traits mentioned in the previous paragraph, the geography of MPs and 
candidates is definitely one of the under-researched topics. By contrast, scholars have 
extensively studied the representation of women and ethnic minorities in parliaments (Htun, 
2004; Norris, 2004). Moreover, it has been well-documented why parties in proportional 
systems are inclined to balance their ticket to include women and ethnic minority groups among 
their candidates (Matland, 1993; Salmond, 2006).  
With regard to the geographical background of MPs and candidates, we know that the large 
majority of electoral systems work with electoral districts to ensure geographical representation 
                                               
36
 This chapter has been published as: Put, G. (2015). Determinants of geographical representation on 
candidate lists in flexible-list systems: Lessons from the Belgian case. Politics, published online: 
[http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9256.12089/abstract]. 
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in parliament. But even electoral systems with a single national constituency produce 
geographically representative parliaments (Latner and McGann, 2005). While it was clear that 
political parties played an important role in this process, it has not been examined how they 
achieved that result. Some authors claim that their internal candidate selection methods 
recognize the importance of regionalism, and force party selectorates to produce geographically 
representative party lists (Koole and Leijenaar, 1988; Hazan, 1997). 
This paper attempts to shed more light on the determinants of geographical representation on 
party lists. The question I try to tackle, is the following: which electoral system-related and 
party-related variables influence this outcome at the district (i.e. party list) level? A dataset was 
built on the place of residence of candidates on 488 party lists for seven elections of the Belgian 
Lower House (1987-2010). Two measures of geographical representation at the party list level 
will be used as outcome variables in the empirical analysis.  
Belgium is a case where geography is strongly embedded in the political culture: it is a federal 
system combining territorial and non-territorial substate levels, with separate party systems and 
strong regional identities. Therefore, it is an interesting case to analyze geographical dynamics 
of candidate selection processes. In addition, recent electoral reforms have significantly 
increased district magnitude and the level of gender representation through the introduction of 
quota laws, creating variation in key independent variables mentioned in the literature. 
 
5.2. A general theory of ticket-balancing 
Ticket-balancing implies that parties present a balanced group of candidates in terms of their 
background characteristics. With regard to the geographical background of candidates, this 
means that party selectorates nominate candidates from various areas in the district, instead of 
a geographically more concentrated group. If this is indeed a primary concern for parties, the 
place of residence of aspirant-candidates becomes one of the candidate selection criteria.  
However, a reading of the literature on the political representation of ethnic groups and women 
suggests that the importance of balancing tickets depends on the electoral system type and 
district magnitude, defined as the number of seats per district (Matland, 2005). In majoritarian 
systems, where district magnitude usually equals one, parties do not even have the chance to 
balance their ticket. They nominate only one candidate, and pursue the strategy of selecting a 
lowest common denominator (Tremblay, 2012), i.e. that particular candidate with the broadest 
108 
 
electoral appeal. This maximizes the odds of winning a majority of votes and consequently the 
seat. In proportional systems, on the other hand, district magnitude is considerably higher, and 
parties could win multiple seats in the district. In other words, party magnitude (defined as the 
number of seats a party wins in the district) increases, which implies that parties are able to 
divide their winning slots or realistic list positions among candidates from various social 
groups. 
Parties in proportional systems thus have the theoretical possibility to balance their ticket, and 
will be inclined to do so for both electoral and organisational reasons (Gallagher and Marsh, 
1988; Norris, 2004; Valdini, 2012). From the electoral perspective, the exclusion of any major 
social group could signal discrimination, which could result into an electoral penalty at the 
ballot box (Norris, 2006). The ticket-balancing strategy also makes sense from a party cohesion 
perspective: balancing the slate avoids internal conflict between party factions (Norris, 1997). 
The ticket-balancing process is often considered a crucial factor affecting women’s presence in 
parliaments and on party lists (Matland and Studlar, 1996). But the exact nature of this process, 
and the actual number of women getting elected, depends on the configuration of three 
elements: ballot structure, district and party magnitude. First, ballot structure determines which 
part of the candidate list should be balanced to guarantee the election of women candidates. In 
closed list systems, where the specific rank order of candidates on the list determines who gets 
elected, parties have to put women in one of the top positions on the list (Marsh, 2005). In open 
list proportional systems, only the voters decide who will get elected by casting preferential 
votes for one or more candidates on the list. In this case, the specific position of women 
candidates on the list is less important (see, however: Miller and Krosnick, 1988). Finally, in 
the more hybrid list PR systems where both rank order and preferential votes come into play 
(e.g. flexible list systems), it is important to have female candidates in winning slots as well as 
on the list in its entirety.  
Second, the higher the district magnitude, the higher the absolute number of list slots and thus 
the available space to present a balanced group of candidates (Carey and Shugart, 1995; see, 
however: Crisp et al., 2007).  A long list of candidates allows parties to include all relevant 
social groups on the ballot. After all, while the majority of the existing literature deals with the 
effects of ticket-balancing on the representation of women, this mechanism also increases the 
representation of other groups, such as ethnic minorities (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993; Norris, 
1997). The third and final element, party magnitude, determines whether these groups have a 
109 
 
realistic chance of getting elected to parliament. If a party expects to win only one seat in the 
district, the candidate selection process becomes a winner takes all event, thereby making 
ticket-balancing purely cosmetic (Young, 1994). 
While this discussion of the ticket-balancing process largely focuses on gender representation, 
I argue that the same mechanisms work for geographical representation. Higher district and 
party magnitude increases the chances of seeing candidates from both urbanized and rural areas 
on the party list and elected to parliament.  
But even in the most ideal institutional setup, there is no absolute guarantee that parties will 
actually balance their ticket. In fact, some parties might still prefer to nominate a very 
homogenous group of candidates, without actually getting electorally punished or creating 
intraparty turmoil. If those parties’ electoral support is largely concentrated, they will be less 
inclined to balance the ticket. Ethnic parties, for example, will mainly draw candidates from 
their own ethnic minority group since they are not interested in drawing support from other 
social groups (Holmsten et al., 2010).  
Applying this argument to geographical representation means that parties with geographically 
concentrated support will be less likely to produce geographically balanced tickets. Parties with 
geographically dispersed support, however, will put some effort in selecting candidates from 
various areas. In the next section, I derive a number of independent variables from the literature, 
and discuss their expected effects on the level of geographical representation on party lists. 
 
5.3. Independent variables and hypotheses 
District magnitude has already been discussed as an important predictor for the level of 
representation in parliaments and on party lists. In general, district magnitude is positively 
correlated with both the number of list slots and party magnitude, which means that both list 
space and multiple winning slots are available to get candidates from various social groups 
elected to parliament. The literature states that minority groups will have higher levels of 
political representation in larger districts (Matland, 1993; Salmond, 2006). 
In terms of geographical representation, this would imply that district magnitude has a positive 
effect on the representation of geographic minority groups. I argue that candidates from small 
municipalities perform the minority role. In general, party selectorates will be more inclined to 
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nominate candidates from the larger and middle-sized municipalities of the district: those 
candidates share their place of residence with a larger proportion of voters which makes them 
electorally more attractive, and they resort on more resourceful grassroots organizations than 
candidates from the smallest municipalities. But this latter group does stand a chance of getting 
nominated in the largest districts: as district magnitude (DM) increases, parties will be more 
willing to allocate list slots to geographical minority groups. This leads to the first hypothesis 
of this paper: 
H1. An increase in DM leads to higher levels of geographical representation on party lists. 
As mentioned earlier, even electoral systems with favorable conditions for balanced tickets will 
have parties with no interest in ticket-balancing efforts. Recent research shows that there is not 
only strong variation in the importance attached to descriptive representation, but also in terms 
of the prioritized social dimension, for which there seems to be a left-right divide (Caramani et 
al., 2014). Arguably, one could measure party efforts by using one form of social group 
representation as predictor of another form. Put differently, if a party list scores high in terms 
of the representation of women, it could be expected that they also perform better in terms of 
geographical representation.  
This argument stems from a strong claim in the literature that various forms of social group 
representation are positively associated (Taagepera, 1994; Lijphart, 1999). The idea is that the 
same factors contribute to higher levels of gender and ethnic representation, mainly the electoral 
system in place, candidate supply and cultural factors (Dahlerup, 2013). While these authors 
focus on parliamentary representation, this association might also hold true for party lists. 
Controlling for electoral system type and district magnitude, the level of gender representation 
might be positively associated with geographical representation. In other words, if party 
selectorates invest in representational politics and find it important to reflect society on party 
lists, geographical representation will go hand in hand with the presence of women candidates: 
H2a. The levels of gender and geographical representation on party lists are positively 
associated. 
There has not been a lot of convincing empirical evidence for this argument. Based on a dataset 
comprising 95 countries, Ruedin (2010) found no positive association between levels of gender 
and ethnic group representation. However, the author did not find a negative correlation either, 
indicating that it is not the case that increasing levels of representation in one form might come 
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at the cost of another. One could, however, make the argument that it does: strong fixation on 
the representation of one social group may impede the representation of other groups. The 
literature points to possible tensions between gender and minority group representation (Dovi, 
2002; Holmsten et al., 2010; Rahat and Malka, 2012). As a result, an alternative hypothesis is 
formulated: 
H2b. The levels of gender and geographical representation on party lists are negatively 
associated. 
Another relevant covariate is the nature of the parties’ candidate selection methods. The most 
useful analytical framework for comparative analysis of candidate selection methods has been 
developed by Hazan and Rahat (2001; 2010). Their model disentangles four dimensions of 
candidate selection, among which selectorate and decentralization are the most important. The 
selectorate, on the one hand, is the body that selects the candidates, and can be composed of 
only one person, or several people, up to the entire electorate of the nation. This dimension can 
be measured on a continuum from exclusive selectorates, where a very limited group of 
selectors take control, to inclusive selectorates, such as the party members or the electorate. 
Decentralization, on the other hand, measures the influence of local party branches in the 
candidate selection.37 In the most centralized methods, the national party level has complete 
control over the nomination process. 
There has been some research attention to the effects of candidate selection methods on political 
representation (Hazan, 1999; Rahat et al., 2008; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). An interesting finding 
is that parties with highly inclusive candidate selection methods produce lists with lower levels 
of representation. Rahat et al. (2008) find that selection methods with membership ballots are 
less likely to produce candidate lists with women on safe positions. Highly exclusive methods, 
on the contrary, lead to highly representative sets of candidates. 
The underlying reason is the difference in the fundamental nature of the task confronting 
selectors in membership ballots vis-à-vis exclusive party committees. In membership ballots, 
on the one hand, members are asked after their individual preferences about party candidates. 
Selectors in party committees, on the other hand, are more inclined to base their decision on an 
evaluation of the collective good of the party. In other words, these party committees are asked 
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 While Rahat and Hazan (2001) discuss both territorial and functional decentralization, I only focus 
on territorial decentralization in this paper. 
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to construct a list of candidates that they think has the best chance of maximizing the electoral 
result and keeping the intraparty turmoil to a minimum. In addition, membership ballots will 
also lead to unbalanced candidate lists because the actions of such a vast selectorate are more 
difficult to coordinate than the actions of party committees with a limited number of selectors. 
Following this argument, I formulate the following hypothesis: 
H3. Exclusive candidate selection methods lead to higher levels of geographical 
representation on party lists. 
An exclusive, non-selected party agency will produce a list of candidates from various areas 
within the district. This limited group of selectors will keep in mind the collective good of the 
party, which will then lead to geographically balanced candidate lists. A selection process 
where members are involved, by contrast, will be more likely to produce unbalanced lists.  
The link between decentralization of candidate selection methods and the level of geographical 
representation on candidate lists seems more straightforward. According to Hazan and Rahat 
(2010), this relationship is positive because ‘if more power in the candidate selection process 
is given to the regional and/or the local selectorates, at the expense of the national party 
organization, the likely result will be more candidates chosen who represent the regional and 
local levels.’ In other words, it is argued that candidates selected by a decentralized, regional 
or local selectorate, will be more geographically representative than candidates selected by 
national party selectorates. 
H4. Decentralized candidate selection methods lead to higher levels of geographical 
representation on party lists. 
 
5.4. The case of Belgium 
The Belgian electoral system is often characterized as a flexible list system, where voters are 
able to endorse the party list as a whole or to cast one or multiple preference votes for party 
candidates on the same list (Marsh, 1985; Shugart, 2005). In theory, both list order and the 
number of preference votes play an important role in intraparty seat allocation. In practice, 
however, the threshold of preference votes to overcome the list order is reached very 
infrequently, which led scholars to characterize flexible list systems as closed-list systems in 
disguise (Crisp, et al., 2013). In recent years, the Belgian system has experienced a number of 
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important electoral reforms that created variation in the key independent variables examined in 
this paper. 
First, district magnitude has increased substantially over the last two decades. As part of the 
fourth Belgian state reform in 1993, the number of electoral districts decreased from 30 to 20. 
This was a consequence of the decision to reduce the number of seats in the Lower House from 
212 to 150. As a result of these reforms, the average district magnitude increased from 5 to 7.5. 
As part of a second electoral district reform in 2002, the number of districts decreased a second 
time from 20 to 11. More specifically, the sub-province districts were merged to provincial 
electoral districts.38 The number of electoral districts decreased to 11 constituencies, with an 
average size of 13.6. Table 5.1 presents a number of descriptive statistics on the evolution of 
district magnitude for the election of the Belgian Lower House. 
 
Table 5.1.: Characteristics of the Belgian electoral districts and lists for the election of the 
Lower House 
 Number 
of 
districts 
Number 
of seats 
Average 
DM 
Min. 
DM 
Max. 
DM 
Average 
list 
length 
Min. 
List 
length 
Max. 
list 
length 
1987-1991 30 212 5 2 18 12.2 6 39 
1995-1999 20 150 7.5 2 22 13.3 6 28 
2003-2010 11 150 13.6 4 24 22.3 10 37 
 
It is important to mention that the introduction of larger districts was accompanied by longer 
party lists. To some extent, this gave parties additional space to keep nominating candidates 
from both large and small municipalities. However, this should not be exaggerated: in both 
reforms the increase in the average list length was lower than the increase in the average district 
magnitude. In 1992, the average district magnitude increased by a ratio of 1.5 (7.5/5) and the 
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 The only exception was the bilingual electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, for which the 
federal government failed to work out an acceptable solution for the involved language groups and the 
constitutional court. 
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average list length by a ratio of 1.1 (13.3/12.2). As a result, the net effect would still be a 
decrease in the number of candidates per seat.39 Figure 1 visualizes these reforms.  
 
 
Figure 5.1.: The electoral districts for the election of the Belgian Lower House before 1995 
(left), in 1995 and 1999 (middle), and in 2003, 2007 and 2010 (right) 
 
A second relevant electoral reform in Belgium was the introduction of candidate gender quotas. 
The first Belgian quota law was introduced in 1994 and first applied in the 1999 elections. It 
stated that no more than two thirds of the candidates on party lists could be of the same sex. In 
2002, this law was adapted in the sense that party lists should from then on include an equal 
number of male and female candidates. In addition, at least one of the top three positions on the 
party list should be reserved for women. Right before the election of 2007, this was again 
adapted to at least one woman in the two top positions.  
The focus on list positions in the Belgian quota law can be explained by the importance of list 
order in the Belgian electoral system. Voters can either cast a vote at the top of the list, or a 
preferential vote for one or more candidates on the same list. If candidates receive a specified 
number of preferential votes, they automatically get elected. Otherwise, the list votes are 
assigned to the highest ranked candidates until they reach the specified amount of votes needed 
for election. While the importance of list order has diminished over time (Wauters and Weekers, 
2008), high ranks on the party list remain very important. 
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 This is mainly caused by the so-called substitute candidates: a particularity of the Belgian electoral 
system is that voters are presented with a list of effective as well as substitute candidates. These 
substitutes for the elected MPs are also rank ordered on the basis of their preferential votes, after the 
distribution of list votes. If an MP becomes member of government, resigns or dies, he or she will be 
replaced by the first substitute. 
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After the introduction of candidate gender quotas, all Belgian parties were legally bounded to 
nominate a sufficient number of women candidates on their party lists, and afterwards even in 
the winning slots. This substantially increased both the number of women candidates on 
realistic list positions and the number of female MPs in the Lower House (from 7.7% in 1987 
to 38.5% in 2010). However, the proportion of female MPs has stagnated recently, and Belgian 
parties still vary considerably in their gender representation efforts on realistic list slots 
(Maddens et al., 2014).  
Third, Belgian candidate selection methods have varied considerably over the last decades. In 
the majority of representative democracies, political parties use comparable candidate selection 
methods most of the time (Scarrow et al., 2000). According to Hazan and Voerman (2006), this 
lack of intra-country variation can be explained by shared norms within every political system 
which restrict the number of legitimate selection methods, and additionally the imitation 
behaviour of parties towards one another. Belgian parties have also been copying each other’s 
methods to some extent, but there still has been some considerable variation in both the level 
of inclusiveness and centralization of their procedures. A possible explanation for this is the 
peculiar situation with separate regional party systems for the Flemish and Walloon regions of 
the country.  
Various Belgian parties have employed highly inclusive selection methods over the last 
decades, allowing their members to participate in the process. The Flemish and francophone 
Christian-Democrats, for example, have frequently been using a system of member polls: party 
members had the possibility to ratify or reject a model list drafted earlier by more exclusive 
party agencies (De Winter, 1988). Furthermore, the Flemish liberals introduced a highly 
inclusive system of primaries in the 1990s, which gave the opportunity to registered voters to 
nominate candidates for parliamentary elections (Verleden, 2013).  
Other parties used methods that involved party delegates. Since they are appointed by the 
members, these delegates can be seen as an indirect inclusion of party members in the selection 
process. The Flemish Socialists, for example, applied selection methods where the lists were 
ratified by an assembly of member delegates. But also the Flemish Christian-Democrats used 
these assemblies for the first three elections included in the analysis (Deschouwer, 1993).  
Finally, there are also examples of highly exclusive selection methods, where no members or 
member delegates are involved in any way. The francophone liberal party MR is a good 
example of this category: only the presidents of the various party components were entitled to 
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appoint the most important candidates on the party lists, and in a final step approve the entire 
candidate lists (Vandeleene, et al., 2013). 
But also in terms of centralization, there was considerable variation among Belgian parties 
between 1987 and 2010. The Flemish liberal party, for example, has a strong tradition of 
keeping the role of the national party level very limited. One or two party agencies at the district 
level dominated their selection process during the entire period of investigation. In other cases, 
candidate lists are the result of an interaction between party agencies at the district and national 
party level. A typical example are the selection methods applied by the Flemish Christian-
Democrats: after a party agency at the district level took the initiative of drafting a first list 
proposal, a national party agency could either modify or ratify this list, before it was presented 
to the members through a poll.  
Centralization was highest where the national party level had veto right in the final step of the 
selection process. In 2003 and 2007, the francophone Christian-Democrats organized a 
candidate selection procedure where a national party committee with a limited number of 
members could approve the model list drafted by the district organization, or simply overrule 
the decisions made at the district level and draft a completely different proposal. 
 
5.5. Data, measurement and method 
I constructed a dataset on the place of residence of Belgian party candidates for all the elections 
of the Lower House since 1987.40 These data on candidates from 488 party lists was used to 
calculate the level of geographical representation on the lists. The dataset contains information 
on candidates from eight Belgian parties: the Christian-democrats, liberals, socialists and green 
parties of the Walloon and Flemish regions of Belgium. The criterion for selecting these parties 
was their level of institutionalization and whether they have been represented continually in 
parliament.41 Furthermore, these parties submitted party lists in all districts during these 
                                               
40
 Candidates for the Lower House do not have to live in the electoral district where they will be running 
for election. In fact, if they are registered in any Belgian municipality on election day at the latest, the 
party selectorate can use them in any district they want. 
41
 The only exception are the Flemish greens, who have been out of the Federal Parliament for one 
legislative term (2003-2007).  
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elections, which indicates that they are parties with consolidated structures and high 
organizational complexity.42  
One of the key issues to deal with is of course how to measure the level of geographical 
representation on party lists. I consider a party list to be geographically representative when it 
includes candidates from the highest possible number of municipalities. This will be measured 
by means of municipality-indicator : 
 = 	


 
where  is the number of municipalities represented on the party list, and  is the total number 
of municipalities in the district. In other words, this indicator calculates the proportion of 
municipalities represented on the party lists. The higher the score, the higher the territorial 
coverage of the district in terms of party candidates.  
This measure of geographical representation does not take into account list positions. Rank 
order remains an important determinant of the candidate’s odds of getting elected in the Belgian 
flexible list system. There might be substantial differences between the level of geographical 
representation on the party list in its entirety on the one hand, and the realistic positions on the 
other. As a result, a second indicator focuses on the realistic list slots. More specifically, it 
measures the proportion of candidates of the largest municipality on the realistic list slots: 
	 = 1 −	


 
Where  is the number of candidates of the largest municipality on a realistic place, and  
is the total number of realistic places on the party list. In other words, this indicator focuses on 
the dominance of large city candidates: the higher the proportion of large city candidates in 
realistic slots, the lower the geographical representativeness of the list. I take the inverse of this 
proportion for reasons of interpretation: higher proportions of large city candidates decreases 
the representativeness and the value of this indicator. 
                                               
42
 While the radical right party Vlaams Blok/Belang does meet these criteria, they were left out of the 
analysis because there is no francophone counterpart available. This would lead to an unbalanced sample 
of parties in the dataset. 
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Of course, determining realistic list slots is not always a straightforward endeavour. According 
to Hazan and Rahat (2010), whether or not list positions can be considered as realistic depends 
on the electoral system and party strength in the district. In closed list systems, it would suffice 
to measure the amount of seats the party expects to win in the district. If a party expects to win 
three seats, then the first three positions on the list should be considered realistic. In flexible list 
systems such as the Belgian case, this exercise is more complicated. 
In practice, Belgian party selectorates distinguish between realistic and non-realistic positions 
on the list, using previous election results as benchmarks (Put and Maddens, 2013). For 
example, if a party won three seats in a district during the previous election, the first four 
positions could be considered realistic: the candidate on the fourth positions stands a real chance 
of being elected on the condition that his or her number of preference votes is high enough 
and/or the party realizes a significant upward swing in the district. In addition, the Belgian case 
has known many examples of the candidate at the bottom of the list managing to get elected 
instead of a higher ranked candidate (Wauters, Weekers, and Pilet, 2004). This is so because 
parties often choose popular politicians for this final position. For these reasons, the ‘list pusher’ 
will also be considered a realistic position in the analysis. Finally, the first substitute candidate 
is also included in the category of realistic list positions, since this is a list slot with a realistic 
possibility of getting a seat in the event of resignation, death or a ministerial office for one of 
the other elected MPs on the list. 
These two indicators both focus on the municipality level as the relevant geographical unit, and 
this for two substantial reasons. First, the municipality level is the lowest organizational unit 
within Belgian political parties and could still be seen as building stones of their party 
organizations (Deschouwer and Rihoux, 2008). They perform the crucial task of recruiting 
talented aspirant-candidates. Second, politicians’ local ties are usually perceived in terms of 
previous political experience at the municipal level (Tavits, 2010; Put and Maddens, 2014). 
District magnitude (DM) is measured by the number of seats per district. In the multivariate 
analyses, I use the logarithm of DM to control for the influence of outliers, since the natural 
DM in the dataset ranges from 2 to 24. While this operationalization is common practice in the 
majority of studies using DM as independent variable, I will also control for the average number 
of list slots per municipality. This variable summarizes the scarcity of list slots compared to the 
number of municipalities in the district, and expresses the level of competition among the 
various municipalities in the district to get at least one list slot.  
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The level of gender representation on party lists is measured by the proportion of female 
candidates in realistic list slots. As a result of the introduction of quota laws, this proportion 
will generally increase over the seven Lower House elections under investigation. However, by 
using this measure, I control for substantial differences between party lists within elections. For 
example, while parties were not legally required to nominate 50% of female candidates before 
2003, the Flemish green party already reached this threshold in 1995 (Maddens et al., 2014).  
To estimate the effect of intraparty candidate selection methods, I work with selection indexes 
measuring the dimensions of inclusiveness and decentralization on an ordinal scale. While 
Shomer (2009) introduced an integrated 6-point scale, I use two separate scales to test the 
distinct effects of inclusiveness and decentralization on the response variables. Data on Belgian 
candidate selection methods were collected on the basis of party regulations, interviews with 
party officials, news articles and existing literature on the topic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2.: Scale of inclusiveness of the selectorate 
 
The level of inclusiveness of Belgian candidate selection methods is measured on a 3-point 
scale. The highest level on this scale are selection methods where members are directly 
involved, for example by ratifying the model lists that have been drafted by one of the party 
agencies. The middle category on this scale are the selection methods where party members 
appoint delegates. The most exclusive category are procedures where members or delegates are 
not involved in any way, but one or more non-selected party agencies dominate the selection 
process. 
 
 
1 2 3 
1: The selection process is dominated by one or more non-selected 
nomination committees 
2: Member delegates participate in the selection process 
3: Members participate in the selection process 
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Figure 5.3.: Scale of decentralization 
 
I constructed a similar 3-point scale for measuring the level of decentralization, the second 
candidate selection dimension included in this study. The highest score on the scale is for 
selection methods where the constituency organization has full autonomy in drafting the list. If, 
however, the selection process takes the form of an interaction between the national and district 
level, the observation fits the second category on the index. The most centralized procedure is 
when the national party level controls the final step of the selection process and/or has the 
chance to overrule any previous decisions taken at a lower party level.  
Finally, two control variables will be added to the analysis: the relative number of realistic slots 
on the party list, and the relative size of the largest city in the district. A large number of realistic 
list positions increases the available space on the list to balance the ticket, and should be taken 
into account. The second control variable is especially important when modelling : self-
evidently, the larger the largest city in the district, the more realistic slots will be assigned to 
candidates from that city. 
Finally, both dependent variables  and		 are proportions:  measures the proportion of 
municipalities represented on the candidate list, and 	 measures the proportion of realistic 
candidates from the largest city of the district. If the dependent variable is a proportion, both 
the assumptions of continuous scores and normality are violated. The classical solution to this 
problem is to perform a logit transformation to achieve normality, followed by OLS regression. 
The following transformation is applied:43	 
                                                
43
 However, this solution is still problematic if some of the observations in the dependent variable equal 
0 or 1. The logit transformation for these observations will yield undefined values, resulting in missing 
1 2 3 
1: The national party level dominates the final phase of the selection 
process and/or has veto power 
2: The selection process is an interaction/cooperation between the 
national and district level 
3: The selection process takes place at the district level, national level 
is not involved 
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	 = 	 ln

1 − 
 
In addition, there are several reasons to believe that the 488 party lists in the dataset are not 
independent observations. First, these are party lists from seven subsequent elections, creating 
the possibility that there might be a time effect involved which is not measured by other 
independent variables. Second, the eight political parties included in the dataset belong to four 
different ideological families. As mentioned in the theoretical discussion, party ideology might 
play an important role in determining what type of representation is prioritized on the party list. 
As a result, to avoid omitted variable bias in the multivariate analysis, I add fixed-effects for 
time and party family to the models.  
 
5.6. Analysis 
What determines geographical representation on party lists? Table 5.2 first summarizes some 
descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent variables included in the analyses. The 
results indicate that, on average, 43% of the municipalities in a district are represented on party 
lists. With regard to the second dependent variable, the large city candidates get on average 
28% of the realistic list positions. Put differently, 72% of these positions are allotted to other 
municipalities than the largest city in the district. Another interesting finding is that only 24% 
of the realistic list slots were assigned to women candidates on the average party list. 
                                               
values and consequently a loss of information. To avoid this, I added some noise to the data to ensure 
that 0 < 	 (or ) < 1, and every observation will be included in the multivariate analyses: 
		 = 	 ln
	 + 0.01
1 − 	 − 0.01
 
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Table 5.2.: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the remainder of this section, I discuss the results of two OLS regression models with  
and 	 as dependent variables.44 Table 5.3 presents the coefficients of these two models. Model 
1 regresses the first indicator  on the independent variables mentioned in Table 5.2. 
Concerning candidate selection methods, especially decentralization plays a substantial role in 
explaining variation in the level of territorial coverage on the party lists. Highly decentralized 
methods, where candidate selection takes place at the district level without any national 
interference, lead to the highest levels of geographical representation. Both the second and third 
category on the decentralization scale have significantly lower proportions of municipalities on 
the candidate list, which is in line with the fourth hypothesis in this paper. The results with 
regard to inclusiveness of the selectorate are not that straightforward: the middle category, 
which involves influence of member delegates in candidate selection, yields the highest scores 
on this indicator. The data does not show a clear pattern for the effect of this second candidate 
selection dimension. 
 
                                               
44
 The regression coefficients should be interpreted with some caution: since I used a logit transformation 
of 	 and , the resulting coefficients should be interpreted on the logarithmic scale. Although it is 
possible to back-transform an estimated probability on the logit scale to the probability scale, it is not 
possible to back-transform a regression parameter estimate to the probability scale. 
Variable Min Max Mean SD N 
 0.19 1.00 0.43 0.17 488 
	 0.00 1.00 0.72 0.25 488 
District magnitude (DM) 2.00 24.00 7.82 5.18 488 
% women in realistic slots 0.00 1.00 0.24 0.23 488 
Decentralization of candidate selection 1.00 3.00 2.27 0.78 488 
Inclusiveness of candidate selection 1.00 3.00 1.67 0.78 488 
% realistic slots on the list 0.08 0.67 0.31 0.10 488 
% of population largest city in district 0.08 0.50 0.23 0.12 488 
Average # of list Slots per municipality 0.19 1.43 0.59 0.28 488 
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Table 5.3.: OLS regression models 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01; *** P < 0.001. 
 
Model 1 
	( 
 Model 2 
		
 
Constant -1.90 
(0.05) 
*** -1.42 
(0.23) 
*** 
Log (DM) 0.02 
(0.01) 
 0.09 
(0.06) 
 
% Women candidates in realistic list slots -0.01 
(0.03) 
 -0.41 
(0.15) 
** 
Decentralization (ref.= District level)     
Interaction national/district level -0.08 
(0.02) 
*** -0.21 
(0.09) 
* 
National level veto/dominance -0.08 
(0.02) 
*** 0.03 
(0.10) 
 
Inclusiveness (ref.= Non-selected agencies) 
 
 
 
 
Member delegates 0.05 
(0.02) 
** -0.04 
(0.09) 
 
Members 0.01 
(0.03) 
 -0.07 
(0.12) 
 
% realistic list slots 0.07 
(0.07) 
 1.76 
(0.35) 
*** 
Average number of list slots per municipality 0.77 
(0.03) 
*** 0.15 
(0.15) 
 
% population of largest city in the district -0.31 
(0.07) 
*** -1.53 
(0.33) 
*** 
Party family dummies (ref.= Ch. Democrats)   
 
 
Socialists -0.10 
(0.02) 
*** -0.34 
(0.11) 
** 
Liberals -0.03 
(0.02) 
 -0.19 
(0.12) 
 
Greens -0.12 
(0.02) 
*** -0.20 
(0.10) 
* 
Year dummies (ref.= 1987)    
1991 0.04 
(0.02) 
* -0.05 
(0.08) 
 
1995 0.06 
(0.02) 
** 0.03 
(0.11) 
1999 0.06 
(0.02) 
* 0.19 
(0.11) 
2003 0.02 
(0.02) 
 0.16 
(0.15) 
2007 -0.00 
(0.03) 
 0.01 
(0.15) 
2010 0.05 
(0.03) 
 0.10 
(0.14) 
N 488  488  
Adjusted R² 0.71  0.14  
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As expected, the average number of list slots per municipality has a highly significant positive 
effect on the territorial coverage on party lists. This is of course a rather straightforward and 
mechanical effect: the more space available on the party list for candidates, the more 
municipalities in the district will have at least one candidate on that list. In addition, the 
population proportion of the largest city in the district has a negative effect on the first indicator 
of geographical representation. This implies that in districts where the largest city is 
demographically dominant, there will be a lower proportion of municipalities represented on 
party lists. Moving on to the dummy coefficients, it is interesting to see that socialist and green 
parties have comparatively lower levels of geographical representation than their liberal and 
Christian-democratic counterparts.  
Model 2 explains variation in the second indicator 	, which focuses on the dominance of the 
largest city on realistic list slots. First, the percentage of women candidates in realistic list slots 
seems to be negatively correlated with this indicator. In other words, high levels of gender 
representation lead to higher dominance of large city candidates and consequently lower levels 
of geographical representation in realistic slots. This is in line with H2b, the more pessimistic 
interpretation of the association between different forms of social group representation. 
Second, the highly significant effect of the percentage realistic list slots is again very logical: if 
a list has a high number of interesting or eligible list positions, there is more space available to 
allot these positions to candidates from other municipalities than the largest city in the district. 
Third, and analogous to the first model, the population proportion of the largest city has a 
negative impact on the second indicator of geographical representation, which is again 
straightforward. Parties seem to reason that cities which dominate the electoral district in terms 
of population size should dominate the best places on the candidate lists as well. Fourth and 
finally, with regard to the dummy variables, the results are similar to the first analysis. More 
specifically, socialist and green party lists again score significantly lower on the second 
indicator.  
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5.7. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to provide more insight into the dynamics of geographical 
representation on party lists. Based on the relevant literature, I selected a number of independent 
variables which were expected to have an impact on geographical representation on the 
candidate lists of eight Belgian political parties. 
Some of the results were not particularly surprising. For example, the fact that higher numbers 
of list slots per municipality increases the territorial coverage of party lists is self-evident. The 
same holds for the second analysis, where I found that a higher number of realistic list slots 
leads to a higher level of geographical representation in those positions. In sum, the more space 
is provided on candidate lists, the more parties will take into account geographical balance on 
their list. 
However, if the number of list slots is limited, parties face tough choices in candidate selection 
processes. The results suggest that selectorates are less inclined to geographically balance the 
ticket if the largest city in the district is relatively dominant in terms of population size. Local 
party branches are able to prevent this if they have any form of influence in candidate selection 
processes: the data suggest that highly decentralized candidate selection methods lead to party 
lists with higher levels of geographical representation. However, this is not confirmed for the 
second analysis, which focused on realistic list slots.  
In addition, the results for the realistic slots support the hypothesis about negative associations 
between different forms of social group representation. More specifically, high percentages of 
women in realistic slots go hand in hand with high numbers of large city candidates, and 
consequently lower levels of geographical representation. This is not the case for the list in its 
entirety.  
While Belgium is of course a case with notoriously complex territorial and electoral dynamics, 
I believe that the results of these analyses can, to a certain extent, be generalized to comparable 
flexible list systems. More specifically, the variation in district magnitude and candidate 
selection methods of Belgian parties has been quite substantial over the last 25 years. This 
makes Belgium the ideal empirical testing ground for some of the hypotheses concerning the 
effects of electoral system and party attributes on party list representation. However, it is 
generally accepted in the specialized literature that candidate selection dynamics and the effects 
of district magnitude on party- and candidate behavior strongly differ according to electoral 
126 
 
system type. This creates the need for a more comparative approach in future research, 
including cases from closed and open list systems. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE EFFECTS OF AGGREGATE CANDIDATE 
LIST CHARACTERISTICS ON THE ELECTORAL RESULT 
OF THE PARTY LISTS45 
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The search for determinants of election outcomes has produced an impressive amount of studies 
in political science research. The majority of these studies has primarily focused on the results 
at the political party level, and found individual voter level determinants (voters’ political 
attitudes, opinions on specific political issues, degree of party identification, etc.) based on 
survey research, or aggregate level determinants (macroeconomic indicators, social 
composition of the electorate, ideological configuration of parties, etc.) (for a comprehensive 
overview, see: Evans, 2003). Other studies on election outcomes analyzed the results at the 
individual candidate level, which is a popular approach in majoritarian electoral systems where 
individual characteristics of candidates can be more directly linked to winning the seat in the 
electoral district. But even in proportional electoral systems, it is possible to investigate the 
determinants of the number of preferential votes individual candidates receive (Taebel, 1975; 
Miller and Krosnick, 1998; Maddens et al., 2006). 
Put differently, the research on electoral success is largely situated at either the party or 
individual level, but rarely at the candidate list level. Self-evidently, the analysis of electoral 
results of candidate lists is impossible in majoritarian systems – which do not have candidate 
lists – or in proportional systems with only one electoral district – where the party level 
coincides with the candidate list level. In proportional systems with multiple electoral districts, 
however, such an analysis could be useful to examine which candidate list characteristics 
determine the electoral success of lists. Especially in open list systems, one can assume that the 
                                               
45
 This chapter has been published as: Maddens, B. and Put, G. (2011). Maken sterke lijsten een verschil? 
Een analyse van de lijsten bij de federale en regionale verkiezingen in het Vlaams Gewest (2003-2010). 
Res Publica: Tijdschrift voor Politologie, 53 (2), pp. 165-188. 
128 
 
electoral success of candidate lists is partly determined by the characteristics of their individual 
candidates. At least, that is what politicians and journalist often seem to assume when they 
distinguish between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ lists. They refer, for instance, to lists with many 
political heavyweights (e.g. mayors, incumbent members of government and legislators) as 
strong lists. The strength of a candidate can also be measured by his or her campaign expenses: 
if candidates significantly invest in expensive campaigns, then this could affect the aggregate 
list result as well. Additionally, parties often seem to follow the intuition that lists with a lot of 
younger candidates, or women candidates, or ambitious self-employed candidates will score 
significantly better. And finally, as parties put a significant amount of effort in drafting 
geographically balanced lists, they seem to expect that geographical representation leads to 
electoral victory. 
However, the empirical ground for these often intuitive assumptions on strong and weak 
candidate lists is rather limited. The existing literature on the topic is outdated and lacks 
systematic empirical analysis. Some authors in the field of political recruitment and intraparty 
candidate selection have previously dealt with the topic. For instance, Seligman (1971) claimed 
that the selection of candidates on party lists is based on two types of criteria: descriptive or 
objective personal characteristics (e.g. age, gender, religion and place of residence) on the one 
hand, and subjective personal characteristics (e.g. communication and negotiation skills, party 
background and ideological position) on the other hand. According to Gallagher (1988), both 
types of criteria are used while composing candidate lists for multiple member districts. 
Moreover, the party selectorate will also try to balance candidate characteristics to appeal to the 
largest possible share of the electorate. This process is often referred to as ticket-balancing, and 
is especially relevant in open list PR systems, where the composition of candidate lists can have 
an important impact on the electoral result. The assumption is that a list has more electoral 
appeal if the various subgroups in the electorate (social class, age, gender, place of residence) 
are equally distributed over the candidate list (Cornwell, 1980; Matland and Studlar, 1996; 
Salmond, 2006). But to our knowledge, the empirical relationship between the composition of 
the list and its aggregate result has never been examined before. 
In this article, we make a first attempt to study this relationship, focusing on the Belgian Lower 
House elections (for Flemish parties) of 2003, 2007 and 2010, and the regional elections of 
129 
 
2004 and 2009. The research includes the aggregate characteristics of 179 candidate lists46 
based on 5540 individual party candidates.47 First, we present and discuss which dependent 
variables are suitable for this type of research. Afterwards, we analyze which aggregate list 
characteristics explain the variation in this dependent variable. More specifically, we look at 
campaign expenses, the social composition of the list (gender, age and profession), the political 
profile of the list (number of local and national office holders) and the geographical distribution 
of candidates over the district.48 
 
6.2. The dependent variables 
Self-evidently, the aggregate result of party lists primarily depends on the general party result 
in the elections. Especially in highly nationalized party systems (Caramani, 2004; Deschouwer, 
2009), candidate lists from the same party will not vary significantly over the electoral districts. 
It seems rather exceptional that one of the list results completely contradicts with the general 
party trends. As a result, the raw percentage of a party list in the district is not an accurate 
dependent variable for this analysis. For instance, it would not be realistic to expect that one of 
the lists of a small party completely overturns the national election defeat in their district by 
drafting a well-balanced list of candidates.  
We could, however, expect that a ‘strong’ list in one of the separate electoral districts will score 
substantially higher than the national result of the party. In other words, maybe the Flemish 
                                               
46
 We limit the analysis to parties that were represented in either the Lower House, senate or Flemish 
parliament. More specifically, we included CD&V/CD&V-N-VA, VLD/Open VLD, SP.A/SP.A-Spirit, 
Vlaams Blok/Belang, Agalev/Groen!, N-VA (only 2003, 2009 and 2010), LDD (only 2007, 2009 and 
2010) and SLP (only 2009). In this article, we use ‘CD&V’ to refer to the party lists of CD&V as well 
as CD&V/N-VA, and ‘SP.A’ to refer to the party lists of SP.A as well as SP.A-Spirit. For the regional 
elections, the candidate lists for the regional parliament of Brussels (for the six representatives of the 
Brussels Capital Region in the Flemish parliament) are not included in the analysis. 
47
 While calculating the values at list level, we take into account the number of candidacies and not 
candidates. If a candidate runs on both the effective and successor list for the party (which is 
exceptional), then the candidate is counted double, except for the calculation of the list campaign 
expenses. 
48
 These data were collected as part of the KANDI-project of the Centre for Political Research, KU 
Leuven. 
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greens were able to limit the electoral damage in some of the electoral districts with an 
incumbent member of government on the party list. This implies we should calculate the 
percentage of the district party list relative to the national party result as the dependent 
variable.49 This relative list result is measured on the basis of the district vote share and the 
party vote share at the aggregate (national or regional) level. We use the latter as the base level, 
and examine to what extent the party lists in the various districts scored better or worse.  
The extent to which this score varies within parties and elections can be considered an indicator 
of the degree of nationalization of the parties’ electoral support. A high standard deviation 
means that the party results highly fluctuate over the districts and its support has not been 
nationalized. This is especially the case for smaller parties. LDD (with an average σ of 0.46) is 
the party with the highest between-district variation, followed by SLP (0.30) and the Flemish 
greens (0.23). For the Flemish-nationalist party N-VA, fluctuations were initially also strong 
(0.22 in 2003), but clearly diminished in 2010 (0.09) and now has scores which are comparable 
to the Flemish Christian-democrats, socialists and liberals. The Christian-democrats have the 
lowest level of between-district variation with an average σ of 0.14. The three LDD candidate 
lists in the province of Western Flanders (2007, 2009 and 2010) obtain the highest score on the 
dependent variable. The first spot is taken by the LDD list of 2010: while the aggregate party 
result was only 3.7%, the candidate list in the district of Western Flanders realized a score of 
7.67%, which implies a relative result of 2.073 (=7.67/3.7). The smaller parties (i.e. Flemish 
greens, LDD and SLP) are also firmly represented among the worst scoring parties in the 
dataset.  
This first dependent variable allows to examine the relationship between the relative electoral 
strength of the party list and its characteristics. This does, however, not imply the existence of 
a causal relationship, such that the list characteristics actually determine the list result. Electoral 
differences between districts are often fixed, and parties have developed electoral strongholds 
in certain areas over time. The Flemish Christian-democrats, for instance, traditionally get their 
                                               
49
 For the electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvorde, the problem is that the percentage is considerably 
lower than the aggregate party result, on the one hand because the Flemish party lists in the Brussels 
region barely enjoy any electoral support, and on the other hand because the francophone party lists in 
Halle-Vilvoorde receive more or less 20% of the votes. To avoid that the lists for the district of Brussels-
Halle-Vilvoorde become outliers, we calculated the vote share for these lists on the basis of the total 
number of votes for Flemish lists instead of the total number of votes in general. 
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highest scores in the province of Western Flanders. It is plausible that, because of these 
traditional strongholds, party lists are generally stronger in these areas (e.g. in terms of 
incumbent legislators or members of government). To control for this, we need to work with a 
relative measure comparing the result for election t with the score in the previous election t-1. 
We calculate the electoral swing between two elections by dividing the result in election t by 
the result in election t-1.50 Additionally, we need to control for the general party result in the 
election. Therefore, we calculate the relative electoral swing: this is the electoral swing in the 
district divided by the electoral swing of the general party result. This is our second dependent 
variable. 
Calculating this second dependent variable was not always straightforward. First, in the event 
of the electoral district reforms in 2003, we have to compare the results of the larger electoral 
districts in 2003 with an aggregate score of the smaller districts of 1999 comprising the same 
area. Second, since some of the parties in our dataset formed an electoral alliance in 2007, we 
had to figure out a way to calculate a relative electoral swing for these lists as well.51 The 
alternative would be to exclude these lists from the analysis, and lose a significant number of 
observations. Third, parties that participate for the first time (LDD at the federal level in 2007, 
and at the regional level in 2009, SLP in 2009) are by definition excluded from the analysis 
since there is no election result at t-1. As a result, the number of observations diminished to 
163. 
The variation in the relative electoral swing was strongest among parties with high volatility in 
general election results. This is the case for N-VA (average σ = 0.249) and LDD (σ of 0.188 in 
2010). The relative electoral swings were generally much lower for the Flemish Christian-
democrats (σ = 0.069) and liberals (σ = 0.07). The most successful lists (based on the calculation 
of the relative electoral swing) are primarily the candidate lists of smaller parties which either 
remained stable while the national party share dramatically decreased, or substantially gained 
                                               
50
 We compare the election result each time with the previous result for the same legislative assembly. 
More specifically, this means that we compare the 2007 result with 2003, the 2009 result with 2004, and 
the 2010 result with 2007. For the 2003 Lower House elections, the 1999 Lower House elections are t-
1, and the 2004 regional election results are compared to the 1999 regional elections. 
51
 The result of N-VA in 2003 is compared with the VU-ID result in 1999. The vote share of the alliance 
CD&V-N-VA in 2004 and 2007 is divided over the two parties on the basis of the vote distribution 
between the two parties in the 2003 elections. 
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in vote share in a modest election victory of their party. An example of the first scenario is the 
N-VA-list of 2003 in Western Flanders, which received 7% of the vote compared with 8.2% of 
the vote in 1999 (which is a proportion of 0.85). At the aggregate level, the N-VA received only 
4.8% of the votes in 2003, compared to 8.8% in 1999 (a proportion of 0.55). The relative 
electoral swing amounts to 0.85/0.55 = 1.55. The least successful are again the candidate lists 
of smaller parties which either could not keep up with the general increase in their party’s 
election result because they were already relatively strong in their district during the previous 
election compared with the rest of the country. An example of the latter scenario is the LDD-
list in Antwerp in 2010. At the aggregate level, LDD received 3.7% of the vote compared to 
6.4% in 2007 (proportion = 0.58). But in the district of Antwerp, LDD only received 2.29% in 
2010 compared to 5.42 in 2007. As a consequence, their relative swing totaled up to 0.42/0.58 
= 0.72.  
The two dependent variables (relative electoral success and relative electoral swing) are not 
entirely independent from one another. Their correlation amounts to 0.36 (p = 0.0001).52 Large 
differences in relative swings are often the result of unequal distribution of votes over the 
districts. 
 
6.3. Campaign expenses 
Since 1989, individual party candidates as well as parties are obliged to declare their campaign 
expenses.53 From a legal point of view, there are no campaign expenses taking place at the list 
level. We know, however, that the expenses declared by individual candidates can partially be 
considered as expenses at the candidate list level. Joint expenses for the entire list have to be 
distributed over the individual declaration reports of the candidates. These amounts then appear 
on the reports of individual candidates as individual expenses paid by the party. However, it is 
not possible to separate these concealed list level expenses from the individual expenses 
                                               
52
 Pearson correlation coefficient, which will be used throughout this article. 
53
 Candidates are restricted to a maximum amount. For effective candidates plus the first successor-
candidate, this maximum is 5000 euro, for the other successor-candidates 2500 euro. A limited number 
of candidates is allowed to spend a higher amount, calculated on the basis of the number of registered 
voters. More specifically, this number of candidates equals the number of seats the party won in the 
previous elections in that district, plus one (Weekers and Maddens, 2009, 67-92).  
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(Weekers and Maddens, 2009, 67-92). We can, on the other hand, safely assume that the real 
individual expenses also contribute to the result of the entire candidate list. As a result, it would 
be interesting to aggregate all declared individual campaign expenses at the list level. The 
question is, then, whether party lists score better if all candidates have spent more in their 
individual election campaigns.  
For various reasons, a relative measure of campaign expenses would be appropriate. First, we 
need to control for between-district differences. Electoral districts with large electorates will 
lead to higher communication expenses. Second, high district magnitude generally leads to 
higher numbers of candidates and consequently higher levels of individual expenses. Third, we 
need to take into account the substantial spending differences between political parties. 
Candidates for the Flemish greens, for instance, generally tend to spend insignificantly less in 
their election campaigns. The question is whether green party lists which raise a more expensive 
campaign compared with other green lists will receive higher vote shares.54 As previously 
mentioned, we aggregate all individual campaign expenses at the party list level.55 To control 
for inflation, we calculated these expenses in prices of June 2010. Finally, this amount is 
expressed in relative terms: more specifically, we related list expenses to the total party 
expenses per voter in the entire election.56 
For the large political parties, the standard deviation of this expenses measure is generally 
smaller, which means that there is only limited variation in expenses between the electoral 
districts. For smaller parties, these differences are not only larger, but also less stable over time. 
In the cases of the Flemish nationalists and greens, there was a significant decrease as the 
                                               
54
 In 2003, for instance, the total expenses of all Agalev-candidates amounted to 0.30 eurocent per 
registered voter. In the province of Limburg, this rises to 0.73 eurocent per registered voter, which results 
in a relative expense of 0.73/0.30 = 2.54. 
55
 We only take into account the individual expenses and not the aggregate party expenses. 
56
 For the case of the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde district, the problem is that the number of registered 
voters is considerably higher than the actual ‘target audience’ of the party lists (Flemish lists aim for 
Flemish voters, francophone lists for francophone voters), which leads to an artificially low amount per 
registered voter. This amount is, on the contrary, artificially high if we divide it by the number of votes 
for Flemish lists. To neutralize this effect, we divided the expenses by a fictive number of registered 
voters, in the manner that the average expense per registered voter for the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde lists 
equals the average for 2003, 2007 and 2010 in the other electoral districts. For 2003 this is 771717 
voters, for 2007 it is 810723 voters and for 2010, finally, 741795 voters. 
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expenses in 2010 vary significantly less compared to 2003. This may be related to a more 
centralized intraparty control over campaign expenses. 
Bivariate results confirm the argument that the most successful lists outspend their competitors: 
the Pearson correlation coefficient between these variables amounts to 0.28 (P < 0.0001). Does 
this, however, mean that higher expenditures leads to increased electoral success? After all, the 
reversed causal relationship is also plausible: the level of campaign expenses is partially 
determined by the party list success in previous elections. The more seats a party list won in 
previous elections, the more candidates are allowed to spend higher maximum amounts of 
campaign money. The correlation between the relative level of list campaign expenses and the 
relative number of candidates allowed to spend higher maximum amounts is 0.37 (P < 0.0001).  
 
6.4.  The social composition of party lists 
We collected data on the profession, age and gender of the party candidates. The percentage of 
women on the lists is constant during the period of investigation because of the gender quota 
laws in Belgium. Party lists do, however, differ in terms of the number of female candidates on 
eligible positions. We developed a measure of ‘femininity’ of the party list which works like a 
point index: a female candidate on the first position leads to three points, on the second list 
position two point, and women on the third position, the latter position or the first/second 
successor candidate one point. The index score over all lists in the dataset averages 3.46 points 
(Table 1). The index of femininity scores highest on the lists of the greens (4.46) and the SLP 
(4.4) and lowest for the far right Vlaams Blok/Belang (2.75) and liberals (3.11). From the 2007 
elections onwards, the quota laws were sharpened in the sense that one of the two top positions 
on the list had to be female (before, this was the case for only one of the three top positions). 
Self-evidently, this resulted in the increase of index scores (from 3 in 2003 and 2.52 in 2004 to 
3.75 in 2007, 2.85 in 2009 and 3.81 in 2010). 
To check whether the feminine lists are more successful we again use a relative measure: the 
score of a particular list on the femininity index relative to the average index score for all the 
party’s lists in that particular election. The question is, for instance, whether a list of Vlaams 
Belang where female candidates are relatively better positioned compared with the other 
Vlaams Belang-lists will get higher vote shares. The answer is no: we did not find a significant 
association between the relative femininity of lists and its relative success or relative swing. 
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With regard to profession, we work with six large categories (Verleden et al., 2009). Table 6.1 
summarizes the average percentage of candidates on the lists that belongs to one of these six 
categories. Employees form the largest category with an average of 32.1%. Especially the 
Flemish greens (38.6%) and SP.A (41.2%) score higher in terms of employees, while the liberal 
lists contain remarkably lower numbers (17.7%). Self-employed candidates (including 
candidates with liberal professions and farmers) constitute the second largest group with 24.9%. 
The logical assumption that the liberal party will attract a lot of self-employed candidates finds 
strong support: liberal lists contain on average 45.9% of this category. The green lists have the 
lowest number of self-employed (13.4%). The average percentage of public servants (including 
teachers) on the list is 13.3%, but for the greens (24.2%) and SLP (20.3%) this number is 
considerably higher. The non-active candidates (working at home, retired, students and 
unemployed) fill in on average 9.3% of list positions, with the highest score for Vlaams 
Blok/Belang (21.7%) and SLP (18.3%). Professional politicians (cabinet or party workers, in 
total 6.8%) are slightly stronger represented on the lists of the larger parties. Finally, only 3.3% 
of the candidates are labourers. The parties which, according to their candidate lists, can be 
considered as representing the labourers’ interests, are Vlaams Blok/Belang (8.1%) and LDD 
(7.8%). 
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Table 6.1.: Womanliness of party lists, percentage of professional and age categories, mean 
age, by party 
 CD&V VLD SP.A VLB GROEN N-VA LDD SLP Total 
Women in top 
positions (index) 3.32 3.11 3.46 2.75 4.46 3.41 3.59 4.40 3.46 
Profession          
% employees 30.9 17.7 41.2 31.4 38.6 33.7 31.6 33.4 32.1 
% self-employed 27.8 45.9 16 18.4 13.4 25.8 31.1 16.4 24.9 
% public 
servants 
14.6 9.8 16.3 4.9 24.2 14.9 4.5 20.3 13.3 
% laborers 1.1 0.5 2.8 8.1 1.7 1.8 7.8 4.6 3.3 
% professional 
politicians 8.2 9.4 6.7 8.7 5.4 6.6 1.4 1.5 6.8 
% not active 6.1 3.3 4.7 21.7 11.5 13.4 6.9 18.3 9.8 
Age          
% < 25 2.5 2.5 3.3 2.3 4.9 2.7 3.9 11.6 3.4 
% 26-35 24.9 21.4 26.6 15.3 21.3 19.9 16.4 26.2 21.3 
% 36-45 30.1 31.2 32.1 29 25.9 22.9 33.8 24.3 29.3 
% 46-55 28.2 29.5 26.5 28 33.6 30.3 25.9 21.7 28.7 
% 56-65 12.2 12.6 10.5 18.5 12.5 18.4 18.3 8.7 14.1 
% > 65 2.1 2.7 1 6.9 1.8 5.8 1.8 7.4 3.2 
Mean age 42.3 43.2 41.3 46.1 42.7 45.2 43.9 40.6 43.3 
s.d. age 10.7 10.7 10.2 12 10.8 12.1 10.6 13.1 11 
 
Only the relative percentage of non-active candidates on the list is significantly correlated to 
the list’s result (Pearson ρ = -0.19, p = 0.0124): the more non-active candidates on the list 
(compared to the party’s average), the lower the relative success. This is probably not a causal 
relationship, as the relative swing – the second dependent variable – is not significantly 
correlated with the percentage of non-actives. 
The mean age of all candidates on a list is 43.3 years. This number varies insignificantly over 
parties. The candidates of SLP are (with 40.6 years) the youngest, the lists for Vlaams 
Blok/Belang (46.1 years) and N-VA (45.2 years) the oldest. Together with the greens, SLP has 
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the highest percentage of young candidates (< 25 years) on their lists: respectively 11.6% and 
4.9%, compared to a general mean of 3.2%. The oldest age category is best represented on the 
Vlaams Blok/Belang (6.9%) and N-VA party lists (5.8%). The extent to which candidates are 
distributed over the various age categories can be examined by means of the average standard 
deviation. The age variation appears strongest for parties with a relatively large number of older 
candidates, such as SLP (13.09), Vlaams Blok/Belang (11.96) and N-VA (12.09). 
A list with more older candidates scores relatively higher: the correlation with age amounts to 
0.254 (p = 0.0006). The distribution of candidates in terms of age categories (measured by 
standard deviation), on the other hand, is negatively correlated to success (Pearson ρ = -0.171, 
p = 0.022). If we check for the relationship between the separate age categories and the electoral 
result, we see why: the more younger candidates on the list (compared to the party’s average), 
the worse the result. The correlation between result and the percentage of 25-34 year olds is -
0.285 (p = 0.0001). A list seems to score considerably higher if the group of candidates aged 
between 45 and 54 years old increases (0.216, p = 0.0037). The negative association between 
the number of young candidates (18-25 years old) on the list and the success remains intact (-
0.21, p = 0.0059) if we take the relative swing as dependent variable instead of the relative 
success. In addition, the negative relationship with age distribution is confirmed for the second 
dependent variable (-0.177, p = 0.0240). This indicates the presence of a causal relationship: 
too many young candidates decreases the odds of electoral success. 
 
6.5.  The geographical dispersion of candidates 
The literature on ticket-balancing often states that parties aim at the optimal geographical 
dispersion of candidates over the districts (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). Contrary to earlier 
research on the geographical background of candidates (Jacobs, 2006; Wauters et al., 2003; 
Pilet et al., 2007), we consider the degree of geographical dispersion or concentration of 
candidates as a characteristic of the party list. There are two distinct approaches to view this list 
variable. Firstly, one could define geographical dispersion as the extent to which all 
municipalities in the electoral district are covered on the party list. This approach was applied 
in earlier exploratory research on the geographical dispersion of candidates (Put et al., 2011). 
Secondly, the other approach is to examine whether the geographical composition of the list 
resembles the demographic reality. In this case, the dispersion is higher if the number of 
candidates for a given municipality corresponds with its relative population size in the district. 
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For example, the city of Antwerp, which represents 28% of the district population, would 
ideally receive 28% of the candidates on the party list. 
These two approaches represent two distinct ‘geopolitical’ strategies which parties might apply. 
Parties could aim to make the candidate list as representative as possible for the electorate by, 
for instance, giving more weight to candidates from the largest cities. But this will inevitably 
be at the expense of the smaller municipalities. As a result, this first approach can be called the 
population strategy. The alternative is to maximize the degree of territorial coverage on the 
party list. In this case, parties prefer to have candidates from as many municipalities possible 
instead of multiple candidates from the largest municipalities or cities. This is called the 
municipality strategy. In what follows, we first examine which approach has been followed by 
the Flemish parties during the period of investigation. 
The extent to which lists correspond to the municipality strategy can easily be calculated as the 
number of municipalities represented on the list (i.e. at least one candidate) as a proportion of 
the total number of municipalities on the list. This is the municipality index. How party lists 
correspond to the population strategy is more difficult to measure. We choose to work with a 
dissimilarity measure. For all municipalities in the district, we count the difference between the 
proportion of candidates a municipality should receive based on its demographic size, and the 
actual proportion of candidates on the list.57 This is called the population index. Both indexes 
are, of course, highly correlated to district magnitude and the number of municipalities in the 
district. The larger districts are, the more list positions will be available and the easier it gets to 
guarantee that either a maximal number of municipalities are represented on the list, or that 
municipalities are represented in correspondence to their demographic size. To control for this 
bias, we will not use the raw index scores in the bivariate and multivariate analysis, but the 
scores controlled for the number of list positions and the number of municipalities in the 
electoral district.58 For reasons of interpretation and comparability, we reverse the scores of the 
                                               
57
 As mostly the case with measures of dissimilarity, the differences are squared, so large differences 
get more weight. Population index P = √∑(Xpi-Xri)², where Xpi equals the number of list positions that 
municipality I should proportionally receive, Xri the actual number of list positions assigned to 
candidates from municipality i. 
58
 The values for this controlled index are the residuals of a regression model with the raw index as 
dependent variable, and the number of list positions and municipalities in the district as independent 
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population index. For both indexes, higher values correspond to higher levels of geographical 
dispersion.59 
 
Table 6.2.: The mean geographical dispersion based on the municipality-index, by party  
 
For every studied election, the Flemish Christian-democrats represent the highest number of 
municipalities on their lists, shortly followed by the Flemish liberals (Table 6.2). The general 
average (over all elections and lists) amounts to 0.06 for CD&V and 0.05 for VLD/Open VLD. 
N-VA comes in third place with an average of 0.04. On the other end of the spectrum we find 
SLP (-0.20 in 2009) and from 2007 onwards also LDD (-0.07). Put differently, the degree of 
territorial coverage is relatively low. We can compare these interparty differences more easily 
on the basis of raw numbers and percentages (Put et al., 2011). For the Flemish regional 
elections of 2004 and 2009, CD&V nominated candidates from 169 and 174 different 
                                               
variables. The available list space for geographical dispersion is slightly better expressed by the number 
of list positions than the number of seats.  
59
 In the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde district, the geographical dispersion is artificially low, because the 
Flemish parties have relatively little candidates from the Brussels region on their candidate lists. For the 
federal elections, we work with a fictive district Halle-Vilvoorde, for which we only take into account 
the candidates of Halle-Vilvoorde. If, for example, 28 of the 34 list positions in this district are assigned 
to candidates from a non-Brussels region municipality, then we consider this a list with 28 candidates 
and calculate the index on the basis of these candidates. This implies that the number of list positions 
may vary between the parties. 
 2003 2004 2007 2009 2010 Totaal 
CD&V 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.06 
VLD 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.05 
SP.A -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
VLB -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 
GROEN -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
N-VA 0.03 - - 0.05 0.04 0.04 
LDD - - -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 
SLP - - - -0.20 - -0.20 
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municipalities on the list, which corresponds to a percentage of 80.5% and 82.9% compared to 
the highest possible score given the number of list positions and municipalities.60 In the Lower 
House elections, the percentage for CD&V is also consistently higher than for the other parties 
(88.7% in 2003 and 86.6% in 2010). The lowest scores are to be found at LDD and SLP: the 
latter selected candidates from only 86 different municipalities on the party lists of 2009, which 
results in a score of 41%. LDD barely scores higher, but was able to gradually increase the 
proportion to 64.2%. 
The geographical dispersion of lists, expressed as the number of represented municipalities does 
not seem to covariate with the electoral result. None of the two dependent variables correlate 
significantly with this variable.  
 
Table 6.3.: The mean geographical dispersion based on the population-index, by party 
 
 
 
                                               
60
 After all, the total number of list positions for Flemish elections only amounts to 210, which is not 
enough to assign at least one position to all of the 308 Flemish municipalities. As a result, 210 is the 
baseline to calculate the number of represented municipalities on the lists. The same problem arose for 
the Lower House elections (only 159 list positions for 327 municipalities) (Put et al., 2011). 
 2003 2004 2007 2009 2010 Totaal 
CD&V 0.99 0.97 0.99 1.03 1.01 1.00 
VLD 1.05 1.13 1.05 1.11 1.07 1.08 
SP.A 1.03 1.09 1.03 1.10 1.03 1.06 
VLB 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.00 1.03 1.03 
GROEN 1.05 1.00 0.99 1.06 1.01 1.02 
N-VA 1.00 - - 0.97 0.94 0.97 
LDD - - 0.76 0.92 0.90 0.86 
SLP - - - 0.54 - 0.54 
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The results for the population index produces different results (Table 6.3). For this second 
approach, the Flemish Christian-democrats score relatively weak in terms of geographical 
dispersion, both in 2003 and 2004. From 2007 onwards, only LDD, N-VA and SLP score worse 
than CD&V. The party with the highest level of geographical dispersion is VLD/Open VLD, 
which receives the best score in every election. The aggregate mean for the Flemish liberals is 
a score of 1.08, compared with 1.00 for the Flemish Christian-democrats. The socialists come 
in second place with 1.06.  
The population index scores are slightly correlated to the success of party lists. The correlation 
coefficient amounts to 0.15 (p = 0.0434): the more balanced the geographical dispersion of 
candidates, the better the electoral result. However, this bivariate association loses significance 
if we switch to the relative swing. 
Why does CD&V score so high on the first index and remarkably low on the second one? The 
first index shows that the Flemish Christian-democrats recruits a relatively high number of 
candidates from the countryside and rural areas of the country. As a result, a lot of smaller 
municipalities have at least one candidate on their party lists, and the largest cities get 
underrepresented. Another analysis on the basis of the VRIND-classification of municipality 
types confirms the relative shortage of CD&V-candidates from metropolitan areas such as 
Ghent and Antwerp: these large cities receive only 55% of the candidates they could claim on 
the basis of their demographic size (Put et al., 2011). The disproportionality between the 
dispersion of the population and candidates is largest in the electoral district of Antwerp. Small 
municipality candidates are strongly overrepresented on the candidate lists, which implies that 
there are barely any list positions left for the city of Antwerp itself, which represents 28% of 
the entire population in the district. 
 
6.6. The political composition of party lists 
The average party list consists of 50.6% of candidates with some type of local office: 33.4% of 
list positions are filled up with local councilors or members of the local social council, 11.7% 
by aldermen and 6% by mayors. The total percentage is highest for CD&V (71.26%), but also 
for the other larger parties the number of local officeholders is more or less 60%, among which 
(for the three traditional parties) half holds an executive local office. CD&V and VLD/Open 
VLD stand out in terms of their high percentage of mayors (15.7% and 13.7% respectively). 
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Furthermore, the average candidate list consists of 14% incumbent MPs. For the four largest 
parties, this percentage fluctuates around 20%. 1.6% of list positions are occupied by incumbent 
members of government. For the Flemish liberals and socialists, the only parties that delivered 
members of government during the entire period of investigation, this number increases to 
respectively 3.8 and 3.3%. In absolute terms, party lists contains on average half a member of 
government, which increases to 1.2 for the liberals and 1 for the socialists. This particularly low 
number induces us to adopt a joint category of incumbent members of government and MPs in 
the multivariate analysis.  
 
 
Table 6.4.: Mean percentage of local councilors, aldermen, mayors, MPs and ministers on the 
party lists, by party 
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% local council 33 36,8 31,6 60,9 31,6 18,4 11,1 10,3 33,4 
% aldermen 22,5 17,1 21,7 0 5,9 10,1 1,2 2,4 11,7 
% mayors 15,7 13,7 6,7 0 0,3 2 0,5 0 6 
% MPs 18,9 19,2 18,1 19,3 6,2 7,6 4,7 0,9 14 
% ministers 2,4 3,8 3,3 0 0,6 0,2 0 0 1,6 
 
It is not surprising that lists with a larger political weight achieve the highest scores. The 
correlation between electoral success and the percentage of office-holders increases as the 
importance of the office increases: 0.168 (p= 0.0246) for local councilors, 0.222 (p= 0.0029) 
for aldermen, 0.276 (p= 0.0002) for mayors, up to 0.415 (p= 0.0001) for incumbent MPs and 
members of government.61 However, if we measure the success based on the relative swing, 
then only the correlation with the number of aldermen remains significant (0.18, p= 0.0189). 
                                               
61
 The relative number of members of government as a separate category has no significant effect. This 
might be related to its extremely low numbers per list. Even if we limit the analysis to the three 
traditional parties, or if we work with the absolute numbers instead of the relative ones, we do not find 
significant effects at the α = 0.10 level. 
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To a large extent, the political weight of party lists seem to be the result of previous successes 
instead of the other way around: a party list contain relatively high numbers of MPs and mayors 
because the party traditionally performs well in the electoral district. We only found evidence 
for the reversed causal effect with regard to aldermen. The fact that we did not find this effect 
for mayors is probably related to the extremely low number of mayors on the party lists. It is 
plausible that lists will only receive additional votes if it contains sufficient numbers of 
executive local officeholders. This line of reasoning is confirmed by the fact that the correlation 
increases to 0.217 (p= 0.0053) if we work with a merged category of mayors and aldermen. 
 
6.7. Multivariate analysis 
By means of an OLS regression analysis, we examine the effect of each of the earlier discussed 
list characteristics on the list’s result, measured both in terms of the relative success and relative 
swing. We add one additional independent variable to the analysis: a dummy variable 
measuring whether the list contains the campaign figurehead of the party.62 Self-evidently, lists 
with party figureheads will score significantly higher than other lists of the same party. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
62
 The figurehead is the politician which is being put forward by the party to lead the campaign and 
future government. If there was no obvious figurehead, the party president was assumed to take this 
position. There is only one figurehead per party per election. 
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Table 6.5.: OLS regression model with the relative success and relative swing of party lists as 
dependent variable 
 Relative result Relative swing 
 Parameter Partial r² Parameter Partial r² 
Intercept  1,068  1,122***  
     
Campaign figurehead on list  0,115* 0,040  0,094** 0,068 
     
Feminity of the list  0,011 0,000  0,011 0,001 
     
% - 25  -0,021 0,014 -0,021* 0,037 
% 26 - 35  -0,171* 0,034 -0,030 0,003 
% 36 - 45  -0,123 0,011 -0,016 0,000 
% 46 - 55  -0,032 0,001 -0,034 0,002 
% 56 - 65   -0,032 0,003 -0,047 0,017 
% + 65  -0,017 0,011  0,002 0,000 
     
% employees  0,010 0,002  0,016 0,002 
% self-employed   0,016 0,001  0,028 0,007 
% civil servants  0,006 0,000  0,026 0,017 
% laborers  0,001 0,000  0,003 0,001 
% professional politicians -0,014 0,004 -0,006 0,002 
% not active -0,014 0,003  0,001 0,000 
     
% local councilors  0,039 0,006  0,022 0,004 
% mayors or aldermen  0,089*** 0,103  0,048* 0,038 
% MPs or ministers  0,094** 0,058 -0,011 0,001 
     
Campaign spending level  0,072† 0,019 -0,031 0,009 
Geographical dispersion 
(population) 
 0,019 0,000 -0,092 0,010 
     
Adjusted R² 0,352 0,123 
N 179 163 
Notes: ***: P < 0.0001; **: P < 0.001; *: P < 0.05; : P < 0.10. 
 
The explanatory power of the first model, with the relative result as dependent variable (R² = 
0.352, see Table 6.5) is substantially higher than for the second model with relative swing as 
dependent variable (R² = 0.123). If we assume that the second model captures the causal 
connection between the strength of party lists and their results, we come to a rather sobering 
conclusion: the composition of a party list does not matter that much to its election result. 
A large group of variables does not make a difference at all, irrespective of the dependent 
variable we worked with in the multivariate analysis. The visibility of female candidates, the 
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composition of party lists in terms of candidates’ professions, the number of local councilors 
and the geographical dispersion of candidates are all irrelevant to the list result.63 Earlier, we 
found a bivariate association between the population index and the result, but this disappears 
as soon as we take into account the relative number of MPs or members of government in the 
model. The latter variable significantly correlates with the population index (0.312, p= 0.0001): 
the higher the number of incumbent MPs, the better the geographical dispersion of candidates 
(measured by the population index). This is caused by the higher number of elected candidates 
from cities than rural areas (Dandoy et al., 2007; Verleden et al., 2009; Vanlangenakker et al., 
2010). As a result, the more incumbents are on the list, the higher the demographic dominance 
of cities on that list. 
This association between the higher number of incumbents and the relative success of party 
lists does not seem causal, since the effect fades in the second model. The number of candidates 
with executive local office, on the contrary, does have a consistent effect on the success of party 
lists in both models. This indicates that higher presence of aldermen and mayors lead to better 
electoral results. 
Furthermore, the age profile of lists matters as well. While parties sometimes seem to prefer 
younger candidates, the multivariate results show that lists with a relatively large group of 
young candidates score significantly worse. As this age effect persists in the second model, we 
believe this is a causal effect.64 The model also controls for political office, so this effect cannot 
be explained by the lack of political officeholders among younger candidates. 
The effect of relative campaign expenses is significant at the α = 0.10 level. This effect strongly 
decreases if we add the number of incumbents to the model.65 Finally, the effect completely 
disappears if we take into account the number of candidates allowed to spend the higher 
                                               
63
 Both indexes do not significantly affect the dependent variable. In the reported model we used the 
population index, since it has a slightly higher, although limited, explanatory power than the 
municipality index. 
64
 The effects of age and the number of aldermen and mayors is consistent. Based on the analysis of the 
externally studentized residuals (Welkenhuysen-Gybels and Loosveldt, 2002, 334-345), three 
observations can be considered outliers (i.e. N-VA in Western Flanders 2009 and 2003, and LDD in 
Limburg 2010). Removing these observations from the analysis does not change the results.  
65
 If the relative number of ministers or MPs is removed from the first model, the parameter for the 
relative expenses is 0.102 (p = 0.0135, partial R² = 0.0376). 
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maximum amounts. The correlation between high expenses and electoral success of lists thus 
only means that party lists which have been previously successful have more candidates with 
higher maximum amounts than other lists. This also appears from the fact that the effect of 
expenses fades if we take the relative swing as dependent variable in the second model.66 
Obviously, party lists with campaign figureheads score substantially stronger. While in the first 
model, this variable only accounts for 10% of the explained variation, in the second model this 
increases to 55% of the total explained variation. A model with only this variable already results 
in an R² score of 0.081. Candidate lists aiming for a large electoral swing need to recruit the 
party’s lead figure in the election campaign. In addition, it might also help to recruit a lot of 
mayors and aldermen, and not too many young candidates. 
 
6.8. Conclusion 
Politicians and reports often intuitively speak about ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ candidate lists for 
parliamentary elections. Our analysis shows that, although there is some support for this 
common wisdom, the existence of ‘strong’ candidate lists should be put into perspective. 
Candidate lists with party figureheads, multiple incumbent MPs and members of government, 
or with many candidates with executive local offices score relatively higher than the general 
result of their party. Still, this is not necessarily a causal effect of the list composition on the 
list result. It might just be the opposite story where party lists that traditionally perform well in 
a district have significantly more incumbent MPs or members of government. We controlled 
for this by not only modeling the relative result, but also the relative swing of the list (i.e. the 
degree to which a candidate list realizes a larger swing in its district compared with the general 
electoral swing of the party). If we look at the model with electoral swing as dependent variable, 
the incumbency effect indeed disappears as predictor of electoral success. Only the effects of 
figureheads and executive local officeholders persists in the second model, which indicates the 
existence of a causal effect. Candidate lists which aim to outperform the other district lists of 
their party might want to recruit as many mayors and aldermen as possible. 
                                               
66
 As mentioned, the number of incumbent MPs on the list strongly correlates to the number of 
candidates allowed to spend the maximum amount, which is calculated on the basis of the seats won in 
the previous election.  
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The more surprising result of the analysis is probably the negative effect of young candidates 
on the list results. This age effect stays significant if we take the relative swing as dependent 
variable. So here we found evidence for a causal effect as well: a lot of young candidates lead 
to weak election results for party lists. This effect remains intact if we control for the political 
and professional background of these young candidates. A likely explanation is that younger 
candidates attract less votes since their social networks are generally smaller. 
Furthermore, the multivariate analyses led to some other contra-intuitive results. The level of 
campaign expenses, for instance, does not affect the electoral results of candidate lists. Lists 
with a relatively high vote share do outspend other candidate lists, but this is because these 
successful lists have more incumbent MPs and consequently more candidates that are allowed 
to spend higher maximum amounts. There is no significant effect of list campaign expenses on 
the relative swing. The prominence of women on candidate lists does not matter either for the 
outcome, but the lack of effects in this regard is probably explained by the gender quota laws, 
which severely decreases variation in women’s list positions. Finally, the professional 
background of candidate lists lacks explanatory power as well. Therefore, it is a wasted effort 
to recruit, for example, as many self-employed candidates as possible on the party list. 
The literature on ticket-balancing traditionally assumes that lists will perform better as 
candidates are selected in a balanced manner. The operationalization of the concept of 
‘geographical dispersion’ appears more complex than expected. After all, parties might follow 
alternative ‘strategies’ in this regard: they could aim for the representation of as many different 
municipalities as possible on the lists, or they might focus on the correct representation of the 
largest municipalities according to their population size. The data show that the Flemish 
Christian-democrats clearly prefer the first strategy: the party lists of CD&V contain candidates 
from an exceptionally high number of municipalities, which results in a low score on the second 
index. The Flemish socialists, on the other hand, follow the second strategy: the geographical 
dispersion of candidates reflects the demographic proportions within districts, but the number 
of municipalities with at least one candidate is rather limited. The liberals are the only party 
which combines satisfactory scores on both indexes. 
However interesting these univariate results might be, they do not explain the electoral success 
of candidate lists: lists with higher levels of geographical dispersion (in both 
operationalizations) do not perform better. Earlier research showed that parties do invest quite 
some effort in realizing geographical representation on party lists (Put et al., 2011). It is, 
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however, probably more likely that geographical balance on candidate lists serves the purpose 
of avoiding internal conflicts about candidate selection processes. In this sense, geographical 
dispersion indirectly leads to an electoral bonus: by recruiting candidates from as many 
municipalities and cities as possible, the odds of intraparty turmoil during the run-up to the 
elections decreases. 
This analysis on the party list level provides some novel insights to the literature on the electoral 
success of individual candidates. Based on research at the individual level, it is nearly 
impossible to examine whether candidates actually attract additional votes for their list, or just 
draw from a fixed pool of votes for the party list. The question is, in other words, whether the 
effects of individual candidate characteristics on the number of preferential votes is translated 
to an aggregate effect of list characteristics on the list result. In earlier research, the political 
office has proven to be a strong predictor of the number of preferential votes for individual 
candidates (see, for instance: Maddens et al., 2006). But the empirical results in this article only 
support the effect of executive local office on the list level. This indicates that local politicians 
with high visibility are able to attract new voters and consequently improve the aggregate result 
of the list. 
With regard to campaign expenses, on the contrary, we find that spending affects individual 
candidate results but not the list results. This suggests that candidates who invest heavily in 
their personal campaigns attract voters that were already voting for their candidate list. 
Apparently, campaign expenses only influence the intraparty allocation of preferential votes. 
Finally, the most intriguing result is the impact of age. Strangely enough, while previous 
research did not find support for individual effects of age, we found an effect of age at the 
aggregate list level. In this article, one of the consistent results was the negative result for 
‘young’ party lists. Candidate lists which are ‘too young’ seem to scare away voters. Further 
research on this topic should focus on this complex relationship between electoral effects on 
the individual candidate- and list level. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE EFFECTS OF PREVIOUS LOCAL 
ELECTION RESULTS ON THE PRESENCE OF LOCAL 
CANDIDATES ON PARTY LISTS67 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
How do parties respond to local electoral volatility in parliamentary elections? While election 
campaigns and results are becoming more and more nationalized (Caramani, 2004), political 
parties still need to deal with subnational variations in electoral support. A possible response to 
these variations is to change the within-district distribution of their candidates over subsequent 
elections. Parties that suffer electoral losses in certain local areas might be inclined to raise the 
number of locally rooted candidates from those areas on the candidate list for the next elections. 
The increased local presence of candidates could then lead to electoral recovery.  
This argument is based on the strong theoretical claim that candidates with local roots (e.g. 
place of residence, birthplace, holding local office) are electorally more successful in their own 
local areas compared with non-locally rooted competitors (Parker, 1983; Marsh, 1987; Blais et 
al., 2003; Shugart et al., 2005). If this is true, then political parties should be able to strategically 
manipulate their candidate lists in response to local electoral setbacks. But do parties indeed 
change the geographical distribution of candidates on their lists in order to increase electoral 
support in specific areas?  
This paper analyzes the effect of local electoral volatility on the geographical composition of 
party lists. We expect that changes in local party results will affect the share of local candidates 
in subsequent elections. In other words, parties adapt the within-district distribution of 
candidates on the basis of previous election results.  
                                               
67
 This chapter has been submitted for publication as: Put, G., Maddens, B. and Verleden, F. (2015). The 
within-district distribution of party candidates: A geographical analysis of party lists for Belgian Lower 
House elections. Acta Politica, under review. 
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The within-district distribution of candidates is the outcome of intraparty candidate selection 
processes. Previous research has shown that these processes can vary both over time and parties, 
in terms of voting procedures, candidacy, centralization and inclusiveness of the selectorate 
(Bille, 2001; Lundell, 2004; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). Arguably, the parties’ ability to 
manipulate or change their candidate lists from one election to another strongly depends on the 
nature of their candidate selection processes. Therefore we will analyze which candidate 
selection methods provide parties with the greatest flexibility to manipulate the geographical 
composition of their candidate lists. Data on the composition of candidate lists and election 
results of eight Belgian political parties for seven consecutive Lower House elections (1987-
2010) are used to answer the research question addressed in this paper. 
 
7.2. Party candidates and the electoral value of their local roots 
Both the field of political science and electoral geography have extensively dealt with the 
effects of local candidate roots in elections. A strong consensus exists that localism plays an 
important role in electoral politics, and that the local roots of party candidates should be 
considered important determinants of voting behaviour and candidate selection outcomes. In 
their seminal work on candidate selection, Gallagher and Marsh (1988) stated that local roots 
are invariably sought by party selectorates. However, the two fields have developed different 
approaches and operationalizations of the local roots concept, and identified different 
mechanisms to explain its importance in political recruitment and elections.  
The political science literature, on the one hand, has strongly focused on local roots as 
informational shortcut for voters to simplify their voting decisions (Shugart et al., 2005). More 
specifically, candidates with local roots in the district make a more convincing claim that they 
are well aware of local constituency needs. Voters use this information in their voting decisions, 
resulting in significantly more personal votes for these locally rooted candidates (Tavits, 2009; 
Tavits, 2010; Put and Maddens, 2014). In this line of research, local roots are usually 
operationalized in terms of political experience at the local level (Tavits, 2010), or being born 
in the electoral district (Smith et al., 2012).  
In the political geography literature, on the other hand, there is a much stronger emphasis on 
local roots operationalized as the place of residence of candidates. Many scholars have 
investigated the impact of local contexts on electoral behaviour, among which Key (1949) and 
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Cox (1969), who described the existence of the friends and neighbours effect. This effect 
explains why voters tend to support candidates living in, or close to their respective areas and 
has been replicated several times (see for example: Arzheimer & Evans, 2012; Gorecki and 
Marsh, 2014). Putnam (1966) argues that locally dominant parties or candidates have strong 
organizations and will be able to outdo the competition in terms of campaign resources. 
Additionally, the ‘neighbourhood effect’ stresses the importance of social distance between 
voters and candidates in electoral behaviour. Voters tend to have more knowledge of their local 
candidates because their communication networks are highly localized and they are more likely 
to be exposed to information about a nearby candidate. This is often summarized by the 
observation that ‘people who talked together voted together’ (Miller, 1978; Pattie and Johnston, 
1999). The implication is that place of residence is a strong predictor of both voting behaviour 
by the electorate and electoral success for the party candidate, through the mechanisms of social 
interaction and personal contact (Gorecki and Marsh, 2014, 565-566). 
These theories have far-reaching consequences for political parties in both majoritarian and 
proportional electoral systems: parties should consider candidates with local roots as extremely 
valuable electoral assets (Bochel and Denver, 1983; Gallagher and Marsh, 1988; Childs and 
Cowley, 2011). This implies that parties will prefer to recruit candidates with some level of 
experience in local politics, for instance through holding a local political office. The more local 
officeholders on the party list, the better the list will perform. 
Concerning the place of residence of party candidates, the story gets more complicated. To 
enjoy the benefits of locally rooted candidates all over the electoral district, parties need to 
geographically balance their lists with candidates from different areas of the district. As a result, 
a geographically diverse set of candidates is needed, but the nature of this exercise strongly 
depends on the electoral system. In majoritarian systems, where district magnitude usually 
equals one, parties will nominate the candidate with the broadest electoral appeal (Tremblay, 
2012). In other words, parties nominate one candidate from one particular area in the district. 
In proportional electoral systems with higher district magnitude, parties nominate groups of 
candidates on candidate lists. This allows them to balance candidate characteristics in terms of 
gender, ethnicity, age, profession, but also their place of residence (Valdini, 2012). 
The existence of friends and neighbours and neighbourhood effects stimulates parties in 
proportional systems to nominate candidates from various areas within the electoral district. If 
parties only select candidates from the largest city of the district, they risk losing potential votes 
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in other areas of the district due to a lack of candidates that are locally rooted in those areas. 
From this point of view, candidate positions on the party list could be considered as scarce 
resources which should be carefully distributed within districts (Latner and McGann, 2005). In 
the next section, we elaborate on what strategies parties might develop in terms of the within-
district distribution of their candidates. 
 
7.3. Within-district distribution of party candidates and local volatility 
By distributing their candidates over the electoral district, parties enjoy the electoral benefits of 
local candidates all over the district. But, as already mentioned in the introduction, local 
variations in voter support might urge parties to reconsider the within-district distribution of 
candidates prior to subsequent elections. But how exactly will parties change the geographical 
distribution of candidates in response to within-district electoral volatility? We define two types 
of party behavior in this respect. The first type is called the expansion strategy, which defines 
parties that increase the presence of local candidates in areas where they lost votes in previous 
elections.  
In this first strategy, parties respond to a local electoral setback in election t-1 by increasing the 
number of candidates with place of residence in that area for election t. The higher the electoral 
setback in the previous election, the larger the increase in candidate share on the list in the 
subsequent election. Parties following the expansion strategy will increase candidate shares in 
losing areas at the expense of winning areas. In sum, this type of party aims to increase their 
vote share by investing more local candidates in areas where they previously lost votes. Hence, 
for parties following this strategy, the changes in local party shares from election t-2 to election 
t-1 are negatively correlated with the changes in local candidate shares from election t-1 to 
election t, in the sense that districts were the party vote has decreased, the number of candidates 
will consequently increase. 
Arguably, this strategy requires a certain amount of coordination by the party elite or selectorate 
drafting the candidate lists. Candidate selection processes are highly complex puzzles where 
parties balance candidate characteristics, factional interests and strategic considerations. In 
order to increase candidate shares in response to losing votes in specific areas, the party elite 
needs to exert some level of control over candidate selection outcomes.  
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A second type of strategic behaviour is the consolidation strategy. Party selectorates following 
this strategy aim to defend areas where they increased their vote share over the last two 
elections. These parties increase the presence of candidates in areas with a positive election 
result: an increase in party vote share over the last two elections leads to an increase in candidate 
share in those areas. In other words, the consolidation strategy implies that parties will increase 
candidate shares in winning areas at the expense of losing areas. These parties will essentially 
give up on areas where their electoral losses have been too large, and focus on the positive 
electoral swings during the previous elections. Hence, for parties following the consolidation 
strategy, the changes in local party shares from election t-2 to election t-1 are positively 
correlated with the changes in local candidate shares from election t-1 to election t.  
Arguably, the consolidation strategy is a very natural strategy for political parties. It implies 
that parties mainly recruit candidates from areas where they have been electorally successful. 
This is a logical course of action: parties will always tend to select more candidates in electoral 
strongholds, since local party branches and political networks of parties have been more 
developed in those areas then elsewhere. In other words, the causality between local candidate 
presence and party vote shares might also work the other way around: not only could candidates 
with local roots increase vote shares in their area, but high vote shares will also increase the 
recruitment of local candidates in those areas. In this sense, the consolidation strategy marks a 
self-reinforcing effect which parties will experience if they do not actively decide to shift to the 
expansion strategy.  
 
7.4. The effect of candidate selection processes 
In sum, parties can develop two types of party behavior in candidate selection. The parties’ 
ability to shift between these behaviors, however, depends on the nature of their candidate 
selection process. If the (national) party elite strongly controls the selection of candidates, 
parties will be more inclined to apply the expansion strategy. If, on the other hand, the selection 
process involves several other intraparty stakeholders, it will be more difficult to shift towards 
the expansion strategy, and the party will more likely apply the consolidation strategy. 
The selection of candidates for parliamentary elections is one of the core functions of political 
parties (Sartori, 1976). Therefore, it is not surprising that this topic has received considerable 
research attention. The analytical framework of Hazan and Rahat (2010) provides a useful set 
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of variables for the comparative analysis of candidate selection processes. Their model 
disentangles four dimensions, among which inclusiveness of the selectorate and 
decentralization are the most important. The selectorate, on the one hand, is the body that selects 
the candidates, and can be composed of only one person, or several people, up to the entire 
electorate of the nation. This dimension can be measured on a continuum from exclusive 
selectorates, where a very limited group of selectors take control, to inclusive selectorates, such 
as the party members or the electorate. Decentralization, on the other hand, measures the extent 
to which local party branches nominate party candidates. In highly centralized methods, the 
national party level has complete control over the nomination process. 
One strand of literature on candidate selection discusses the ideal selection method (Rahat, 
2009). From a normative democratic viewpoint, highly inclusive selectorates are preferable 
(Shapira et al., 2010): parties open up their internal procedures for participation by party 
members or even voters. Other scholars have argued that high inclusiveness in candidate 
selection has detrimental consequences for party management: candidates and MPs depend on 
party members and not party elites for re-nomination on candidate lists. First, this might lead 
to decreased party cohesion, which threatens government stability and functioning of 
democracy in general (Hazan and Rahat, 2006a). Second, since inclusive candidate selection 
form a complex coordination game, the resulting candidate lists are often not very 
representatively composed. For instance, Rahat et al. (2008) find that selection methods with 
membership ballots are less likely to produce candidate lists with women on safe positions.  
Highly exclusive methods, however, do lead to more representative sets of candidates. Selectors 
in exclusive party committees are more inclined to base their decisions on evaluations of the 
collective party good. In other words, these party committees are asked to construct a list of 
candidates that they think has the best chance of maximizing the electoral result, and keeping 
the intraparty turmoil to a minimum.  
The argument is largely similar from the perspective of within-district distribution of 
candidates: in the case of exclusive candidate selection methods, the party elite has more 
flexibility to control candidate selection outcomes, and thus the geographical composition of 
candidate lists. This is not the case with inclusive candidate selection methods, where the 
number of stakeholders in the candidate selection process is too large to develop a clear 
response to local electoral volatility. In line with this argument, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
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H1. Parties with exclusive candidate selection methods are more likely to follow the 
expansion strategy than parties with inclusive candidate selection methods. 
The effect of the centralization dimension of candidate selection is not that straightforward. 
Arguably, to develop a clear strategy with regard to within-district candidate distribution, the 
party should at least have a bird’s eye perspective over the electoral district: any involvement 
of the sub-district level party branches would complicate this exercise. More specifically, if 
local (municipal) party branches are involved in candidate selection, these branches will not be 
inclined to lower their share of candidates to the advantage of other local branches, regardless 
of the electoral result in previous elections.  
So any level of decentralization involving sub-district party branches would be problematic for 
party elites inclined to follow the expansion strategy. If candidate selections are taking place at 
the district level, the party at least has an overview of the entire electoral district and is able to 
respond properly to local electoral volatility. But arguably, centralized candidate selection 
methods are even more preferable: centralized parties can develop a clear strategy both within 
and between districts in response to local electoral volatility. National party elites would be able 
to impose the expansion strategy within all electoral districts. If, on the contrary, every district 
party decides autonomously, strategies will strongly diverge which endangers party cohesion.  
Hence the second hypothesis of this paper: 
H2. Parties with centralized candidate selection methods are more likely to follow the 
expansion strategy than parties with decentralized candidate selection methods. 
 
7.5. Case selection, data and methods 
Being a multilevel democracy with separate regional party systems, Belgium is a country case 
with complex territorial dynamics. Moreover, its proportional representation electoral system 
for parliamentary elections works with large multimember districts, in which a lot of seats are 
at stake. Contrary to single-member districts, electoral competition in multimember districts is 
fought between multiple parties with often long lists of candidates. Multimember districts thus 
allow parties to distribute their candidates over the various parts of the electoral district. These 
candidates are crucial assets for parties because they collect votes in their local areas on the 
basis of familiarity and networks. 
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The Belgian electoral system is a flexible-list system: voters can support the party list as a whole 
or cast preferential vote(s) for candidates on party lists (Shugart, 2005). While the allocation of 
seats is determined by both list order and preferential votes, the threshold of preferential votes 
to overcome list order is infrequently reached. These flexible-list systems therefore more 
strongly resemble closed- than open-list systems (De Winter, 2005). The importance of rank 
order implies that not every candidate has the same perspective on winning a seat. The highly 
ranked candidates have considerably more chances of getting elected to parliament than 
candidates placed in the lower positions on the party list. This is not only caused by the 
mechanical effects of the electoral system, but also because of the higher campaign visibility 
of highly ranked candidates and the voters’ propensity to vote for them (Miller and Krosnick, 
1998).  
While examining the within-district distribution of candidates on Belgian party lists, one should 
take into account these differences between types of candidates. In this article, candidates 
assigned to realistic list positions are double-weighted and candidates in unrealistic positions 
only counted one time. The used dichotomy realistic-unrealistic list positions is similar to 
previous work (see other chapters in this dissertation). In practice, Belgian party selectorates 
often distinguish between realistic and non-realistic list positions with previous election results 
as benchmarks. For example, if a party won two seats in a district during the previous election, 
the upper three positions could be considered realistic: the first two positions led to a seat in the 
previous election, and the candidate on the third position stands a realistic chance of getting 
elected depending on her number of preferential votes and/or a positive result by the party list.68 
We register the number of seats parties won in the district in the previous election, and consider 
that number of positions plus one at the top of the list as realistic.69 
                                               
68
 In addition, the Belgian case has known many examples of the candidate at the bottom of the list 
managing to get elected instead of a higher ranked candidate (Wauters, Weekers, and Pilet, 2004). This 
is so because parties often choose experienced politicians for this position. For these reasons, the ‘list 
pusher’ will also be considered a realistic position in the analysis. 
69
 Finally, a particularity of the Belgian system is that voters are presented with both lists of effective 
and substitute candidates. Substitutes for elected MPs are ranked on the basis of their preference votes, 
after distribution of list votes. MPs that quit during the legislative term are then replaced by the first 
substitute. Therefore, the first substitute candidate is also included in the category of realistic list 
positions, since this is a list slot with a realistic possibility of getting a seat in the event of resignation, 
death or a ministerial office for one of the other elected MPs on the list. 
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The next crucial decision is the selection of a geographical level as unit of analysis. Up until 
this point, we have talked about within-district candidate distribution and its relationship with 
parties’ vote shares in local areas. But what is an appropriate operationalization of these ‘local 
areas’ in the Belgian case? As already mentioned, Belgium has a very complex 
territorialization, and this is also noticeable at the subdistrict level, where there are 
municipalities, kantons and arrondissements.  
First, the lowest geographical level are of course the municipalities, in which parties also have 
their lowest organizational units (i.e. local party branches). While municipalities are a 
meaningful geographical level to analyze electoral trends, the fundamental problem is that there 
is no data available at the municipality level for Belgian parliamentary elections.70 
Second, electoral kantons are the lowest level for which there are data available on Belgian 
parliamentary elections. However, kantons are merely administrative units in which groups of 
municipalities coordinate and organize parliamentary elections. This level has no political or 
electoral meaning, and kantons are very unequal in size (in terms of population). Moreover, 
data aggregation at the kanton level has shown that there is an insufficient number of candidates 
at this level for meaningful analysis. 
Finally, the third sub-district geographical unit are the arrondissements. These have long been 
the electoral districts for parliamentary elections in Belgium. Before the electoral district reform 
of 2002, all districts were arrondissements or mergers of arrondissements. Since 2002, Lower 
House elections are organized in electoral districts that coincide with the Belgian provinces. 
However, the arrondissement level still has its political relevance since various Belgian parties 
still organize themselves to some extent at the arrondissement level (Wauters et al., 2003). As 
a result, these arrondissements take on the role of ‘local areas’ in this article, and form the unit 
of analysis. It is important to stress that we do not take into account local areas that form an 
electoral district on their own. If an arrondissement forms a separate electoral district, parties 
are not able to distribute candidates over various local areas within the district, since there is 
only one local area.71 
                                               
70
 From the 2014 parliamentary elections onwards, voting data will be available at the municipality level. 
71
 An arrondissement which forms an electoral district by itself is not included in the analysis. Since we 
go back to t-1 and even t-2 for the calculation of ∆CS and ∆PS, we can only take into account 
arrondissements that did not form electoral districts on their own in those previous elections. The 
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We gathered data on party candidates from eight Belgian political parties, four in each language 
group. These parties were permanently represented in parliament during the seven consecutive 
elections we have data for (1987-2010).This gives us a total of 519 observations or local areas 
(i.e. arrondissements) which will be analyzed in the empirical part of this paper.72  The two 
most important variables are the place of residence of Belgian election candidates and the party 
vote shares in the local area. We calculated the number of candidates per municipality for every 
election and party and aggregated these data to the local area level. For every party list, we 
calculated the percentage of candidates from a local area in the district. This gives us the 
candidate share for every local area. To measure the change in candidate share (∆ CS), the 
dependent variable in this paper, we calculate the following: 
∆ = 	
 −	

 
This is the relative change in candidate share between election t-1 and election t for every local 
area. Furthermore, the change in party share (∆ PS) is calculated according to the following 
formula: 
∆  = 	
  −  !
 !
 
The two hypotheses should be tested by means of a multivariate analysis where intra-party 
candidate selection methods and other control variables are taken into account. To test for the 
                                               
arrondissement of Antwerp, for example, has stayed a separate electoral district as late as the 
parliamentary elections of 1999. From 2003 onwards, the arrondissement of Antwerp became part of a 
larger (provincial) electoral district. So since then, the arrondissement of Antwerp became an interesting 
area for our analysis of within-district distribution of candidates. However, it was only in 2007 we could 
calculate ∆CS, since we need the relative number of candidates of the Antwerp arrondissement for t-1 
(=2003 elections) and t (=2007 elections). 
72
 Data on the candidate lists were collected in the archives of the Belgian Lower House. Some of the 
electoral districts were missing in the archives, which reduced the number of observations. Missing data: 
Bruges arrondissement, 1991; Liège province, 2003; Walloon Brabant province, 2003; Hainaut 
province, 2007. Furthermore, some parties did not provide correct information on the party lists for the 
district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. They registered every candidate on the list as living in the city of 
Brussels. Therefore, it was not possible to expand the analysis with these observations on the Brussels 
district. 
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effect of candidate selection methods, we enter the level of decentralization and inclusiveness 
of the selectorate as independent variables to the analysis. Data on Belgian parties’ selection 
methods were collected on the basis of party regulations, news articles and existing literature 
on these parties.73 
 
Figure 7.1.: Scale of inclusiveness of the selectorate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The two candidate selection variables, selectorate and decentralization, are measured on ordinal 
three-point scales.74 First, the selectorate dimension has three categories: 1) exclusive selection, 
where non-selected nomination committees dominate the selection process, without any form 
of member influence; 2) The middle category defines selection procedures where party 
delegates form the selectorate; 3) the most inclusive category are the selection procedures with 
member influence, for instance primaries and member polls. 
 
 
 
                                                
73
 Gopress, an online databank of Belgian newspaper articles was used to gather information on 
candidate selection methods in press articles. We searched for articles with keywords (e.g. candidate 
selection, nomination of candidates, list formation, party list) in combination with the party name during 
the four months preceding the election.  
74
 The categories in these scales are based on the integrated scale of candidate selection methods 
developed by Shomer (2009). 
1 2 3 
1: The selection process is dominated by one or more non-selected 
nomination committees 
2: Member delegates participate in the selection process 
3: Members participate in the selection process 
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The second dimension is decentralization, which is also divided in three categories: 1) the 
highest level of centralization is reached if the national party level has a strong grip on the 
selection process, for example by practicing veto power or through modification of candidate 
lists in the final phase of the process; 2) the second category are candidate lists which are the 
outcomes of interaction between the national and district level; and 3) the most decentralized 
methods are those where the district party level (or lower) autonomously drafts the lists without 
interventions by the national party level. The multivariate analysis in the next section also takes 
into account the district magnitude, measured as the number of seats to be distributed in the 
electoral district. District magnitude is strongly related to the number of candidates on the lists 
and thus the level of flexibility that party selectorates have in changing candidate shares within 
districts. Moreover, we also add dummies for election years to control for changes in electoral 
laws during this period (e.g. gender quota laws, district reform, higher impact of preference 
votes). 
 
7.6. Analysis 
How do intraparty candidate selection processes affect the within-district distribution of 
candidates? In the theoretical section, the argument was made that exclusive and centralized 
candidate selection processes allow more flexibility to apply an expansion strategy. Inclusive 
and decentralized processes, on the other hand, will push parties toward the consolidation 
strategy where local candidate shares are positively related to local vote shares. But what is the 
variation in candidate selection processes in the data sample, which deals with the Lower House 
elections between 1987 and 2010?  
1 2 3 
1: The national party level dominates the final phase of the selection 
process and/or has veto power 
2: The selection process is an interaction/cooperation between the 
national and district level 
3: The selection process takes place at the district level, national level 
is not involved 
Figure 7.2.: Scale of decentralization 
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Figure 7.3 shows the distribution of 519 observations over the different categories of the 
centralization and selectorate dimension. With regard to centralization, only in a minority of 
cases the national level completely controls the selection process. In 70% of the observations 
in our dataset, the party district level at least has some influence on the composition of the 
candidate list. Put differently, the majority of local areas in our dataset were part of an electoral 
district where candidate selection was highly decentralized. However, differences between the 
categories are negligibly small as in 34% of the cases, candidate lists were drafted through 
cooperation between the district and national party level. Finally, 30% of local areas were part 
of an electoral district where the national party level completely controlled the outcome of the 
process. 
The second candidate selection dimension, inclusiveness of the selectorate, tells a different 
story. In this dimension, observations are not as equally distributed over the three categories: 
no less than 61% of the observations involved members in the candidate selection process. Party 
scholars indeed found that the practice of primaries and member polls became popular again 
during the 1990s in Belgian politics (Deschouwer, 1993; Fiers and Pilet, 2006; Verleden, 2013). 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the majority of Belgian parties applied more exclusive procedures 
(De Winter, 1988). The system with delegates (28%) and especially the nomination committees 
(11%) have been more and more out of use: while selection by delegates have been applied by 
both the Flemish and francophone socialist parties, nomination committees were almost 
exclusively used by the francophone liberal party. 
 
Figure 7.3.: Relative frequency of every category of selectorate (left) and decentralization 
(right) 
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How do these candidate selection dimensions affect the within-district distribution of 
candidates, measured by ∆ ? The most suitable modeling strategy to examine this 
relationship is to estimate a multinomial logit model. For two reasons, ordinary least squares 
regression would be the incorrect choice to model the variation in the dependent variable, 
change in local candidate share (∆. First, normality tests have shown that the dependent 
variable is not normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk W = 0.89, P < 0.001), which implies that one 
of the basic assumptions of linear regression is violated. Second, ∆ has both negative (i.e. 
decrease in local candidate shares) and positive (i.e. increase in candidate shares) values, which 
problematizes interpretation of regression coefficients estimated by any model where ∆	is 
treated as a continuous dependent variable. As a consequence, ∆ has been transformed into 
a categorical dependent variable with three response categories75: 
(1) Positive values, implying that local candidate shares increased (n=116) 
(2) Negative values, implying that local candidate shares decreased (n=255) 
(3) Insignificant changes in local candidate shares76 (n=148) 
This categorization allows us to examine how candidate selection processes are related to 
increases or decreases in local candidate presence. Table 7.1 presents the cross-tabulation of 
candidate selection dimensions and changes in local candidate shares.  
With regard to the inclusiveness of the selectorate, the table shows that candidate shares in local 
areas are less often changed when candidate selection is controlled by an exclusive nomination 
committee: 18.12% of the cases where we observed a status quo in candidate shares falls under 
the exclusive end of the selectorate dimension. There is, on the other hand, a clear 
underrepresentation of ‘status quo in local candidate share’ within the category of candidate 
selection with members. The most inclusive category accounts for 60.58% of all observations, 
but only 52.35% of local areas with ‘status quo’ belongs to this category. In other words, 
inclusive selectorates are more inclined to change the within-district candidate distribution than 
                                               
75
 We do a comparable transformation with ∆  for the multivariate analysis, which results in a 
categorical independent variable with three response categories: status quo (less than 5% changes in 
local result); positive swing (> 5%); negative swing (<5%). 
76
 More specifically, all values between -0.05 and 0.05 are included in this third category, which means 
that changes in candidate shares of less than 5% are considered too insignificant to be perceived as 
increase or decrease of candidates. 
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exclusive selectorates. Inclusiveness of the selectorate is also significantly associated with 
changes in local candidate shares (χ² = 13.19 ; P<0.01). 
 
Table 7.1.: Candidate selection dimensions and changes in local party shares 
 
Decreased 
candidate share 
Status quo in 
candidate share 
Increased 
candidate 
share 
All local 
areas 
Inclusiveness of the selectorate     
 Nomination committee 9.80 18.12 6.03 11.35 
 Delegates 25.49 29.53 31.90 28.08 
 Members 64.71 52.35 62.07 60.58 
Centralization     
 National level 33.33 41.61 35.34 36.15 
 Mix 30.98 36.24 38.79 34.23 
 District level 35.69 22.15 25.86 29.62 
N 255 148 116 519 
 
 
With regard to the second dimension, the level of centralization in candidate selection, we find 
that national selection processes more often lead to unchanged candidate shares. In the case of 
district level candidate selections, the number of local candidates decreases more often 
(35.69%). The centralization dimension is also significantly associated with changes in local 
candidate shares (χ² = 10.01 ; P<0.05). In sum, both candidate selection dimensions seem to be 
correlated to party selectorate decisions regarding the within-district distribution of party 
candidates. But do these bivariate associations hold up in a multivariate analysis with changes 
in local candidate shares as dependent variable? 
Table 7.2 presents the results of a multinomial logit model with ‘status quo in candidate shares’ 
as the reference category. The first column presents the estimated coefficients for parties 
decreasing their candidate shares, the second column deals with parties increasing candidate 
shares. The results show that changes in local party shares do not affect changes in candidate 
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shares: both positive and negative electoral swings do not significantly influence the number of 
candidates in local areas.  
With regard to the two candidate selection variables, selectorate and decentralization, we find  
that both dimensions indeed significantly affect changes in party shares. Where party members 
are involved in the candidate selection procedures, there seem to be more changes to the 
geographical composition of party lists than in procedures with delegates or nomination 
committees. Instead of maintaining the status quo, highly inclusive parties significantly 
decrease their candidate shares, regardless of the change in party share over the last two 
elections. A possible explanation is that candidate selection processes with member 
involvement produce higher uncertainty: if members are able to modify the candidate lists 
drafted by the party elite, the outcome of the process will be less predictable. Moreover, parties 
with centralized selection methods are less often inclined to decrease party shares in local areas. 
The results for district magnitude confirm the expectation that large electoral districts provide 
parties with more flexibility: the larger the districts, the smaller the chance that local candidate 
shares are decreased and the higher the chance that candidate shares are increased.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
165 
 
Table 7.2.: Multinomial logit model with changes in candidate share as dependent variable 
 Decrease Candidate 
Share 
Increase Candidate Share 
β (SE) β (SE) 
Intercept -0.99  (0.88) 0.91  (0.67) 
Main effects       
District Magnitude -0.06  (0.02) 0.05  (0.02) 
Relative Swing (ref.: status 
quo)       
Positive swing -1.24  (0.79) -0.89  (0.77) 
Negative swing -0.85  (0.81) 0.15  (0.79) 
Selectorate (ref.: delegates)       
Nomination committee -0.83  (0.67) 0.45  (0.62) 
Members 1.73  (0.92) 0.79  (0.83) 
Decentralization (ref.: mix)       
National level -1.23  (0.68) -0.11  (0.62) 
District level 0.36  (0.70) -0.22  (0.55) 
Interaction effects       
Positive Swing*Nom. 
Comm. 1.53  (0.95) 0.39  (0.91) 
Negative swing*Nom. 
Comm. 0.99  (0.88) -0.82  (0.82) 
Positive swing*Members -0.76  (1.16) -0.71  (1.20) 
Negative swing*Members 0.14  (0.84) 0.14  (0.84) 
Positive swing*National 
level 1.95  (0.95) 0.77  (0.90) 
Negative swing*National 
level 0.83  (0.87) 0.13  (0.80) 
Positive swing*District level -0.39  (0.96) 0.43  (0.83) 
Negative swing*District 
level -0.18  (0.91) 0.36  (0.75) 
Dummies       
Years Yes   Yes   
Notes: Log-odds and standard errors (between brackets) are shown. Reference category of the dependent 
variable is ‘Status Quo in Candidate Share’. Bold coefficients are significant at the P < 0.10 level.  
 
In order to test the abovementioned hypotheses, we need to have a look at the interactions 
between the relative electoral swing and candidate selection dimensions. In this regard, the 
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model does not produce a lot of substantial results. There is one significant coefficient: the 
interaction between positive electoral swings and the national level. This implies that parties 
with centralized candidate selection methods are more inclined to lower the number of 
candidates in a local area where their party share has increased over the last two elections. This 
provides some support for the expansion strategy, as this approach consists of both lowering 
the number of candidates in winning areas and raising the number of candidates in losing areas. 
The model does not, however, support the latter expectation. 
This result suggest that the applied strategies in response to local electoral volatility is 
dependent on the nature of intra-party candidate selection methods, namely the level of 
centralization. Highly centralized parties more often apply expansion strategies, where the local 
candidate share of arrondissements decreases in response to increased vote shares. Concerning 
the inclusiveness of the selectorate, however, there are no conclusive findings to report: the 
interaction terms of changes in party share and selectorate do not contribute to the explanatory 
power of the model. 
Reconsidering the hypotheses presented earlier in this paper, it is clear that only the effects of 
decentralization are partly supported by the empirical analysis. Candidate selection does play a 
role, but not entirely in the way we described it: there is no support for the first hypothesis on 
the selectorate, and partial support for the second one.  
 
7.7. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the effects of changes in local vote shares on the within-district 
distribution of party candidates. By studying the geographical composition of party lists and 
election results for eight Belgian parties in seven Lower House elections, we analyzed whether 
there is a clear party strategy in responding to local electoral volatility using the geographical 
composition of party lists. Additionally, we examined whether these responses are related to 
particular types of candidate selection procedures. 
With regard to the effect of previous election results on changes in local candidate shares, the 
multivariate analysis has produced little substantial results. The main effect of relative electoral 
swing did not contribute to the explanatory power of the model. Moreover, only one of the 
many interaction terms between electoral swing and candidate selection procedures reached 
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significance: if parties increase their vote shares in local areas and have centralized candidate 
selection methods, they are significantly more inclined to decrease candidate shares in those 
areas. This provides partial support for the expansion strategy, where parties decrease candidate 
shares in electorally successful areas to increase candidates in losing areas. However, the 
interaction term between negative swing and high centralization is not significant. 
It appeared very difficult to pinpoint a more general relationship between local electoral 
volatility, changes in list composition and candidate selection procedures. There are several 
explanations for these difficulties. First, for some parties it might be the case that there simply 
is no relationship here: some parties do not perceive list positions as scarce campaign resources, 
but rather focus on campaign spending efforts to respond to local vote fluctuations. The 
geography criterion might not be equally important for all parties, resulting into geographically 
unbalanced candidate lists.  
Second, while some parties might take previous election results into account during candidate 
selection processes, their opposing strategies blur the image of a general relationship. In other 
words, it might be interesting to work with hierarchical models where the effect of changes in 
vote shares varies over the different parties. That way we would also be able to treat the 
candidate selection variables as level 2-predictors that vary over time and parties, but not within 
parties during an election. In this study, the number of observations and parties were too limited 
for estimating such hierarchical models. More data on the composition of candidate lists for a 
larger set of political parties is needed to expand the analysis and apply these more advanced 
estimation techniques. 
Third, even if parties think about applying these strategies, they might not succeed because of 
the complex nature of intra-party candidate selection methods. More precisely, candidate lists 
could be considered the outcome of intraparty struggles between different factions, constrained 
by the rules of the candidate selection process (i.e. centralization, selectorate, candidacy and 
voting procedures). If candidate selection is indeed primarily a coordination game where party 
elites balance the interests of their party factions, there is of course little room for strategic 
maneuvers such as the ones analyzed in this contribution.  
Still, this contribution led to some significant results that has its implications for the literature 
on candidate selection procedures. The geographical composition of candidate lists is more 
stable in the event of centralized and exclusive candidate selections. If parties, on the other 
hand, allow their members to participate in the decision making process, we see significantly 
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more variation in the composition of candidate lists from one election to another. In other 
words, members produce more uncertainty with regard to the outcome of candidate  selection, 
which implies that selection procedures such as primaries and member polls bare more risk for 
intraparty turmoil than procedures controlled by an exclusive party elite. This finding is in line 
with the earlier claim by Rahat et al. (2008) on the uneasy relationship that exists between 
inclusiveness of the selectorate and the level of representation on party lists. Yet again, it seems 
that democratic candidate selection procedures pose a threat to intraparty cohesion.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
 
The final chapter summarizes the main findings of this dissertation. A general conclusion 
should answer the following question: what can we learn from the present research, and how 
can we build upon its findings? In light of the theoretical framework mentioned in Chapter 1, I 
summarize and interpret the main findings per chapter. Moreover, since the present research 
dealt with a relatively novel topic, a number of venues are available for future research related 
to the intersection of geographical representation, intraparty candidate selection and electoral 
systems. Therefore, the second part of this general conclusion presents a possible future 
research agenda following the results of this dissertation. Finally, the concluding remarks will 
summarize the main implications of the present study for party politics scholars and 
practitioners.  
 
Summary of the chapters and main findings 
The examples in the general introduction showed that political parties in various electoral 
systems and political contexts are highly involved with the geographical dimension of candidate 
selection. While some party selectorates go out of their way to present a geographically 
balanced list of candidates to the public on election day, other parties even introduce formal 
mechanisms by which territorial/geographical representation on the party list is guaranteed (e.g. 
reserved list positions). This obsession with the geography criterion seems to be at odds with 
the nationalization thesis and other processes in the political sphere which state that election 
campaigns, results and politics in general are becoming more and more determined by 
aggregate, national-level determinants. 
Why are political parties so involved with this local and geographical dimension of candidate 
selection? This puzzling paradox was the main focus of this research project. The aim of the 
dissertation was to develop suitable measures of geographical representation, to examine the 
level of geographical representation on party lists and the incentives of political parties behind 
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their geographical balancing efforts, and to analyze the mechanisms that inhibit or facilitate 
geographical representation on party lists. One of the major challenges of this research was to 
translate the anecdotal evidence from real-world examples to systematical and well-executed 
empirical analyses, against the background of relevant earlier literature. Chapter 1 summarized 
the four literature strands that provided important concepts, independent variables and testable 
hypotheses for explaining the importance of geographical representation and the role of local 
candidate characteristics in candidate selections and elections.  
First, the theory of descriptive representation provided a crucial underpinning for this 
dissertation. It implies that the policy priorities of different societal groups are distinct, and only 
members of the group are able to adequately represent the group’s interests. Translated to the 
geographical dimension of representation, this means that the interests of large cities or small 
municipalities can only be represented by politicians living in those areas. This makes 
geographical representation on party lists and in parliaments a salient issue for empirical 
research. How, then, can geographical representation on party lists be realized? While a certain 
level of geographical representation in parliament is guaranteed as a result of electoral districts, 
parties in PR systems are also inclined to balance their ticket, i.e. to nominate a geographically 
balanced group of candidates on their party lists. The literature points to both electoral and 
organizational incentives behind the ticket-balancing mechanism. Over the various empirical 
chapters, this dissertation has studied the determinants of balanced tickets and how to measure 
the geographical ‘balancedness’ of the ticket (Chapter 5), the electoral effect of a balanced 
ticket (Chapter 6) and the effect of previous local election results on ticket-balancing (Chapter 
7). 
Second, the level of geographical representation on party lists is also affected by intraparty 
candidate selection methods. The nature, determinants and consequences of candidate selection 
methods have all received considerable scholarly attention over the last decades. Earlier 
research on the effects of these selection methods on the representativeness of candidates 
showed that inclusive selection procedures lead to unbalanced candidate lists. The concept of 
inclusiveness of the selectorate, which refers to the openness of the body that selects the 
candidates, was borrowed as one of the key concepts in several empirical chapters of the 
dissertation. Additionally, intraparty decentralization, which refers to the relative dominance of 
subnational party branches in candidate selection, was also selected as explanatory variable in 
the present study. The concepts of inclusiveness and decentralization have been discussed on 
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several occasions throughout the dissertation, and Chapters 5 and 7 present these intraparty 
candidate selection dimensions as main independent variables in the empirical analysis. 
Third, the personal vote model by Carey and Shugart (1995) explains how the nature of electoral 
systems affects the campaign and legislative behavior of MPs and election candidates. Recently, 
a group of authors started focusing on specific candidate characteristics that allow candidates 
to signal their credibility of being aware of the local and particularistic needs of their 
constituents (Shugart et al., 2005). Local roots and local-level political experience have been 
identified as crucial personal vote-earning attributes (PVEA) which significantly affect the 
electoral success of candidates. Chapter 4 contributed to the rich literature on the effect of 
PVEA on election results. 
Fourth and finally, the friends and neighbors effect in electoral geography describes the 
tendency of voters to support candidates living in, or close to, their respective local areas. It 
explains why and how parties would use these local candidate characteristics as strategic 
resources in the candidate selection process. If parties want to gain votes in all areas within the 
electoral district, they need to recruit candidates from all areas to let the friends and neighbors 
effect do its work (see Chapter 7). These four strands of literature all provided relevant concepts 
and research hypotheses for the empirical chapters of this dissertation. The added value of each 
literature was discussed in more detail at the start of every chapter. 
In addition, Chapter 1 also discussed the particularities of the selected case: the Belgian Lower 
House elections between 1987 and 2010. This case is particularly interesting because of the 
significant variation in terms of district magnitude, gender quota laws and intraparty candidate 
selection processes, all recognized as important explanatory variables for geographical 
representation in earlier research. During the period of investigation, Belgium has experienced 
two electoral district reforms that led to increasingly larger electoral districts for the election of 
the Lower House. Gender quota legislation was first introduced during the 1990s, but gradually 
became more restrictive for parties over the following decade.  
Finally, some of the studied parties have substantially modified their intraparty candidate 
selection processes. These parties have considerably increased the openness of their procedures 
during the 1990s, mainly incentivized by intraparty reforms of the green parties and Flemish 
liberals. However, through the use of model lists and exclusive informal nomination 
committees, it was still relatively difficult for party members to control the outcome of the 
process. Since the 2000s, candidate selection processes became relatively more centralized 
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because of electoral district reforms and the increased presence of party cartels, although there 
are substantial differences between Flemish and francophone parties. In Flanders, the 
introduction of larger provincial districts led to higher levels of intraparty centralization. In 
Wallonia, on the other hand, centralization pressures were more limited due to the continued 
use of smaller electoral districts for the election of the Walloon regional parliament. Thus on 
some occasions, these intraparty reforms were partly incentivized by electoral system changes.  
Finally, Chapter 1 ended with a short discussion of the data for the present research. The data 
for the dependent variables were collected as part of the KANDI-project, where the social and 
political background characteristics of Belgian election candidates are systematically collected 
and analyzed. Data were already collected for the Belgian Lower House elections of 2003, 2007 
and 2010 on 1.864 unique candidates for the Flemish parties studied in this dissertation. After 
the approval of the Privacy Commission, I was able to complement the dataset with the 
background characteristics of candidates for four francophone parties in the seven Belgian 
Lower House elections since 1987. Additionally, these data were also collected on candidates 
for Flemish political parties in 1987, 1991 and 1995. By accessing the archives of the Belgian 
Lower House itself, I was able to collect data on 7.113 unique candidates from March 2011 to 
October 2011. This led to a dataset on the place of residence of no less than 8.977 candidates. 
Apart from candidate characteristics, this dissertation also used data on candidate selection 
methods, election results and aggregate list characteristics. More details on the data for other 
variables can be found in the several chapters and in Appendix 3. 
Chapters 2-7 were the empirical chapters of the dissertation. Chapter 2 presented a descriptive 
analysis of the place of residence of Belgian parliamentary candidates. This analysis showed 
that, while the number of central city candidates was relatively stable between 1987 and 2010, 
the share of small municipality candidates systematically decreased over the years. Again, there 
are remarkable differences between the Flemish and francophone case. In Flanders, the share 
of small municipality candidates clearly diminished from 1999 onwards. However, the 
francophone parties have continued to nominate considerable shares of small municipality 
candidates, even after the provincialization of electoral districts. This clearly mirrors the 
difference in candidate selection procedures between Flemish and francophone parties. With 
regard to realistic list positions, the results show a strong increase in the share of central city 
candidates among Flemish parties. This might be the effect of the larger electoral districts. In 
Wallonia, the presence of central city candidates in realistic list positions declined in 2007. 
Finally, the analysis also shows that the number of represented municipalities on party lists 
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significantly decreased as a result of the consecutive electoral district reforms. Especially in 
Flanders, the provincialization of districts has led to a decrease in the number of municipalities 
with at least one candidate on the list. 
Chapters 3-7 went a step further than the mere descriptive analysis and tested a number of 
research hypotheses to identify the explanatory factors of geographical representation on party 
lists. As discussed in the general introduction, the research problem to be tackled in this 
dissertation was dissected into various dimensions, each represented by analytically distinct 
cells in Table 0.1. While both candidates as candidate lists served as units of analysis in this 
dissertation, the candidate selections and legislative elections were the political institutions in 
which the role of local candidate characteristics and geographical representation were analyzed. 
The combination of these units of analysis and political institutions led to four cells for which 
specific research questions were formulated. Table 8.1 reports the main findings for each cell. 
These findings answer the research questions formulated in Table 0.1 from the general 
introduction. In the remainder of this section, I reiterate the research questions, hypotheses, 
dependent and independent variables and most important results per empirical chapter. 
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Table 8.1.: Analytical perspectives, political institutions and answers to research questions 
Political institutions 
 Candidate Selections Elections 
A
n
a
ly
tic
a
l p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e 
Candidates 
Chapter 3 
- Mayors are more often selected 
in realistic or marginal positions 
- Municipality size (main term) 
has a negative effect on getting 
selected in realistic and marginal 
positions 
- For marginal positions, parties 
particularly seek local office 
holders from larger 
municipalities 
 
Chapter 4 
- Municipality size itself does not 
have an effect on electoral 
success 
- The interaction between local 
office and municipality size 
confirms that the electoral 
advantage of being mayor, 
alderman or local councilor 
increases with the relative size of 
the municipality in the district 
Candidate 
lists 
Chapter 5 
- Geographical list representation 
is operationalized in two ways 
(list in its entirety and realistic 
list positions) 
- Decentralized candidate 
selection methods lead to higher 
levels of geographical 
representation on the list in its 
entirety 
- In the realistic list slots, the 
percentage of female candidates 
is negatively associated with 
geographical representation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
- The number of aldermen and 
mayors on the list codetermines 
the relative success and swing of 
the candidate list 
 
- The success and swing of lists 
does not depend on the level of 
geographical dispersion of its 
candidates (operationalized in 
two distinct ways) 
 
 
Chapter 7 
- Inclusive candidate selection 
methods lead to more changes in 
candidate shares 
- Centralized candidate selection 
methods result in more stable 
candidate lists 
- Relative swings in local election 
results do not affect the within-
district distribution of party 
candidates 
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In Chapter 3, I examined the importance of municipality size and local office as nomination 
criteria in candidate selection processes while controlling for other important selection criteria 
such as incumbency, gender, previous campaign experience, profession and age. The research 
question to be answered was whether local candidate characteristics such as local political 
office or municipality size are important selection criteria for party selectorates (Research 
Question 1). The approach was to contrast the candidates who obtain a realistic or marginal list 
position to those wo obtain unrealistic list positions. By juxtaposing these groups of candidates, 
it was possible to check for similarities and differences in social background characteristics 
(gender, age and profession), individual political variables (political office at the regional, 
national or local level, campaign experience), and the municipality where the candidate lives. 
With regard to local offices, the argument was that local office-holders will be more familiar to 
voters and have more campaign resources. Moreover, these local offices are also a strong 
indication of a candidate’s strong ties to the local community.  
 
 
Figure 8.1.: Dependent variable and main independent variables in Chapter 3 
 
With regard to municipality size, I hypothesized that the effect of local office on the odds of 
being selected in realistic list positions would interact with the size of the candidate’s 
municipality. But in addition to this interaction effect, municipality size was also expected to 
interfere with the candidate selection process in another way. Parties in proportional systems 
are incentivized to balance their tickets, and I discussed two alternative geographical strategies 
Realistic/
Marginal/
Unrealistic 
Positions
Local office Municipality Size
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for parties to follow in this regard: the population strategy, which implies that municipalities 
are represented on party lists in accordance to their demographic size, and the municipality 
strategy, where the party will try to get as many municipalities represented on the list as 
possible.77 
The bivariate analysis showed that particularly mayors are overrepresented on the realistic list 
positions. I also found that candidates on realistic positions live in significantly larger 
municipalities than candidate in unrealistic list positions. The multilevel multinomial regression 
analysis showed that incumbents, mayors, and party employees stand a significantly larger 
chance of being selected as a realistic or marginal candidate. Specifically for the category of 
marginal positions, parties particularly seek local office holders from larger municipalities. This 
interaction effect does not play for realistic list positions. In sum, the municipality’s population 
size affects candidate selection in a rather complex way: it positively interacts with the office 
of mayor and alderman for getting marginal list positions, which means that parties particularly 
prefer local office holders from large municipalities for these positions. However, once the 
effects of local office are controlled for, the municipality’s population size has a negative effect 
on the odds of obtaining a realistic or marginal position. So both variables of interest in this 
chapter are important factors in the candidate selection process, but municipality size in a more 
complex manner than local office. 
Chapter 4 examined the effect of local candidate characteristics on the individual election 
results of parliamentary candidates. Do local candidate characteristics determine the number of 
preferential votes in parliamentary elections (Research Question 2)? I hypothesized that the 
relative size of the candidates’ municipality would have a positive effect on the relative number 
of preferential votes they receive in the constituency. Moreover, I expected that the relative 
municipality size would interact with the effect that holding local office has on the individual 
election result. In other words, candidates who are local political office holders in large 
municipalities are likely to be more successful than similar candidates in small municipalities. 
While the positive effect of holding local office on electoral success has been demonstrated in 
previous research, examining the effect of municipality size and its combined effect with local 
political office adds a novel element to the literature. 
                                               
77
 While the results of Chapter 3 may suggest that the studied parties generally follow one or the other 
strategy, a more systematic analysis of these strategies is presented in Chapter 6. 
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Figure 8.2.: Dependent variable and main independent variables in Chapter 4 
 
The multilevel analysis does not show support for the idea that municipality size in itself has a 
significant effect, but the expected interaction between local office and municipality size was 
confirmed. In other words, large city candidates do not appeal to larger shares of voters in the 
district based on a shared local background, but the electoral advantage of being mayor, 
alderman or local councilor does seem to increase with the relative size of the municipality in 
the district. Furthermore, the office of mayor is the only local office which generates a large 
electoral advantage in itself compared to election candidates without any local office, and also 
compared to other types of local officeholders (i.e. aldermen, local councilors). In fact, the size 
of the mayoral office effect on individual electoral success is larger than for MPs. This 
difference increases even more if mayors hold their local office in large cities. Put differently, 
the electoral capital of mayors in parliamentary elections proves to be larger than that of 
incumbent MPs, who are running for their own seat. This is a remarkable finding, and stresses 
the importance of local roots in Belgian elections, and political careers in general. So in sum, 
this chapter showed that local political office is a crucial candidate trait to attract preference 
votes, but it is crucial to distinguish between the various types of office. The office of alderman 
and local councilor is important, but not nearly as important as that of the mayor. 
Starting from Chapter 5, the dissertation shifted its analytical perspective from individual 
candidates to candidate lists. Chapter 5 itself focused on the determinants of geographical 
representation on candidate lists. Research Question 3 was formulated as follows: How should 
one operationalize the concept of geographical list representation, and which institutional and 
party-related variables affect the levels of geographical representation? The chapter presented 
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two different measures of geographical representation on party lists: municipality indicator M, 
which measures the number of municipalities represented on the party list, and R, measuring 
the proportion of candidates of the largest municipality in the district on the realistic list slots. 
These two indicators represent two different operationalizations of the concept of geographical 
representation on party lists. While one indicator solely focuses on realistic list positions, the 
other one takes into account all positions on the candidate list to calculate the level of 
geographical representation. 
 
Figure 8.3.: Dependent variables and main independent variables in Chapter 5 
 
With regard to the determinants of geographical representation, I examined the effects of district 
magnitude, gender representation, and candidate selection methods, which are all identified as 
explanatory factors in previous research. As mentioned in the ticket-balancing literature, district 
magnitude was hypothesized to be positively associated with levels of representation. For 
gender representation, two countervailing hypotheses were formulated. Following the strong 
claim in the literature that the same factors contribute to higher levels of gender and 
geographical representation, I hypothesized that the levels of gender and geographical 
representation are positively associated. Alternatively, other authors found no empirical 
evidence for this positive association and instead argue that the representation of one social 
group possibly impedes the representation of other groups. Finally, concerning candidate 
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selection methods, Rahat et al. (2008) demonstrated that exclusive selection methods lead to 
higher levels of gender representation. I tested this hypothesis with regard to geographical 
representation. Furthermore, decentralization would supposedly lead to higher levels of 
geographical representation on party lists. 
The results show that decentralized candidate selection methods indeed lead to higher levels of 
geographical representation on the list in its entirety. The results with regard to inclusiveness 
of the selectorate do not show a clear pattern in its effect on geographical representation. With 
regard to realistic list slots, I found that the percentage of female candidates is negatively 
associated with geographical representation. This supports the second hypothesis about the 
effect of gender representation, which stated that both forms of representation would be 
negatively associated. District magnitude, measured as the number of seats distributed in the 
district, did not have any significant effects on any of the indicators. Finally, in districts where 
the largest city is dominant in terms of population size, it is more difficult for party selectorates 
to realize geographical balance. 
Chapter 6 studied the effects of the aggregate characteristics of party lists on their election 
results, with special attention to the aggregate geographical characteristics. In fact, the analysis 
in this chapter was an empirical test of the hypothesis that parties should balance their ticket for 
electoral reasons. In other words, it is often stated that higher levels of geographical 
representation/dispersion on candidate lists contribute to the electoral success of party lists. The 
main research question was, then, whether the level of geographical representation positively 
affects the electoral success and electoral swing of the party list compared to the previous 
election (Research Question 4)? The first dependent variable, electoral success, was measured 
based on the district vote share and the party vote share at the aggregate level. In this way, I 
could examine to what extent party lists in various districts scored better or worse. However, 
electoral differences between districts are often fixed, and parties have developed historical 
strongholds in specific areas over time. In order to take this into account, the second dependent 
variable, relative electoral swing, compares the result for election t with the score in the previous 
election t-1, and compares this with the general electoral swing of the party. 
I first compared the levels of geographical representation on the party lists, both in terms of the 
earlier mentioned municipality and population strategies. While the Flemish Christian-
democrats receive the highest scores for every election on the municipality index, meaning that 
they include the highest proportion of municipalities on their lists, the liberals take the first 
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place when it comes to the population index. This latter index is also slightly correlated to the 
success of party lists, suggesting that geographically representative lists in terms of this second 
indicator contributes to the success of candidate lists. However, this bivariate association loses 
significance if we switch to the relative swing as dependent variable. With regard to local 
offices, the correlation between electoral success and the percentage of office-holders increases 
as the importance of the office increases. If we use the second dependent variable, the relative 
electoral swing, only the correlation with the number of aldermen remains significant. The 
disappearing effect for mayors can be explained by the extremely low number of mayors on 
party lists.  
 
Figure 8.4.: Dependent variables and main independent variables in Chapter 6 
 
The multivariate analysis showed that lists are more successful compared to other list of the 
same party in the same election if there are more incumbents and aldermen or mayors on the 
list, and less young candidates. A similar analysis with the relative swing as dependent variable 
suggests that only the age and the number of aldermen or mayors have a causal effect on the 
success. The success of a list does not seem to depend on the geographical dispersion on the 
list, nor on other list characteristics such as the visibility of woman candidates, the professional 
profiles of candidates or the total campaign expenditures. In sum, the analysis in Chapter 6 does 
not support the popular argument that geographical dispersion leads to better results: both 
models show that the electoral result is not affected by these list characteristics. Local offices, 
on the other hand, are all the more important. 
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Finally, in Chapter 7 I returned to the lower left cell in Table 0.1, and examined whether 
political parties change the level of geographical representation from one election to another as 
a response to local electoral volatility. In other words, this empirical chapter again dealt with 
Research Question 3, namely what determines geographical representation on party lists. 
However, this time I approached the question from a more dynamic perspective by looking at 
changes in election results. Chapter 5, which also dealt with Research Question 3, did not take 
into account the effect of election scores on geographical representation on the list. The main 
argument in Chapter 7 is that parties which suffer electoral losses in certain local areas might 
be inclined to raise the number of locally rooted candidates from those areas on the candidate 
lists for the next elections. One could argue, based on the literature dealing with friends and 
neighbors effects, that the increased local presence of candidates could then lead to electoral 
recovery. 
I defined two possible strategies parties could follow in this regard. The expansion strategy, on 
the one hand, defines parties that increase the presence of local candidates in areas where they 
lost votes in previous elections. The consolidation strategy, on the other hand, is followed by 
parties who increase the presence of candidates in areas with a positive election result. While 
the latter strategy is a more natural course of action for parties, the first strategy requires more 
coordination and control over the candidate selection process. As a result, I hypothesized that 
the levels of inclusiveness of the selectorate and decentralization play a crucial role in this 
regard. More specifically, parties with exclusive and centralized candidate selection methods 
are more likely to follow the expansion strategy as they have a stronger grip on the outcome of 
the candidate selection process. 
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Figure 8.5.: Dependent variable and main independent variables in Chapter 7 
 
The bivariate results showed that inclusive selectorates are more inclined to change the within-
district candidate distribution than exclusive selectorates. With regard to the second candidate 
selection dimension, I find that national selection processes more often lead to unchanged 
candidate shares. So both dimensions seem to be correlated with party selectorate decisions on 
the geographical distribution of party candidates, and this remained the case in the multivariate 
analysis for Chapter 7. Highly inclusive parties are less inclined to maintain the status quo, but 
instead either increase or decrease candidate shares from one election to another. A possible 
explanation is the higher uncertainty of these processes because of member involvement. But 
do parties change their candidate shares in response to local electoral volatility? Only the 
hypothesized effects of decentralization are partly supported by the multivariate analysis: 
highly centralized parties more often follow the expansion strategy, where local candidate 
shares are decreased in response to increased local vote shares. To answer Research Question 
3 based on this chapter: the relative swing, which measures local electoral volatility, does not 
have a significant effect in itself, but its effect is mediated by the level of centralization in 
candidate selection processes. It appeared very difficult to find a clear connection between local 
electoral volatility, changes in candidate shares and candidate selection methods. 
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Suggestions for future research 
One of the major future challenges for this research project is to extend its main findings to 
other political parties and electoral systems. Given the primary role of rank order in the 
Belgian system and the impact it has on the nature of candidate selection processes and 
outcomes, it appears straightforward to, above all, focus on other flexible list systems (e.g. 
Austria, Chile, Denmark, Finland) or other electoral systems where rank order plays a decisive 
role, such as latent list78 (e.g. Estonia and the Netherlands) or closed-list systems (e.g. Israel, 
South Africa, Spain). Arguably, the operationalization and measures of geographical 
representation in Chapter 5, and the operationalization of realistic and marginal list positions 
throughout this dissertation can be applied to these particular types of list systems. Moreover, 
expanding the analytical model of this dissertation to other country cases would boost 
confidence in my findings on the importance of local office and municipality size in candidate 
selections and elections. Local roots are also invariably sought by the Belgian party selectorates 
(see: Gallagher and Marsh, 1988, p. 251), but their importance as candidate selection criteria 
partly depends on where exactly candidates are rooted.  
The candidate data for the present research has been collected from parliamentary archives and 
KANDI datasets, from which we registered the place of residence of candidates. If available, 
data on local office were added, but this was not possible for all parties and elections. As a 
result, overcoming these data limitations in itself proves an interesting challenge for further 
research. In addition to completing the data on local offices, it would also be interesting to 
repeat these analyses on a lower level, which allows for a more fine-grained image of the 
importance of local roots and place of residence. With regard to place of residence in large 
cities, this implies that we would be able to assign city candidates to their specific city areas or 
quarters. Even within municipalities, party selectorates are sensitive to geographical balances 
on the candidate list in local elections (source). Since parties usually recruit several candidates 
from larger cities (cf. Chapter 2), it can be expected that geographical representation also plays 
at the intra-municipality and intra-city level.  
Another way to repeat analyses on a lower level is to use election results data on the municipal 
level. While the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 was based on preferential vote data at the 
                                               
78
 In latent list systems, voters can only indicate preferential votes, but the party rank order is also 
taken into account to determine seat assignment (Shugart, 2005). 
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district level, Chapter 7 used data on the arrondissement level. Data on the lower municipal 
level would allow for a more detailed and fine-grained analyses of the effects of place of 
residence and local office on candidate selection processes and election results. Unfortunately, 
data for this level has not been available for parliamentary elections studied in this dissertation. 
Since the 2014 elections, preference and list vote data are in fact available at the municipal 
level, which creates ample interesting venues for future electoral research. Indeed, the 
availability of more detailed election data will increase the international competitiveness of 
electoral research on the Belgian case. Moreover, it will increase the decision-makers’ 
understanding of what the voter wants, which contributes to the well-functioning and legitimacy 
of the Belgian representative democracy. 
Some questions are hard to answer using only statistical tools. There is need for additional 
qualitative research for several reasons. The present research finds no proof of the electoral 
incentives for geographical ticket-balancing on candidate lists. But what about the 
organizational incentive? In order to examine the importance of this second incentive (which, 
arguably, should have an effect since the data shows that parties are in fact inclined to 
geographically balance their lists) in every distinguishable party, one should contact local and 
national party employees for in-depth interviews on the mechanisms behind selection 
processes, the selection criteria used and the motives of the party selectorates. Conducting in-
depth interviews with a sufficient number of party officials from all studied parties goes beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. Additionally, how important do party members and local party 
branches rate the fact that they are represented at the national party level of on the party lists by 
at least one local candidate? Recently, research has indeed shifted to focus on the impact of 
democratic intraparty procedures on the opinions and attitudes of members and voters (Close 
et al., 2015; Put et al., 2014).  
A related research problem which could also be approached in a more qualitative manner is the 
importance of the geography criterion vis-à-vis other candidate selection criteria. Could we be 
able to draft a general ranking of selection criteria over the different party selectorates? This 
question can be answered using either in-depth interviews or by taking surveys from important 
actors in the candidate selection process (see also: Bochel and Denver, 1983; Campbell and 
Cowley, 2014; Caramani et al., 2014). However, these qualitative research methods also suffer 
from a number of fundamental flaws when it comes to the analysis of candidate selection 
processes. A major issue in this discussion is the time perspective. For candidate selection 
processes that recently took place, it is arguably easier to contact and interview the appropriate 
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respondents. For less recent selection processes, it would be more difficult to do this for reasons 
of retirement, turnover, etc.  
And even if we would be able to find all the important actors in Belgian candidate selection 
processes since 1987, respondents for recent selections would be more inclined to give socially 
desirable answers. After all, since these candidate selection processes only took place recently 
and still have political implications both in and outside the party, respondents will talk less 
freely about the involved candidates, mechanisms and party decision-making process in 
general. With regard to earlier candidate selection processes, the gates of the secret garden 
might already be more opened: these events (e.g. processes in 1987 and 1991) are already part 
of political history, so respondents will be more likely to talk frankly about their experiences 
and opinions. This would create a systematic bias in the data collection process and 
subsequently also in the analysis of these candidate selection processes.  
 
Concluding remarks 
Is all politics still local? At first sight, Tip O’Neill’s famous quote at the beginning of this 
dissertation sounded painfully outmoded in an era where virtually every aspect of society is 
becoming more and more globalized. In politics, processes of Europeanization and global 
governance, and the increasing interdependence among nation states and international 
organizations makes the common wisdom postulated by O’Neill (or actually his father) a 
disputed statement at the least. More specifically with regard to electoral politics, I already 
mentioned the nationalization of electoral competition and presidentialization processes which 
hollow out the role of ‘the local’ in elections and party organizations. This dissertation has 
examined the importance of the geographical dimension of candidate selection: I studied the 
incentives for and determinants of geographical representation on party lists, the value of local 
offices in candidate selection processes and elections and analyzed what role the (size of) the 
place of residence plays in these political institutions. 
While national political parties are also affected by abovementioned ‘de-localization’ 
processes, the empirical results have shown that Belgian politics is still very local in nature 
when it comes to intraparty candidate selection processes and legislative elections. From the 
individual politician’s perspective, it still pays off to combine parliamentary office with a local 
office, as this ‘cumul des mandats’ seems to provide some sort of career insurance for national 
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politicians. Politicians are able to detect local sensitivities through their local office. Moreover, 
holding the office itself clearly delivers additional votes in national elections and creates a 
competitive advantage over non-local office holders in candidate selection processes. Mayors, 
aldermen and local councilors thus receive more preferential votes. What is more, the electoral 
bonus for mayors is even larger than for incumbent MPs. This is a remarkable finding, since 
the latter group is actually running for their own office in parliamentary elections.  
Indeed, intra-party competition seems to be dominated by local office holders, and especially 
local-office holders in larger cities. When controlled for other mechanical and straightforward 
factors (e.g. rank order), local-office holders are way out in front of their co-partisans in terms 
of vote results on candidate lists. So for politicians it still pays off to run for local office and to 
consider local elections a serious step in their careers. Getting in local office, building a local 
network and credibility as the defender of local interests can still be the start of a successful 
parliamentary career. Put differently, the idea of the springboard model (Schlesinger, 1966; 
Francis and Kenny, 2000) where the local level is a stepping stone to higher offices still comes 
across as an attractive and successful career plan in Belgian politics. This classical, bottom-up 
career model came under pressure by recent research on career patterns in federal or ‘multi-
level’ political systems (Borchert and Stolz, 2011; Vanlangenakker et al., 2013).  
From the political party perspective, investing in local elections and local party branches stays 
worthwhile: both the aggregate list result as the individual results of party candidates are 
strongly determined by ‘local roots’. This implies that candidates that hold local office, which 
is an indication of their commitment to local interests, are more successful than their co-
partisans and lift the aggregate list result to a higher level. This is an interesting finding, as the 
seminal literature on the transformation of party organizations stresses that the party on the 
ground loses its significance to the other two faces of the party organization, the party in public 
and central office (Krouwel, 2006; Katz, 2001; Katz and Mair, 1995; Hopkin and Paolucci, 
1999). Local party branches, and especially the smaller group of local office holders remain an 
important recruitment pool for parliamentary elections. This is the party level where the national 
party organization should still scout for political talents.  
Furthermore, the empirical analysis has shown that geographical representation of party lists 
strongly depends on the level of decentralization in candidate selection processes. If local party 
branches are allowed to participate in intraparty decision-making, a more balanced 
representation of municipalities and local areas within the district is reached. The design of 
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candidate selection procedures is of course in the hands of the party elite, usually represented 
by one of the formal party organs at the national party level. When it comes to geographical 
representation on party lists, the antidote for intraparty turmoil and electoral penalties in 
underrepresented areas of the electoral/district, this party elite holds the key. So parties would 
be well advised to take on board these conclusions, and keep treating their local party branches 
as important building blocks of organizational stability and an organizational ‘life insurance’. 
A final intriguing finding that I wish to highlight at the very end of this dissertation, is the 
limited effect of the variable district magnitude on the various dependent variables used in the 
empirical chapters. District magnitude has always been considered a crucial explanatory 
variable in earlier research such as the personal vote, descriptive representation and ticket-
balancing. However, looking at the results of this dissertation, it appears that the direct effect 
of district magnitude on geographical representation in Belgium has been quite limited.  
Although the descriptive analysis in Chapter 2 shows that the number of municipalities 
represented on the lists has decreased after the district reforms, and the central city candidates 
are overrepresented on realistic list positions since 2003, the multivariate analysis in Chapter 5 
does not find any significant effects of district magnitude on the geographical representation-
indicators. Instead, intraparty candidate selection methods seem to play the decisive role in this 
process.  
This might explain the substantial difference between the results for Flanders and Wallonia in 
Chapter 2: while the introduction of larger districts has led Flemish parties to become more 
centralized in their candidate selection processes, centralization tendencies were less strong in 
the francophone case, leading to geographically more balanced lists among the francophone 
parties. As a result, district magnitude had an indirect effect on geographical representation in 
Flanders: as a result of more centralized candidate selection methods, Flemish parties selected 
more large city candidates in realistic list positions, and ignored a larger chunk of municipalities 
in each of the districts. Moreover, as the results from Chapter 4 show, the larger electoral 
districts did not make local roots insignificant candidate assets in elections, as some parties 
(Pilet, 2007) and some authors (De Winter and Baudewyns, 2014) argued. 
In sum, this dissertation has shown that Tip O’Neill’s common wisdom should stay in place, at 
least in the case of the Belgian political parties. Party selectorates rate local roots as important, 
try hard to geographically balance the ticket and win elections partly because of the presence 
of local office holders on their lists. And as long as national party elites are willing to lose some 
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of its control over internal decision making to local party branches, politics will still remain 
local.
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SUMMARY 
 
When Belgian voters go to the polling booth on election day, they are presented with a set of 
candidate lists of different political parties. Voters know that they can either cast a list vote, 
which implies that they endorse the party list in its entirety, or they can cast an individual 
preferential vote for one or several candidates from the same list. What most voters are unaware 
of, however, is the amount of effort and preparation that political parties have invested in 
drafting those candidate lists and selecting candidates, long before election day.  
In list proportional systems such as Belgium, party selectorates are inclined to carefully balance 
their lists in terms of various candidate characteristics, in order to include candidates from all 
social groups. There are both electoral and organizational incentives to balance the ticket. From 
the electoral perspective, the exclusion of any major social group could signal discrimination, 
which discourages voters and could result into an electoral setback. From the organizational 
perspective, balancing the ticket decreases the chances of internal conflicts between the various 
party factions.  
While previous research has traditionally focused on the gender and ethnic dimensions of the 
candidate selection process, this dissertation examines the geographical aspect of ticket-
balancing. In Belgium, but also in other list proportional systems worldwide, parties go out of 
their way to select candidates from all regions, municipalities or other localities within the 
electoral district. This is an intriguing observation, as empirical research shows that elections 
are becoming increasingly nationalized and homogenized and the role of the local seems to 
have diminished over time.  
Based on the case of the Belgian Lower House elections between 1987 and 2010, this 
dissertation aims to tackle this research problem and examines how and why political parties 
geographically balance their ticket. How important are local and geographical candidate 
characteristics for parties, vis-à-vis other candidate characteristics? Which intraparty 
mechanism are at work to realize geographical representation on party lists? What impact does 
geographical representation have on the electoral result? And do political parties develop a clear 
strategy with regard to geographical representation, for instance in response to electoral losses 
in some districts or local areas? 
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Chapter 2 presents a descriptive analysis of the place of residence of Belgian parliamentary 
candidates, and shows that the share of small municipality candidates has systematically 
decreased over the years. The analysis also shows that the number of represented municipalities 
on party lists decreased, possibly as a result of the consecutive electoral district reforms that 
took place in Belgium during the period of investigation. 
Chapter 3 and 4 focus on the importance of local candidate characteristics as candidate 
nomination criteria and electoral assets. The results suggest that political parties especially 
nominate local mayors, incumbents and party employees for realistic list positions, and that 
candidates from larger municipalities and cities are more often assigned to these attractive 
positions. Moreover, for marginal positions party selectorates look for local office holders from 
larger municipalities. With regard to election results, a multilevel analysis shows that 
municipality size in itself does not have a significant effect on the number of preferential votes, 
but the expected interaction between local office and municipality size (which was also found 
in Chapter 3) was confirmed. This implies that the electoral advantage of holding a local office 
increases with one’s municipality size in the district. These findings show that local office 
holders, and especially local-office holders in large cities, dominate intra-party competition 
(both in terms of candidate selection as election results). 
With regard to the determinants of geographical representation, the empirical analysis in 
Chapter 5 has shown that especially the level of decentralization in candidate selection 
processes plays the decisive role. If local party branches are allowed to participate, a more 
balanced representation of municipalities within the district is reached. Although the analysis 
in Chapter 6 suggests that geographical dispersion in itself does not lead to electoral victories, 
geographical representation on candidate lists can be an important antidote for intraparty 
turmoil.  
From the individual politician’s perspective, this dissertation demonstrates the added value of 
combining parliamentary office with local office, as a ‘cumul des mandats’ provides a career 
insurance for national politicians and gives them a head start in intraparty candidate selection 
and electoral competition. From the political party perspective, it seems that investing in local 
elections and local party branches still pays off as both the aggregate list result as the individual 
results of party candidates are strongly determined by local roots.  
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Wanneer Belgische kiezers naar de stembus trekken, hebben ze de keuze tussen 
kandidatenlijsten van verschillende politieke partijen. Kiezers weten dat ze enerzijds een 
lijststem kunnen uitbrengen, waarmee ze zich akkoord verklaren met de kandidatenlijst in haar 
geheel, en anderzijds een of meerdere individuele voorkeurstemmen kunnen geven aan 
kandidaten van een en dezelfde lijst. De meeste kiezers zijn echter niet op de hoogte van de 
inspanning die politieke partijen lange tijd voor de verkiezingsdag leveren om geschikte 
kandidaten te selecteren en kandidatenlijsten in elkaar te boksen. 
Zowel in België als in andere lijst proportionele kiessystemen proberen politieke partijen 
evenwichtige kandidatenlijsten op te stellen, waarop kandidaten van zoveel mogelijk 
verschillende maatschappelijke groepen vertegenwoordigd worden. De uitsluiting van een 
bepaalde maatschappelijke groep zou immers het signaal kunnen geven dat een partij niet 
begaan is met de belangen van die groep, wat kiezers kan ontmoedigen en  mogelijk leidt tot 
een electorale afstraffing. Bovendien verkleint de inclusie van verschillende maatschappelijke 
groepen ook de kans op interne fricties binnen de partijorganisatie. 
Terwijl eerder onderzoek naar kandidatenselectie en lijstvormingsprocessen zich eerder richtte 
op aspecten zoals gender en etnische minderheden, bestudeert deze verhandeling de 
geografische dimensie. In België, maar ook in andere lijst proportionele systemen wereldwijd, 
doen partijen ontzettend veel moeite om kandidaten te selecteren uit alle regio’s, gemeenten of 
zelfs dorpen binnen de kieskring. Dat is een interessante vaststelling, aangezien empirisch 
onderzoek aantoont dat verkiezingen steeds meer een genationaliseerd en homogeen karakter 
vertonen, en de rol van het lokale naar de achtergrond verschuift. 
Op basis van de case van de Belgische Kamerverkiezingen tussen 1987 en 2010, bestudeert 
deze verhandeling het hoe en waarom van geografische spreiding op kandidatenlijsten. Wat is 
het belang van lokale en geografische kandidatenkenmerken voor partijen? Welke interne 
partijmechanismen bevorderen geografische vertegenwoordiging op de lijsten? Welke impact 
heeft geografische vertegenwoordiging en spreiding op het verkiezingsresultaat? En hebben 
politieke partijen een duidelijke strategie m.b.t. geografische vertegenwoordiging, bijvoorbeeld 
wanneer ze een verkiezingsnederlaag hebben geleden in een bepaalde regio of gemeente? 
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Hoofdstuk 2 omvat een beschrijvende analyse van de woonplaats van Belgische kandidaten 
voor parlementsverkiezingen, en toont aan dat het aandeel kandidaten uit kleine gemeenten 
systematisch is gedaald. Verder suggereren de resultaten dat het aantal gemeenten dat 
vertegenwoordigd wordt op de lijsten ook sterk daalde, mogelijk ten gevolge van de 
kieshervormingen en bijhorende electorale schaalvergrotingen in het Belgische systeem. 
Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 focussen op het belang van lokale kandidatenkenmerken als nominatiecriteria 
bij de lijstvorming en als determinanten van verkiezingssucces. De resultaten tonen dat 
politieke partijen vooral op zoek gaan naar burgemeesters, incumbents en partijmedewerkers 
voor de invulling van verkiesbare plaatsen, en dat kandidaten uit grotere gemeenten en steden 
systematisch vaker toegewezen worden aan deze topposities op de lijst. Daarnaast selecteren 
partijen m.b.t. de strijdplaatsen opvallend vaak lokale mandatarissen uit grote gemeenten. Wat 
betreft de verkiezingsresultaten bewijst het multilevel-model in Hoofdstuk 4 dat de 
bevolkingsomvang van de gemeente als dusdanig geen significant effect heeft op het aantal 
voorkeurstemmen, maar de verwachte interactie tussen lokaal mandaat en bevolkingsomvang 
van de gemeente wordt wel bevestigd. Dit impliceert dat het electorale voordeel van een lokaal 
mandaat toeneemt met de omvang van de gemeente. Deze resultaten tonen aan dat lokale 
mandatarissen, en in het bijzonder deze uit grote steden, de interne partijcompetitie tussen 
kandidaten domineren (zowel in termen van lijstvorming als verkiezingsresultaten). 
Betreffende de determinanten van geografische vertegenwoordiging bewijst de analyse in 
Hoofstuk 5 dat vooral het niveau van decentralisatie in kandidatenselectieprocessen een 
belangrijke rol speelt. Als lokale partijafdelingen mogen deelnemen aan de besluitvorming, 
leidt dat tot een meer evenwichtige vertegenwoordiging van gemeenten binnen de kieskringen. 
En hoewel de analyse in Hoofdstuk 6 geen steun geeft aan de stelling dat geografische spreiding 
als dusdanig leidt tot electorale vooruitgang, kan een evenwichtige vertegenwoordiging op de 
lijsten wel degelijk de interne tegenstellingen binnen een partij tot een minimum beperken. 
Vanuit het perspectief van de individuele politicus benadrukt deze verhandeling de toegevoegde 
waarde van cumulatie van lokale en parlementaire mandaten. Een bijkomend lokaal mandaat 
geeft nationale politici blijkbaar een voorsprong in het lijstvormingsproces en bij de electorale 
competitie met partijgenoten. Vanuit het politieke partijperspectief lijkt het dat investeren in 
lokale verkiezingen en partijafdelingen nog steeds de moeite waard is aangezien zowel het 
resultaat van de lijsten als van individuele kandidaten mede bepaald wordt door lokale 
verankering en  het lokale profiel.
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RESUME 
 
Quand les électeurs belges vont à l’isoloir sur le jour de vote, ils sont confrontés avec des listes 
électorales des plusieurs partis politiques. Les électeurs savent qu’ils peuvent soit exprimer un 
vote de liste, que signifie qu’ils soutiennent la liste entière, soit un vote préférentiel pour un ou 
plusieurs candidats sur la même liste. Ce que la plupart des électeurs ne savent pas, par contre, 
c’est la grande quantité d’efforts que les partis politiques ont investi dans la confection des listes 
et la sélection des candidats, longtemps avant le jour de vote. 
Dans les systèmes électoraux proportionnels qui utilisent des listes comme la Belgique, les 
sélectorats sont inclinés de balancer leur listes des candidats concernant différents 
caractéristiques, afin d’inclure candidats de tous les groupes sociaux. Les raisons sont aussi 
bien de nature électorale qu’organisateur.  Du point de vue électoral, l’exclusion d’un groupe 
sociale considérable peut signaler aux électeurs que le parti ne s’occupe pas avec les intérêts de 
ce groupe, qui peut mener à une défaite électorale. De plus, du point de vue organisateur, une 
balancement des listes diminue la possibilité de conflits dans le parti entre factions internes. 
Bien que des recherches antérieures se sont concentrés sur les dimensions de sexe et ethnicité 
dans le processus de confection des listes, ce thèse de doctorat étudie les aspects géographiques 
dans la sélection des candidats. En Belgique, mais aussi dans des autres systèmes électoraux 
proportionnels, les partis politiques aspirent à sélecter des candidats de tous les régions, 
municipalités ou autres localités dans la circonscription. Ceci est une observation intéressante, 
car des recherches empiriques montrent que les élections deviennent de plus en plus 
nationalisées et homogénéisées, et la rôle du local semble d’être diminué. 
Basé sur le cas des élections de la Chambre des Représentants belge entre 1987 et 2010, ce 
thèse essaie de résoudre ce problème de recherche et examine comment et pourquoi les partis 
politiques balancent leur listes électorales d’une manière géographique. Quelle est l’importance 
des caractéristiques locales et géographiques vis-à-vis des autres caractéristiques des candidats? 
Quelles mécanismes intra-organisationnelles résultent en représentation géographique sur les 
listes des partis ? Quelle est l’impact du niveau de représentation géographique sur le résultat 
de la liste ? Et est-ce que les partis politiques développent une stratégie perspicace concernant 
la représentation géographique, par exemple en réponse des défaites électorales dans certaines 
circonscriptions ou zones locales ? 
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Chapitre 2 présente une analyse descriptive de la place de résidence des candidats législatives 
belges, et montre que la proportion de candidats des petits municipalités a systématiquement 
diminué avec le temps. De plus, l’analyse expose un recul de la nombre de municipalités 
représentées sur les listes électorales, probablement en conséquence des réformes électorales 
consécutives qui se sont déroulées en Belgique pendant la période de recherche. 
Chapitre 3 et 4 se focalisent sur l’importance des caractéristiques locales comme critères de 
nomination et avantages électorales. Les résultats suggèrent que les partis politiques sélectent 
notamment des bourgmestres, législateurs sortants et employés des partis pour les positions 
réalistes, et les candidats des municipalités et villes plus grandes sont aussi plus souvent 
assignés à cettes positions. En outre, concernant les positions marginales les sélectorats des 
partis cherchent des mandataires locaux des plus grandes municipalités. Concernant les 
résultats électorales, une analyse multilevel montre qua la taille des municipalités n’a pas un 
effet significatif sur le nombre de votes préférentiels d’un candidat, mais l’interaction prévue 
entre un mandat local et la taille de la municipalité est confirmé. Cela implique que l’avantage 
électoral d’un mandat local grandit avec la taille de la municipalité. Ces résultats établissent 
que les mandataires locaux, et notamment les mandataires locaux dans les grandes villes, 
dominent la compétition interne du parti (tant concernant la sélection des candidates que les 
résultats électorales).  
En ce qui concerne les déterminants de représentation géographique, l’analyse empirique en 
Chapitre 5 a montré que surtout le niveau de décentralisation dans le processus de sélection des 
candidats joue le rôle déterminant. Si les sections locales peuvent participer, une représentation 
plus balancée de municipalités dans la circonscription est réalisée. Bien que l’analyse en 
Chapitre 6 suggère que la dispersion géographique en soi ne résulte pas aux victoires 
électorales, la représentation géographique sur les listes électorales peut être une antidote 
importante contre des disputes internes. 
Du point de vue d’un homme politique individuel, ce thèse doctorale illustre la valeur ajoutée 
du combinaison d’un mandat parlementaire et local, étant donné que le cumul des mandats 
fournit une assurance de carrière pour des politiciens nationales, et leur donne une avance dans 
le processus de sélection des candidats et compétition électorale. Du point de vue du parti 
politique, l’investissement dans les élections locales et les sections locales continue de aboutir 
au succès, vue que tant le résultat agrégé de la liste électorale que le résultat d’un candidat 
individuel est forcément affecté par les racines locales.
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APPENDIX 1. CANDIDATE SELECTION PROCEDURES OF 
BELGIAN POLITICAL PARTIES (1987-2010) 
 
 
 
The Flemish Christian-democrats 
Being one of the most influential Belgian parties during the post-war period, it is self-evident 
that considerable research attention has been paid to the internal organisation of the Belgian 
CVP-PSC, and after the 1968 split, the Flemish Christian-democrats CVP (Beke, 2005). 
For the better part of the twentieth century, the party had a relatively unique structure, based on 
the cooperation of mainly three social movements or standen: ACW (an umbrella organisation 
comprising various Christian-democratic worker organisations), UNIZO (an organisation for 
self-employed and enterprises) and finally the Boerenbond (which defended the Belgian 
farmers’ interests). Even after the official abolition of the standen in 1945, the internal decision-
making procedures have long been taking this factional structure into account. This resulted in 
a party culture where there has always been a lot of effort invested in creating and conserving 
a balanced representation of these groups. 
For the selection of legislative candidates, CVP had been using the procedure of member polls 
for the entire post-war period (Fiers and Pilet, 2006). While this system was still incorporated 
in the party regulations in 1987, the number of candidates selected through polls rapidly 
declined at the end of the sixties, and was close to zero in the 1970s and 1980s  (De Winter, 
1980). This can partly be explained by the high number of premature elections in the politically 
unstable Belgium. The party regulations provides an exceptional candidate selection procedure 
for early elections (Delwit and De Waele, 1997).  
The 1987 Lower House election was one of those premature elections, which implies that 
member polls were not applied for the selection of legislative candidates (Delwit and De Waele, 
1997). Instead, the procedure progressed as follows. First, the district party drafted a model 
list, with a specific order of candidates. Subsequently, a national party board either ratified 
or modified this list. More specifically, this national committee could alter the candidate order, 
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add or remove candidates with a ¾ majority of the votes (Katz and Mair, 1992). In a final step, 
the assemblies of member delegates at the district level (arrondissements) approved the model 
lists. Alternatively, they could reject the model list and suggest an alternative list order of 
candidates. In sum, the candidate selection process essentially took place at the district level, 
but the national level was entitled to have a say before the lists were presented to the member 
delegates. 
The procedure applied for the 1991 election strongly resembled the one used in the premature 
1987 elections. Comparably, the initiative to draft a model list was assigned to the bureau of 
the district party. Afterwards, the national party board had the possibility to make a number 
of modifications to this list with a 2/3 majority of the votes (Katz and Mair, 1992). Finally, the 
assemblies of member delegates at the district level were again expected to approve the 
model lists. The most important difference compared to the previous election is that this was 
the standard procedure as formulated in the party regulations. In 1989, the party reformed its 
procedure and replaced the member polls at the district level by the assemblies of member 
delegates (Fiers and Pilet, 2006). According to Deschouwer (1993), the party regulations at the 
start of the 1990s clearly showed the national party’s concern to acquire a level of control over 
the list formation and candidate selection process. At the same time, the party announced that 
it was reconsidering the use of member polls.  
In 1995, the exact same procedure was repeated and there were no modifications to the party 
regulations yet. However, there was a substantial difference in the centralization level. The 
fourth state reform included a redrawing of the electoral districts by merging some of the 
smallest districts for the election of the Lower House. The party regulations of the Flemish 
Christian-democrats mention that all the local party branches within the boundaries of an 
electoral district constitute a district party. This automatically implies that the redistricting, 
which took place in 1993, resulted in a number of new and larger district parties. Like before, 
the party bureau at this level drafts the model list, which is afterwards ratified by the national 
party board. The assemblies of member delegates at the constituency level maintained their 
right of approving or rejecting the lists.  
For the elections of 1999, the procedure passed substantially different compared to the previous 
elections in the 1990s. The initiative was still taken at the district level, where the majority of 
the district parties created an informal and highly exclusive list formation committee to 
coordinate the process. The first draft of the candidate list needed to be ratified by the bureau 
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of the district party. Afterwards, it was passed to the national level where the general 
assembly ratified the model lists of all the electoral districts. Indeed, we found that it was no 
longer the relatively exclusive national party board, but the more inclusive general assembly 
which had the right to ratify these lists. In the final step of the process, all members had the 
possibility to ratify or reject the proposed model lists through member polls at the district level. 
On the basis of the data gathered from press articles, the system of polls appears to be 
reintroduced in 1999. 
The 2003 Lower House election were a sui generis case for the Flemish Christian-democrats. 
After their dramatic loss in the previous elections, resulting in four years of opposition in federal 
parliament and a name change from CVP to CD&V, the party organisation with its high level 
of local embedment had to deal with the new reality of large, provincial constituencies. While 
there already was a provincial organizational level at the time, it did not have any important 
competences and, more specifically, no formal role in the candidate selection process. The party 
decided to follow an ad hoc procedure where the model list would be drafted at the (provincial) 
district level through a cooperation between all subdistrict (arrondissemental) party 
organisations (Smulders, 2012). The second and third phase of the process – ratification by the 
national general assembly and afterwards member polls at the district level – remained 
unchanged. 
Between 2003 and 2007, CD&V reformed its party structures by assigning more competences 
to the provincial party level, among others concerning the candidate selection process. This 
implies that the district reform of 2002 had a very direct impact on the party organisation of 
CD&V (Smulders, 2012). Furthermore, the Flemish Christian-democrats engaged in an 
electoral alliance with the Flemish-nationalist party N-VA. This resulted in a more exclusive 
and centralised candidate selection process. In a first step, the two partners agreed on the 
distribution of list positions (Vandeleene et al., 2013). This might have been part of the alliance 
agreement between the parties, as the party regulations did not mention anything on the modus 
operandi for nominating candidates on a joint list. Afterwards, the normal procedure was 
initiated: the bureau of the district (provincial) party drafts the model list (actually, this role 
was often fulfilled by the informal list formation committees), and the general assembly at the 
national level ratifies these lists. Finally, a member poll at the district level finalised the 
candidate selection process. 2007 was the only Lower House election in which the party formed 
an electoral alliance with N-VA. In the early elections of 2010, CD&V respected its normal 
statutory procedure. 
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Table 1: Summary of the candidate selection procedures applied by the Flemish Christian-
Democrats, 1987-2010 
 
Inclusiveness of the 
selectorate 
Centralization 
1987 Member delegates Cooperation district and national level 
1991 Member delegates Cooperation district and national level 
1995 Member delegates Cooperation district and national level 
1999 Members Cooperation district and national level 
2003 Members Cooperation district and national level 
2007 Members Cooperation district and national level 
2010 Members Cooperation district and national level 
 
 
The francophone Christian-democrats 
As was the case for their Flemish counterparts, the PSC applied a provisional procedure for the 
premature elections of 1987. The party board at the district level with a limited number of 
members took the initiative of drafting a model list, which then had to be approved by the 
bureau at the district level with a 4/5 majority of the votes. If this majority was reached, the 
list also had to be ratified by the national party bureau. If the majority was not reached, an 
assembly of member delegates at the district level had to be summoned for a vote. Finally, 
if this assembly did not approve the proposed model list, the national party bureau had the 
exclusive competence to compose the candidate lists. 
While it was only provisional, the described procedure in 1987, with anonymous voting 
procedures and no member polls was actually very typical for the candidate selection process 
of the francophone Christian-democrats at that time (Deschouwer, 1993). But as there was no 
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tradition of member polls in the PSC during the eighties (De Winter, 1988), it was reintroduced 
starting from the 1991 election. As in 1987, the board and bureau of the district level took 
the initiative of composing a model list. However, this time the model list was supplemented 
by an alphabetical list of candidates. In a second step, the model lists had to be approved by the 
national party bureau. The third and final step was the organization of member polls at the 
district level. This gave members the opportunity to approve the district model list as drafted 
by the district party, or, alternatively, reject it and select a number of candidates from the 
provided alphabetical candidate lists. 
The exact same procedure was repeated for the 1995 and 1999 election. The only difference 
was the adapted centralization level after the earlier mentioned district reform of 1993. The 
selectorate, however, remained unchanged: the organization of polls implied that the members 
had the final say in the nomination process. According to Verleden (2013), this high level of 
inclusiveness should be nuanced: the system of model lists made it relatively difficult for party 
members to overrule earlier decisions made by the district party. In 2003, we registered 
adaptations to both the level of inclusiveness and centralization in the candidates selection 
method of the francophone Christian-democrats (CDH was the new party name since 2002). 
After the district reform of 2002, the model list was drafted at the new provincial district level 
through a cooperation between all subdistrict (arrondissemental) party branches. More 
specifically, these subdistrict branches created a ‘special committee’, with representatives of 
both the subdistrict and national party level, which was entitled to make a first proposal of 
the model list. Contrary to their Flemish counterpart, this was not an ad hoc procedure: the 
party decided not to give their provincial party level additional competences after the district 
reform, but instead preferred to continue working with arrondissemental party branches 
cooperating at the provincial level. Quite atypical for Belgian parties, this special committee 
was explicitly mentioned in the party regulations of CDH at the time. When this committee 
agreed on a model list, it had to be presented to a national committee with a very limited 
number of members. This national committee could then either approve the model list, or 
overrule the decisions made at the district level and make a completely different proposal. In a 
final step, member polls were organised for the formal adoption of the lists. This procedure 
was also applied for the selection of candidates in 2007.  
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Table 2: Summary of the candidate selection procedures applied by the francophone 
Christian-Democrats, 1987-2010 
 
Inclusiveness of the 
selectorate 
Centralization 
1987 Nomination committee Cooperation district and national level 
1991 Members  Cooperation district and national level 
1995 Members  Cooperation district and national level 
1999 Members National level 
2003 Members National level 
2007 Members National level 
2010 Nomination committee National level 
 
In sum, the candidate selection method of the francophone Christian-democrats has become 
more centralized over the last couple of elections. One of the more distinguished characteristics 
of this party has been the use of several ‘special’ or ‘exclusive’ committees, both at the 
constituency and national level. In the early elections of 2010, the party applied an exceptional 
procedure that strongly resembled the one that was used in 1987. 
 
The Flemish liberals 
In the beginning of the 1980s, the Flemish liberal party transferred full control over the 
candidate selection process to the district parties (Deschouwer, 1993). The national party 
regulations promoted the use of member polls, but the design of the selection method belonged 
to the competences of the district party. In addition, the national party bureau was able to 
formulate recommendations about candidates and the rank order, but these were non-binding 
(De Winter, 1988). In sum, the input of the national party level was limited. 
224 
 
In practice, the various district parties organised their candidate selection processes according 
to a generally applied procedure. First, the bureau of the district party drafted a model list, 
which then had to be approved by the committee/board at the same party level. This latter 
party organ could either unanimously approve the candidate list in its entirety, or compose an 
alternative list by organising a vote, candidate by candidate (Ceuleers and De Winter, 1986). 
After the district board made its decision, the candidate lists were final. This highly exclusive 
procedure was the candidate selection method applied for the Lower House elections of 1987 
and 1991. 
The new party regulations of 1993 announced the introduction of a candidate selection method 
that was novel to the Belgian political arena. The Flemish liberals introduced a system of 
primaries. After the bureau of the district party took the initiative of drafting a model list 
and an alphabetical list of candidates, party members and registered voters had the right to 
vote in favour or against the proposed model list. A simple majority of the votes had to be 
obtained to approve the model list. Alternatively, a candidate list was constructed on the basis 
of the votes casted for candidates on the alphabetical list. 
 
Table 3: Summary of the candidate selection procedures applied by the Flemish liberals, 
1987-2010 
 
Inclusiveness of the 
selectorate 
Centralization 
1987 Nomination committee District level 
1991 Nomination committee  District level 
1995 Members  District level 
1999 Members District level 
2003 Members District level 
2007 Members District level 
2010 Members District level 
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The system of primaries has been applied for all the elections in our sample of elections starting 
from 1995. Still, we observed considerable variation in the level of inclusiveness of the 
selection methods post-1995. First, after the 1995 elections, registered voters were excluded 
from the selection process. In other words, the highly inclusive system including registered 
voters resembling the open primaries in the American presidential pre-election primaries lasted 
only one election. Second, in 2007 and 2010, the party introduced a system where the list 
figurehead was appointed by the members, and this person could then form a nomination 
committee to draft the model list. Members were, however, continuously allowed to approve or 
disapprove these lists.  
In addition, the centralization level has also been modified after 1995, once again as a result of 
the 2002 district reform. In 2003, the different phases – drafting model list, primaries – of the 
selection process were still located at the level of the smaller pre-2002 constituencies. But from 
2007 onwards, the Flemish liberal party concentrated its candidate selection activities at the 
new provincial district level.  
 
The francophone liberals 
The evolution of the selection method applied by the liberal party in Wallonia is a very peculiar 
one. In 1987 and 1991, the district parties had complete autonomy in deciding and fixing their 
own rules. The national party organization had no role whatsoever in the selection process. 
In 1993, however, the party decided to form an electoral alliance with the regionalist 
francophone party FDF. In this alliance, the candidate selection procedure was highly exclusive 
and relatively centralized at the same time. First, both parties decided separately on their share 
of candidates of the mutual lists that would be presented to the electorate. While the PRL 
assigned this task to the district bureau, the FDF-candidates were selected by the national 
party bureau. Second, the resulting lists of candidates had to be ratified by a national party 
committee that covered both parties in the alliance. These rules were applied in the candidate 
selection processes preceding the 1995 and 1999 lower Chamber elections. 
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Table 4: Summary of the candidate selection procedures applied by the francophone liberals, 
1987-2010. 
 
Inclusiveness of the 
selectorate 
Centralization 
1987 Nomination committee District level 
1991 Nomination committee  District level 
1995 Nomination committee  National level 
1999 Member delegates National level 
2003 Nomination committee National level 
2007 Nomination committee National level 
2010 Nomination committee National level 
 
Prior to the 2003 elections, the francophone liberal party was integrated into MR, a federation 
of four different francophone parties. The different components of the federation all kept their 
own organisational structures, but the MR designed an integrated procedure for the selection of 
their legislative candidates. More specifically, the party presidents of the four components 
negotiate and decide on the main candidates in each of the electoral districts. Subsequently, 
these main candidates compose a full candidate list for their district. The resulting candidate 
lists, however, have to be approved by each of the four party presidents. This highly exclusive 
and nationalized procedure has been used in 2003, 2007 and 2010. 
 
The Flemish greens 
Ecologist parties often have the reputation of maintaining highly democratic party structures, 
fighting the iron law of Michels by treating internal democracy as a goal in itself (Poguntke, 
1987). As we will see in the following overview of candidate selection methods used by both 
the Flemish and francophone greens, this is also the case for the ecologist parties in Belgium. 
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In 1987 and 1991, the initiative was taken by the various district parties to draft a model list. 
After an agreement was reached, a membership ballot was organized at the district level 
where the members were able to ratify the proposed model list. While this procedure might 
seem highly decentralized, the national party level had a number of ways to intervene in the 
process. More specifically, the national party board has the ability to change the selection 
procedures followed at the district level. In addition, this exclusive national party organ also 
needed to ratify the model lists proposed by the district parties before it was presented to the 
members. In the event that the members did not ratify the model list with at least a 2/3 majority, 
the national board could also ratify the list themselves with a simple majority of votes. 
 
Table 5: Summary of the candidate selection procedures applied by the Flemish greens, 1987-
2010. 
 
Inclusiveness of the 
selectorate 
Centralization 
1987 Members Cooperation district and national level 
1991 Members Cooperation district and national level 
1995 Members District level 
1999 Members District level 
2003 Members District level 
2007 Members Cooperation district and national level 
2010 Members Cooperation district and national level 
 
In the three following elections, the procedure got more decentralized: a poll committee at the 
district level drafted a model list, which was then approved by the members in a poll. The 
selection method applied in 2007 and 2010 included the party members even more than before. 
In a first phase, the national party elite selected the number one candidates on the list for every 
electoral district. Subsequently, the party members could confirm or reject this choice at the 
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district level. Finally, a member poll was organized to fill in the remaining list positions on the 
party lists. 
 
The francophone Greens 
Analogous to their Flemish counterparts, Ecolo has a strong tradition of involving their 
members in the candidate selection process. In 1987, the selection of candidates was organized 
at either the subdistrict, district or national level. The constituency members were entitled to 
organize the selection if a quorum for voting of at least 15 members was met at the district 
congress. If this was not the case, the same routine was repeated at the higher provincial level: 
a provincial member congress with at least 15 people present could take control of the 
selection process. If that quorum was again not met, the process would become even more 
centralized, and the national member congress would decide on all the candidate lists of the 
party in the country.  
In fact, this procedure had been in use for a considerable amount of time and assigns the 
responsibility of selecting candidates to the party district members. The sole condition was that 
their district branch was organized to a certain extent, and that the quorum of 15 members was 
reached. Before 1983, the candidate lists also had to be approved by the national member 
congress if there was a realistic chance of someone getting elected in the electoral district. The 
selection method applied in 1991 strongly resembled the previous one. The only difference was 
that the quorum for voting was now altered to 20% of the entire group of district members, with 
15 members remaining the absolute minimum. 
After these elections, the selection process became more exclusive. Starting from 1995, a party 
committee at the district level drafted a model list, that had to be approved by the members in 
a poll meeting at the district level. While the selection in 1999 passed in an identical way, the 
2003 election announced some changes in the procedures. While the party committee kept the 
initiative of drafting a model list, the members immediately had the possibility to approve or 
reject the most important positions on these lists. 
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Table 6: Summary of the candidate selection procedures applied by the francophone greens, 
1987-2010. 
 
Inclusiveness of the 
selectorate 
Centralization 
1987 Members District level 
1991 Members District level 
1995 Members District level 
1999 Members District level 
2003 Members District level 
2007 Members National level 
2010 Members National level 
 
In 2007, the procedure drastically changed. First, a highly exclusive party committee 
(lijstvormingscomité) at the national level determines the ‘strategic’ or most important list 
positions. Second, a national board of delegates needs to ratify this work. Third, a highly 
exclusive party committee (lijstvormingscomité) at the district level drafted a model list. Fourth, 
all members in the constituency are summoned to participate in a poll meeting to approve the 
model list with a majority of at least 2/3 of the votes. While it has been rarely used, the national 
level does have a veto over the resulting candidate lists. This procedure was repeated in the run-
up to the Lower House elections of 2010. 
 
The Flemish socialists 
At the beginning of the period under investigation, the frequency of member polls had already 
decreased significantly. More specifically, the polls were no longer an obligated part of the 
candidate selection process according to party regulations. As a result, it has only been used in 
a very limited number of electoral districts in the run-up to the 1987 elections (Ceuleers and De 
Winter, 1986). The most commonly applied selection method started with the district party 
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board drafting a model list. Afterwards, a congress of member delegates at the district level 
either approved the entire list, or voted over each candidate individually. Also in 1991, this 
procedure was the most popular one among the various district parties. 
After the party approved new party regulations in 1992, the candidate selection process became 
more centralized. The initiative was still located at the district level: an exclusive party 
committee (lijstvormingscomité) drafted the model list, which subsequently had to be approved 
by the district board. Finally, the congress of member delegates had the final say in the process. 
The main difference with the previous candidate selection procedure was the role of the national 
level: it determines the composition of the lijstvormingscomité, and it checks if all the model 
lists drafted by the district party are “in accordance” with national guidelines. The candidate 
selection method applied in 1999 was identical to the one in 1995. 
 
Table 7: Summary of the candidate selection procedures applied by the francophone greens, 
1987-2010. 
 
Inclusiveness of the 
selectorate 
Centralization 
1987 Member delegates District level 
1991 Member delegates District level 
1995 Member delegates National level 
1999 Member delegates National level 
2003 Member delegates National level 
2007 Member delegates National level 
2010 Member delegates National level 
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After the electoral reform of 2002, the Flemish socialists adapted the level of decentralization 
in their candidate selection method. The first phase consists of the (provincial) board of (thus) 
the district party to assign a special committee which drafts a first model list. This list is then 
ratified by the provincial board, and afterwards sent to the bureau of the national party 
organization. If the national party organization does not agree to the drafted lists, another 
committee was appointed to solve the problem. The final step consists of the member delegates 
at the district level ratifying the model lists. At every moment of the procedure, the national 
party president can also ask for an intervention of the national party level in the candidate 
selection at the district level. This was repeated in 2007 and 2010.  
 
The francophone socialists 
The procedure was identical in 1987, 1991 and 1995: in a first step, an exclusive special 
committee drafted model lists at the district level. In a second step, a so-called ‘federal 
committee’ at the constituency level approved the lists and subsequently presented them to the 
members in a poll at the constituency level. As a result, the level of decentralization was 
maximal on our scale since the candidate selection process took place at the electoral district 
level. Additionally, the level of inclusiveness was also high since members were involved 
through the organization of member polls. 
From 1999, the procedure was reformed in the sense that the party started working with member 
delegates instead of using the entire group of members as the party selectorate. Moreover, the 
national level became more important: model lists were drafted by the federal committee (i.e. 
committees at the subnational level of fédérations), in which the national party elite is 
systematically represented. Afterwards, a member delegates conference where the number of 
delegates per area depends on the size of the local party organization in terms of members, 
ratifies the candidate lists. 
This system was kept in place for the other consecutive elections during the period under 
investigation. However, it is worth mentioning that in the electoral districts that included several 
fédérations (and this was very common after the provincialization of electoral districts), the 
chairs of the different fédérations agreed on a mutual model list before sending it to the member 
delegates conference. When compared to the Flemish socialists, this procedure is far more 
decentralized as the role of the national level is clearly more limited (Vandeleene et al., 2013).  
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Inclusiveness of the 
selectorate 
Centralization 
1987 Members District level 
1991 Members District level 
1995 Members  National level 
1999 Member delegates Cooperation district and national level 
2003 Member delegates Cooperation district and national level 
2007 Member delegates Cooperation district and national level 
2010 Member delegates Cooperation district and national level 
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APPENDIX 2: OPERATIONALIZATION OF REALISTIC AND 
UNREALISTIC LIST POSITIONS 
 
 
 
This figure summarizes the operationalization of realistic and unrealistic list positions, which 
was used in Chapter 2, Chapter 5 and Chapter 7 of this dissertation. As the empirical analyses 
in these chapters dealt with the entire period of investigation in this dissertation, this particular 
operationalization scheme had to take into account the large variation in district magnitude 
between 1987 and 2010. As a result, the number of realistic positions was determined based on 
two dimensions: the number of seats in the district (district magnitude), and the number of seats 
for the party in the district in the previous election (party magnitude). 
 
   Number of seats in the district 
    < 10 ≥ 10 
Number of 
seats for 
the party 
in 
previous 
election 
< 5 
- Number of seats in previous 
election 
- 0 marginal seats * 
- 1 list pusher 
- 1 successor candidate 
- Number of seats in previous 
election 
- 1 marginal seat 
- 1 list pusher 
- 1 successor candidate 
≥ 5 
- Number of seats in previous 
election 
- 1 marginal seat 
- 1 list pusher 
- 2 successor candidates 
- Number of seats in previous 
election 
- 2 marginal seats 
- 1 list pusher 
- 2 successor candidates 
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APPENDIX 3. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
 
Chapter 3: Variables in multilevel multinomial logit model (Table 3.2) 
 
 
 
Variable name Operationalization 
District size Measures the number of seats in the district (M) 
Gender 1 : Male ; 0 : Female 
Profession Categorical variable with six categories: (1) Non-employed 
(students, retired, unemployed, working at home); (2) Self-
employed and liberal profession (self-employed, professor, 
school principal, doctors, lawyers); (3) laborer (skilled or 
unskilled); (4) Civil servant (working for government, teachers 
and other educational jobs); (5) Party/cabinet staff (candidates 
working for political parties in central/public office or 
ministerial cabinets); (6) employees (service industry) 
Age Measures the age of the candidate. Categorical variable with 5 
categories: (1) -30; (2) 31-40; (3) 41-50; (4) 51-60; (5) 60+ 
Incumbency Measures the incumbency status of the parliamentary candidate. 
(1) incumbent MP (regional or federal) or incumbent member of 
government; (0) not an incumbent MP or member of government 
Local office Measures whether the candidate holds local office at the time of 
election. (1) Mayor; (2) Alderman; (3) Local councilor. Added 
as dummy variables to the analysis. 
Campaign experience Measures the number of previous candidacies of the candidate 
in parliamentary elections (both regional and federal), starting 
from the 1987 federal elections. Added as a relative measure of 
campaign experience: the actual number of candidacies is 
divided by the potential number of candidacies given the number 
of elections counted (which, of course, increases over the 
elections). 
Population size Number of inhabitants in candidate’s municipality (z-
standardization: subtracting the mean and dividing by its 
standard deviation) 
List position Dependent variable measuring the type of list position 
candidates were assigned to in candidate selection processes. (1) 
Realistic position; (2) Marginal position; (3) Unrealistic 
position. (For operationalization: see Appendix 2). 
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Chapter 4: Variables in multilevel models (Table 4.1) 
 
Variable name Operationalization 
List position Measures the list position assigned to the candidate: First, 
second, third, fourth, fifth, last but one, last, first successor, 
second successor. The other list positions (after 5th position and 
other successor positions) are reference category. 
% of list in constituency Measures the percentage of the votes that the list has received 
in the constituency of the candidate (0-100%) 
Candidate list for 
federal/regional elections 
Dummy variable measuring whether the list of the candidate is 
formed for federal (1) or regional (0) elections. 
Age Measures the age of the candidate (continuous)  
Gender 1 : Male ; 0 : Female 
Local office Measures whether the candidate holds local office at the time of 
election. (1) Mayor; (2) Alderman; (3) Local councilor. Added 
as dummy variables to the analysis. 
First female candidate Dummy variable measuring whether the candidate is the highest 
placed female candidate on the party list. 
Ethnic candidate Measures whether the candidate can be labeled as ethnic on the 
basis of a name recognition method similar to the one used in 
Thijssen (2013), where co-authors independently consider 
whether candidates represent an ethnic minority. 
Profession Categorical variable with six categories: (1) Non-employed 
(students, retired, unemployed, working at home); (2) Self-
employed and liberal profession (self-employed, professor, 
school principal, doctors, lawyers); (3) laborer (skilled or 
unskilled); (4) Civil servant (working for government, teachers 
and other educational jobs); (5) Party/cabinet staff (candidates 
working for political parties in central/public office or 
ministerial cabinets); (6) employees (service industry) 
Individual campaign 
spending 
Measures the level of personal campaign expenses, relative to 
the size of the electoral district (in Eurocent). 
Former minister Dummy variable which measures whether the candidate has 
previously been a member of government at any level. 
Former MP Dummy variable which measures whether the candidate has 
previously been a member of parliament at either the regional, 
federal or European level. 
Local office Measures whether the candidate holds local office at the time of 
election. (1) Mayor; (2) Alderman; (3) Local councilor.  
Relative municipality size Number of inhabitants of the candidate’s municipality, relative 
to the number of inhabitants of the entire electoral district. 
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Chapter 5: Variables in OLS regression models (Table 5.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable name Operationalization 
District magnitude Measures the number of seats in the district of the party list 
% of women candidates 
in realistic list slots 
Measures the proportion of women assigned to realistic 
positions on the list. Realistic positions is operationalized as 
explained in Appendix 2. 
Decentralization Measures the level of decentralization in candidate selection. 
Three point scale presented throughout the dissertation: 1) 
national party level dominates; 2) interaction/cooperation 
between national and district level; 3) district level dominates. 
Inclusiveness of 
selectorate 
Measures the level of inclusiveness of the party selectorate. 
Three point scale presented throughout the dissertation: 1) 
nomination committee; 2) member delegates; 3) member 
participation. 
% realistic list slots Measures the proportion of list positions which are considered 
realistic on the list. 
Avg. # list slots per 
municipality 
Number of list positions divided by the number of municipalities 
in the electoral district. 
% population of largest 
city in the district 
Proportion of inhabitants of largest city in the electoral district 
in the entire population of the electoral district. 
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Chapter 6: Variables in OLS regression models (Table 6.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable name Operationalization 
Campaign figurehead on 
list 
Measures whether the list includes the party’s campaign 
figurehead, i.e. the most important politician in the campaign. 
This is reported by the parties themselves on the campaign 
expense forms.  
Femininity of the list Index score expressing how feminine the top of the list is: 
woman in first place (+3 points), second place (+2), third 
place/last place/first or second successor (+1). 
Age of the list Measures the percentage of candidates from each of the 
following age categories on the list: (1) -25; (2) 26-35; (3) 36-
45; (4) 46-55; (5) 56-65; (6) 65+ 
Professional profile of the 
list 
Measures the percentage of candidates from each of the 
following professional categories: (1) Non-employed (students, 
retired, unemployed, working at home); (2) Self-employed and 
liberal profession (self-employed, professor, school principal, 
doctors, lawyers); (3) laborer (skilled or unskilled); (4) Civil 
servant (working for government, teachers and other educational 
jobs); (5) Party/cabinet staff (candidates working for political 
parties in central/public office or ministerial cabinets); (6) 
employees (service industry) 
Local office holders on 
the list 
Measures the percentage of candidates on the list with 1) local 
council office 2) alderman office 3) mayoral office 
Incumbent MPs or 
ministers on the list 
Measures the percentage of candidates that are incumbent MPs 
or ministers at any level  
Campaign spending level Measures the aggregate spending level for the entire list of 
candidates, relative to the total party expenses per vote in the 
entire election. 
Geographical dispersion Level of geographical dispersion of candidates over the 
municipalities in the electoral district. Operationalized 
according to the population or municipality strategy (details in 
chapter). Table includes population strategy. 
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Chapter 7: Variables in Multinomial logit model (Table 7.2) 
 
Variable name Operationalization 
District magnitude Measures the number of seats in the district of the party list 
Relative swing Measures the change in the party share from election t-2 to 
election t-1 according to the following formula:  
∆  =	
  −  !
 !
 
For the multivariate model, this variable was transformed to a 
categorical variable with three responses: status quo (less than 
5% changes in local result); positive swing (> 5%); negative 
swing (<5%). 
Selectorate Measures the level of inclusiveness of the party selectorate. 
Three point scale presented throughout the dissertation: 1) 
nomination committee; 2) member delegates; 3) member 
participation. 
Decentralization Measures the level of decentralization in candidate selection. 
Three point scale presented throughout the dissertation: 1) 
national party level dominates; 2) interaction/cooperation 
between national and district level; 3) district level dominates. 
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